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William B. Gould**
The professional team sports which began as organized clubs have evolved into
multimilion dollar industries. In this Article, Professors Berry and Gould examine
the origin and development of these industries. As part of their examination, the
authors trace the influence of national labor law on the nascent industrial models
applicable to sports. The authors then note that the advent of collective bargaining in
the realm ofprofessional sports signalsprogress in the development of sports indus-
trial models and also highlights the depth of the player-management rift which tradi-.
tional labor law princoles seem unable to resolve. Finally, Professors Berry and
Gould conclude with prospects for resolving the intense infighting within the sports
industries that promises to unfold in the next decade.
THE ELYSIAN FIELDS, Canton's mud patch, the peach basket
in Springfield, and ice ponds across Canada produced the be-
ginnings of organized team sports in baseball, football, basketball,
and hockey. These early teams evolved into professional sports
t Copyright @ 1981 by Robert C. Berry and William B. Gould.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., University of Missouri
(1958); LL.B., Harvard (1961).
.. Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. A.B., University of Rhode Island (1958);
LL.B., Cornell (1961).
Several notes in this Article are not capable of verification through published sources.
These notes are based on the knowledge of the authors concerning the workings of the
sports industries, and their accuracy is thus the responsibility of the authors. The authors
wish to express their appreciation to a substantial number of people connected with profes-
sional sports who were most helpful in providing insights about the industries through
interviews and other discussions. These individuals include Donald Fehr, Edward Garvey,
Lawrence Fleischer, Elliot Azoff, Leonard Koppett, Raymond Grebey, David Stem, Jan
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leagues which are major industries today. Other teams await their
evolution-notably soccer. Individual performer sports such as
tennis, golf, and bowling also have begun to coalesce as sports
industries. Multimillion dollar businesses are the result; multimil-
lion dollar problems are the inevitability.
The development of business and legal approaches to profes-
sional sports industries has proceeded rather traditionally. This
development is not surprising in light of the limited models avail-
able and the constraints of existing laws. Nonetheless, special
problems are created by traditional approaches, and doubts exist
as to their optimality. Sports industries are an anomaly-their
product is ephemeral, seen in a moment, perhaps remembered,
but generally not used by the hand or physically consumed. Their
product is entertainment-amusement of a special variety. A
victor is declared and a loser identified, but this dichotomy is, in
one sense, an illusion, since most participants may be winners
where it counts-in the pocketbook.
Professional sports leagues are not identical in either the his-
tory of their foundation or the problems they face. The nature of
the sport, its potential appeal to an audience, and the personalities
involved in the development of the business are factors which may
distinguish one professional sport from another.'
Volk, and Robert Woolf. The factual depictions, however, are the work of the authors and
not those of the named individuals.
The authors also would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Kren Snell, Stan-
ford Law School '81; Barbara Booth, Stanford Law School '83; and James Berry.
1. Numerous factors influence the creation and operation of sports leagues. These
factors include the number of teams in each league, the number of players on each team,
the location and size of the arena to be used, the national marketability of the sport, the
number of games in a season, and the adaptability of the game to the broadcast media.
Factors such as these demonstrate that sports leagues are individual entities and should not
be regarded as having identical interests or problems. While some commonality exists, it is
likely to be outweighed by the differences.
Significant disparities exist, therefore, among the major sports leagues. In the summer
of 1981, the Wrigley family sold the Chicago Cubs for a reported $20.5 million. Chicago's
Fans in a Whirl ofExpectations, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, § B, at 18, col. 1. This price is
comparable to the earlier sales price of their cross-town compatriot, the Chicago White
Sox. Id These figures can be contrasted with a $12 million price set for the Philadelphia
76'ers of the National Basketball Association (NBA). Rogers, Katz Says He Paid S12 Mi-
lionfor 76ers, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1981, § A, at 17, col. 1. This price included the buyer's
assumption of outstanding future indebtedness, particularly deferred compensation to be
paid players in future years. The actual price realized by the seller was substantially less
than $12 million.
Although the 76'ers recently have been one of the more powerful teams in the NBA,
drawing moderately well at the gate, apparently the team is worth substantially less than
weaker baseball franchises, like the Cubs and White Sox. See note 28 infra. The above
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In the sports industries, however, certain factors create the
facade of a common front. The potential for fame and wealth
transforms pastime into passion. This potential also breeds con-
flict as the component parts of the industry fight over prospective
riches. This process is highlighted by the increasing tensions in
management-player relations and the consequent upsurge of or-
ganized and aggressive player associations. Once uncertain in
their nature, these associations now can be characterized as labor
unions.2 Previously, the common assertion was that sports profes-
mentioned factors affect the market value of franchises in the various leagues such that the
leagues have differing economic bases.
As an example of the radical change in the economic structure of one league, in 1920 a
National Football League (NFL) team cost $100 (lowered to $50 in 1921). F. MENKE, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPoRTs 460 (6th ed. 1977). Even as late as 1961, the new American
Football League sold its franchises for $25,000. An estimate of the cost of a top NFL
franchise today would be $50 million.
Discussions of the peculiarities of sports leagues have emanated from various legal de-
cisions. Of particular note is NASL v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), mod ying
465 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The opinion compares the well-established and well-
financed NFL to the North American Soccer League (NASL), a struggling newcomer. See
also Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc., v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 466-67 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (discusses the relative positions and strengths of the old
National Hockey League (NHL) and the new World Hockey Association (WHA)). A good
basic factual analysis of professional basketball leagues can be found in Robertson v. NBA,
389 F. Supp. 867, 873-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
According to Jay Moyer, counsel to the NFL Commissioner, a case can be made for
each sports league being sui generis. Moyer, Book Review, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1590, 1592
(1979).
2. See notes 180-86 infra and accompanying text. Although players associations are
recognized now as unions, this achievement took a struggle. In the late 1950's, sports
leagues other than baseball still had some hope of obtaining an exemption from the anti-
trust laws. To improve its bargaining position, the NFL Commissioner, Bert Bell, made
the following statement to a House Subcommittee:
Accordingly, in keeping with my assurance that we would do whatever you gen-
tlemen consider to be in the best interest of the public, on behalf of the National
Football League, I hereby recognize the National Football League Players Asso-
ciation and I am prepared to negotiate immediately with the representatives of
that association concerning any differences between the players and the clubs that
may exist. This will include the provisions of our bylaws and standard players'
contract which have been questioned by members of this committee.
Organized Professional Team Sports: Hearings on HRA 5307, HRA 5319, HR 6877, HR
8023, and H.RA 8124 Before the Subcomn± on Antitrust of the House Conmm on the Judici-
ary, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 2691-92 (1957-1958) (statement of Bert Bell). George Halas,
Chicago Bears owner and a founder of the NFL, concurred, with reservations, in this rec-
ognition. See id at 2694-2701 (statement of George Halas).
Despite the assurances given to a congressional subcommittee in 1958, it was over 10
years before the first collective bargaining agreement was effectuated in the NFL. See note
192 infra. The players and their lawyers were responsible, in part, for this delay. These
individuals were afraid to declare that their organizations were unions. Creighton Miller,
long-time counsel for the NFL Players Association (NFLPA), generally resisted labelling
the NFLPA as a union. See Krasnow & Levy, Unionization and Professional Sports, 51
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sionals would not unionize, but the influence of our nation's labor
laws was too strong for the players to resist.' Unions are, and will
continue to be, integral to professional sports. The unions' ulti-
mate potential, however, is more uncertain. The transformation
of players associations into unions may have been predictable, but
only future developments will define the scope of their effec-
tiveness.
Any industrial equation is shaped by variables. Current
wealth, growth potential, market conditions, and the overall econ-
omy provide initial input. The sports industry equation has addi-
tional variables:
(1) Sports combines are embryonic. These associations are
overgrown small businesses, traditionally managed as such, now
thrust into larger industrial settings.4
GEO. L.J. 749, 763 (1963). The authors cite correspondence they had with Miller in which
he was extremely reluctant to talk in terms of the NFLPA as a union. ld at 773 n.72.
The same phenomenon occurred in baseball. The original and persisting position by
baseball players was that their organization was not a union. The first president of the
association, Bob Feller, stated: "You cannot carry collective bargaining into baseball."
American League Changes Rule on Play-Off of Tie/or Pennant, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1956,
at 52, col. 2. His successor, Bob Friend, was even more explicit: "I firmly believe a union,
in the fullest sense of the word, simply would not fit the situation in baseball." Brady,
Player Rep Friend Raps Proposal that Athletes Form Labor Union, The Sporting News,
Aug. 3, 1963, at 4. For a fuller account of these positions, see J. DWORKIN, OWNERS VER-
SOS PLAYERS 28-29 (1981).
An early study of the growth of players associations concluded that the baseball associ-
ation was "definitely not a union." P. GREGORY, THE BASEBALL PLAYER: AN ECONOMIC
STUDY 204 (1956).
3. In Krasnow & Levy, supra note 2, the authors urged that the players direct their
associations to seek union status. The authors did express doubts, however, that associa-
tions as unions could be effective without affiliating with larger established unions. Id at
774-76. This proposal has not died completely. Over the last few years, the NFL and
NASL players associations have affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Even so, other players as-
sociations have been able to bargain collectively without union affiliation.
4. Today's sports industries generate less revenue than the public perceives. The me-
dia tends to overemphasize the salaries paid players, the profits from the sale of franchises,
and the revenues to the leagues and clubs from television contracts with the networks and
local stations. While it is true that salaries are high and profits are substantial compared to
capital investment, it must be remembered that the sports industries are not comparable in
terms of sheer dollar volume to the oil, automobile, or insurance industries.
Profits, nevertheless, are high. Precise figures sometimes are difficult to obtain since
most clubs are either partnerships or closely held corporations and need not divulge in-
come figures. Economic and other relevant data, however, are becoming more available
and reveal that sports leagues are growth industries. Because of the relatively few people
involved, the stakes are substantial, and the potential for personal gain is great.
Studies of the sports industries, concentrating on salary figures, are outdated quickly as
inflation and other fluctuations make the figures insignificant. A few analyses, however,
are timeless. See, e.g., J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1981); GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS (R. Noll ed. 1974); Neale, The
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(2) People in the industries still are experimenting. The exis-
tent industrial models are unclear, unappreciated, or arguably in-
applicable. Many people still refuse to accept the modem sports
league model.
(3) There are relatively few participants in the professional
sports business.6 This absence of participation may cause domi-
nation or disruption by a small number of people. The human
factor can tilt any equation; in the sports industries, this factor is
magnified.
This Article evaluates the combined legal and business aspects
of the sports industries, focusing on their history and future. The
Article also highlights the often fractious relationships in profes-
sional sports, particularly between labor (the players) and man-
agement (the clubs and leagues), because this area of labor
relations is developing rapidly. The industrial models applicable
to the sports industry are nascent, however, and the construction
of theories to clarify and strengthen those models is a central pur-
Peculiar Economies of Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1964); Quirk, An Economic
Analysis of Team Movements in ProfessionalSports, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 42 (1973);
Scully, Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 915 (1974).
Although media accounts are informative, they are less reliable because of author bi-
ases. See, eg., Kennedy & Williamson, Money: The Monster Threatening Sports (pts. 1-3),
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 17, 1978, at 29, July 24, 1978, at 34, July 31, 1978, at 34.
5. Commonplace are stories of errors made by team owners, general managers, and
coaches who were unfamiliar with the basic working agreements-the collective bargaining
agreement, the standard player contract, or even the league bylaws which govern relation-
ships with their players. The Carlton Fisk free agency agreement, discussed infra at notes
520-23 and accompanying text, is illustrative. A similar incident occurred when John Y.
Brown, a former owner of the Boston Celtics, renegotiated a contract with the uniquely
talented and hopelessly uncontainable Marvin Barnes. Neither party had counsel present.
In the process, most of the guarantees in Barnes' contract were removed. This could have
precipitated lengthy litigation when Barnes later was released. McDonough, Celtics 4x
Barnes; will theypay him?, Boston Globe, Feb. 8, 1979, at 41, col. 1; Van Handle, Players
Assn. Backs Barnes, Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 1979, at 46, col. 4. For other related tales, see
D. KOWET, THE RICH WHO OWN SPORTS (1977), which contrasts old style owners such as
Phil Wrigley and Art Rooney with the new breed, such as Lamar Hunt and Clint Murchi-
son. Included in the book are the battles of the ever-volatile Charlie Finley and those of
Ray Kroc, who once took over the public address system at his ballpark to castigate both
his players and the visiting team for their sloppy performance. Id at 97, 119-36, 147. See
also Briner, Making Sport of Us,411, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 10, 1973, at 36; McGraw,
Memo to Dilettante Owners: Sports Are Not a Joke, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1978, § 5, at 2,
col 1; Smith, Charlie I and His Subjects, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1973, at 37, coL 1.
6. Including NASL soccer as a major league sport, there are still no more than 3,000
professional athletes on the team rosters in all the major professional leagues. There are
perhaps 500 additional touring professionals in individual sports such as golf, tennis, and
bowling. Race car drivers, boxers, jockeys, and others make up the balance. Club and
teaching professionals also are included in the figures, but only a few thousand athletes
receive the large sums of money associated with sports.
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pose of this analysis. Labor law and labor relations are important,
but other developments interweave the industrial fabric and must
be examined. Any industry is complex; the sports industries are
deceptively complicated, since they are, in part, a product of their
seeming simplicity.
In the mid-1970's, as a reflection of this complexity, full-
blown, arm's-length bargaining emerged, resulting in collective
bargaining agreements in the major sports. As a result, a wide-
spread view emerged that peace had come to the industries after a
decade of litigation, abortive strikes, and constant wranglings.
This view was myopic. In many respects, despite progress toward
resolving some long-standing disputes, the actual depth of the
player-management rift was just being discovered.
Baseball exemplifies the continuing tension between major
factions in the sports industries. The negotiations in baseball over
a new collective bargaining agreement began in late 1979. A com-
promise agreement, incomplete in several respects, 7 was reached
in May, 1980. A dispute during the following season, however,
resulted in a prolonged baseball strike from mid-June to August,
1981. It is doubtful that anything of lasting significance was
gained through the strike in exchange for the millions of dollars
lost. The tensions, likewise, have not abated, even though the
strike was settled.
The labor situation in other sports basically parallels that in
baseball. The National Basketball Association (NBA) recently
has switched its procedure governing a player whose contract has
ended with one team who wants to contract with another team.
The right of first refusal, in its initial usage in that league, has
produced fascinating contrasts. Some players have been made
instant millionaires while others have found only frustration.
In addition, the National Football League Players' Association
(NFLPA) will be battling with management over a new collective
agreement, scheduled to be completed before the start of the 1982
season. The NFLPA, already a most troubled sports association,
will be challenged greatly in trying to exact an agreement that
raises its players? salaries nearer to the average salary enjoyed by
the players of other major team sports. Finally, although hockey's
labor-management relations seem more placid, issues crucial to
the continued vitality of that industry also must be resolved. All
7. See note 377 infra and accompanying text.
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of this debate underscores the turbulence among the principal in-
terests that constitute the heart of professional team sports.
The trends in these sports are examined in the analysis which
follows. It is evident that there will be continued and intense in-
fighting in the 1980's. While this analysis concludes with an ex-
amination of future prospects of the sports industries, the Article
concentrates primarily on the origins and progress of these indus-
tries. To begin this examination of the sports industries and their
internal workings, it is necessary to analyze the components that
make them tick-and at times explode.
I. COMPONENTS OF THE INDUSTRIES
Professional sports draw their economic lifeblood primarily
from fans in the stadium and those viewing television and listen-
ing to radio.' The advertisers who dole out millions of dollars are
merely conduits in this economic chain. These advertisers are in
business only because they can reach people with their message.
The consumer in the stands thus pays directly while everyone us-
ing the advertiser's products, whether sports viewers or not, pays
indirectly. Cumulatively, therefore, consumers pay billions of
dollars to sports and related industries.9 A portion of the purchase
8. Whether spectator interest in sports is measured by attendance figures or the size
of the television or radio audience, its growth has been steady, but fluctuating. A survey on
attendance at major sports events, contrasting 1974 with 1965, showed a 33% increase in
attendance. When attendance figures for the four team sports (baseball, football, hockey,
and basketball) were combined with horse, dog, and auto racing, the total was 206 million
in 1956 and over 273 million in 1974. During 1974, the attendance for professional hockey
(325% increase) and professional basketball (249% increase) showed the most significant
gains. See Housa SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTO PROFES-
SIONAL SPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 94-1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1977).
Television audiences and accompanying revenues are another aspect of the growth of
the sports industries which is not fathomed completely. Each new contract between a net-
work and a league, with the notable exception of hockey's demise on national television,
showers additional dollars on the leagues and clubs. Estimates of 1981 television and radio
revenues are $3.45 million per team in baseball (combining national and local contracts),
$1.1 million in basketball (national and local), and $5.8 million in football (national only,
with some additional local revenues received for preseason games). Hockey, with no na-
tional network coverage in the United States, must rely on local contracts, where the
revenues fluctuate widely. See Veesey, In Sports, Money Is the Main Issue, N.Y. Times,
March 16, 1981, § C, at 6, col. 2. For additional television revenue figures, see J. MARK-
HAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 4, at 64-65; Baseball 1981, BROADCASTING, March 2, 1981,
at 43. For a historical perspective, see Horowitz, Sports Broadcasting, in GOVERNMENT
AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 275-323.
9. The relatively limited economic characteristics of the sports industries have been
discussed previously. See note 4 supra. The statement that sports generate billions of dol-
lars in revenue is not contradictory. Constant comparisons must be made between individ-
ual clubs, which are relatively modest business ventures, and other corporations that dwarf
1981]
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price for these products is funneled through the manufacturer to
the network or station and the league or club. This funneling
translates into millions of people paying for the livelihood of
a few thousand. These few usually profit handsomely by the
arrangement. 10
The recipients of this wealth require scrutiny. These recipients
are the components of the sports industries, and the relative suc-
the sports franchise. On the other hand, as some of the figures in note 8 supra suggest, the
total dollar amounts accruing to professional sports, in general, influence the sports indus-
tries. In addition to sources cited in notes 4 & 8 supra, see J. DURso, THE ALL-AMERICAN
DOLLAR: THE BIG BUSINESS IN SPORTS (1971). The author details the growth of sports
after World War I and the resultant increase in revenues. Id at 47-66. On growth in
attendance figures from 1936 to 1978, see J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, supra note 4, at 61.
10. There are three major categories of beneficiaries: the players, the owners, and the
broadcast industries. Precise profit figures on the latter can only be estimated since they
are part of the overall profit and loss statements of the networks and stations. Some con-
tend that sports are "loss-leaders" for the networks. Such protestations, however, are sus-
pect because the rights figures keep climbing.
The economic gains by players, so much in the limelight, are easily documented. See
note 41 infra for a comparison of 1980 average salaries in the four major leagues with the
minimum salaries established by the collective bargaining agreements. Also of interest are
the increases in average salaries by leagues over the past 10 years:
Year 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Sport
Baseball $29,303 $44,676 $ 51,501 $ 76,066 $ 99,876 $113,558 $143,756
Basketball 40,000 93,000 109,000 125,000 145,000 160,000 190,000
Football 34,600 - - 55,288 62,585 68,893 78,657
Hockey 25,000 74,000 86,000 96,000 92,000 101,000 108,000
A comparison between 1970 salaries, in 1980 dollars, and actual 1980 salaries, demon-
strates that all sports except football show significant "real" dollar gains. Football players,
on the average, actually lost $1,735 per year in real earnings. Baseball players gained
$45,595; basketball players gained $57,017; and hockey players benefitted by an increase of
$31,317 per year. It also should be noted that average salaries for engineers, accountants,
lawyers, and doctors declined in real value terms. INSIDE SPORTS, Aug. 31, 1981, at 58, 69.
For further information on average player salaries, see INSIDE SPORTS, July 31, 1980, at 19.
The outlook is not as optimistic for new and struggling leagues. Figures released by the
NASL show a far different financial picture in comparison to the four major team sports.
By extrapolation, the following averages can be determined according to position played
and whether the players are from the United States or elsewhere:
Country Americans Foreigners
Position
Defender $ 18,900 $ 30,400
Forward 27,900 37,000
Goalie 20,800 34,000
Midfielder 20,200 35,000
In addition to average salaries, the salaries paid to top players deserve mention. As
players in baseball and basketball start commanding annual salaries near or above $I mil-
lion, the impact of free agency becomes apparent. For detailed discussions and informa-
tion on such salaries, see J. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 100, 113-17; Eskenazi, Athlete's
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cess or failure of each component depends on its vitality and ag-
gressiveness within its particular industry. Absolute failures, at
least by components of the major sports industries, are few."
Salaries: How High Will the Bidding Go, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1981, § 5, at I, col. 1;
Fimrite, Richest Kid on the Block, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1981, at 22.
The owners' profits are harder to document. The NFL franchises generally are consid-
ered the most profitable, but such assertions are made cautiously. See Block, So, You Want
to Own a Ball Club, FORBES, April 1, 1977, at 37; Maher, NFL Teams Net Under S1 Million,
Court Told, L.A. Times, July 21, 1981, § I, at 3, col. 1.
Other reports dispute this assertion about the profitability of NFL franchises, including
Kennedy & Williamson, supra note 4. The Green Bay Packers, one of the few publicly
held clubs, reported an increase in profits from $395,000 in 1977 to $2.7 million in 1978.
The new NFL television contract with the three networks largely was responsible for this
increase. See Stelino, Packer 'Windfall Profits' Up 700 Percent, The Sporting News, June
9, 1979, at 51. Even in the waning days of Charles Finley's ownership of the Oakland A's,
he managed to turn a profit despite record low attendance. Koppett, Let's Not Weepfor
Finley-He'r in No Bind, The Sporting News, Aug. 18, 1979, at 15. Nor was there any real
showing, despite low attendance, that the A's adversely affected the rest of the league.
Koppett, Are A's a Drag on Rest ofA.L.?, The Sporting News, Aug. 25, 1979, at 10.
11. As to failing franchises and the attendant losses owners suffer, there have been
numerous instances where rival leagues were formed. Only a few of these teams survived
by merging later with an established league. Several clubs in the American Basketball
Association (ABA) and World Hockey Association (WHA), to cite only recent examples,
failed. The situation in the four major leagues (NFL, NBA, National Hockey League
(NHL), and Major League Baseball) has been quite different, at least in the last 30 years.
Since 1950, only one NFL franchise, the Dallas Texans, has failed. This team should
not be confused with the Dallas Texans of the early American Football League (AFL) who
later became the Kansas City Chiefs. These NFL Texans were the Boston Yanks from
1944 to 1948, the New York Bulldogs in 1949, the New York Yanks from 1950 to 1951 and,
finally, the Dallas Texans in 1952. The Texans' move to Texas largely was unheralded,
and the episode is noteworthy only because it was the last failing NFL franchise not res-
cued by another buyer. See T. BENNETT, D. Boss, J. CAMPBELL, S. SiwoFF, R. SMITH & J.
WIEBUSCH, THE NFL's OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIC HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL
241 (1977) [hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIC HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL
FOOTBALL].
Major league baseball may have several franchises that are marginally successful. The
team that came closest to failing was the Seattle Pilots, an expansion franchise that lasted
only the 1969 season. Underfinanced and garnering almost no support from its fans, the
club faced bankruptcy, and a court ordered the franchise moved to Milwaukee only four
days before the 1970 season started. As the Milwaukee Brewers, the team has prospered,
both on the field and in the box office.
Lack of success on the playing field was only part of what led to the Pilots' demise.
Though its 64-98 (.395) record in 1969 hardly was impressive, Seattle far exceeded the
52-110 (.321) performances of two other expansion clubs-the Montreal Expos and the
San Diego Padres. As low as it was, Seattle's 1969 record was not as low as that held by the
Cleveland Indians, one of the oldest American League franchises, who occupied the Amer-
ican League cellar with a 62-99 (.385) record. For a general discussion of the Seattle Pilots,
see Pilots Move to Milwaukee is Clearedby Court Decision, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1970, at 59,
coL 2; Moving of Pilots is a Step Closer, N.Y. Times, March 25, 1970, at 57, cOL 2; Koppett,
New Seattle Group is Offered Chance to Buy Pilotsfor $9-Million, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,
1970, at 33, col. 1; Injunction 4sked to Bar Pilot Shift, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1970, at 36, col.
8.
Basketball franchise failures have occurred more often. In addition to the failure of
19811
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Five integral interests exist within the infrastructure of profes-
sional sports leagues. Two of the interests (leagues and clubs) are
aligned on the side of management while three of the interests
(players associations, individual players, and the agents and attor-
neys for the players) are aligned opposite management. No soli-
darity exists on either side. An individual club owner may
identify certain league actions as inimical to his or her best inter-
ests.' 2 The three-way split on the side of labor is equally severe.' 3
By limiting the analysis to these five interests, several forces are
several ABA clubs, there were also a string of disasters in the NBA's early years. The
merger of the Basketball Association of America and the National Basketball League
(NBL) in 1949, see note 142 infra, brought several teams from the old NBL into the newly
formed NBA. Six of these teams comprised the Western Division during the 1949-50 sea-
son, and only one team, the Tri-Cities, now the Atlanta Hawks, still exists. See generally
Sporting News, NBA Guide (1981).
In the NHL, both the WHA teams that died when the WHA merged with the NHL and
the Golden Seals, one of the six expansion clubs added to the NHL in 1967, have failed. In
the case of the Seals, the NHL had to purchase the club and manage it until the Seals
disbanded. See Finley's Franchise on Coast Bought by NHL, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at
27, col. 1.
12. The conflicts between an owner and a league, usually represented by the commis-
sioner, sometimes reach the courts and spur bitter infighting. The most recent and perhaps
most notable example is Al Davis' bid to move his Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles. Early
skirmishing has produced mixed results. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), modpfed, 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
These preliminary rulings kept the Raiders in Oakland, and a long and vociferous trial
began in the summer of 1981. After 55 days of trial and two weeks of deliberation, the jury
was unable to reach a unanimous decision, and a mistrial was declared. Much rancor and
name-calling, particularly from the Oakland Raiders, resulted. The Raiders accused the
NFL of planting a person on the jury. For contemporary accounts of this trial, see Lind-
sey, Raiders Trial CouldAffect NFL Power, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981, § 5, at 9, coL 4;
Maher, A Replay of Raiders vs. NFL, L.A. Times, July 6, 1981, § I, at 3, col. 4; Judge
Crushes Major NFL Line ofDefense, L.A. Times, July 25, 1981, § II, at I, col. 5; NFL Tries
to Refute Raiders Profit Claim, L.A. Times, July 22, 1981, § I, at 3, col. 2; Some Notice
Shifting in Raider Trial, L.A. Times, July 20, 1981, § II, at 1, col. 6; Raiders: Davis Makes
Points, L.A. Times, June 15, 1981, § II, at 3, col. 1; NFL Assailed as Trial Opens, N.Y.
Times, May 20, 1981, § B, at 4, col. 4.
Other notable cases include Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F.
Supp. 213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
13. On more than one occasion, contracts drafted by the club and a player's agent
have incurred the wrath of that sport's players association. Such was the case in 1977
concerning contracts entered into between the Boston Red Sox and star players Fred Lynn,
Carlton Fisk, and Rick Burleson. According to the Major League Baseball Players Associ-
ation (MLBPA), the players' agent had agreed to a clause giving the Red Sox a right of first
refusal at the end of the contract periods. The MLBPA filed a grievance, charging that this
clause contravened the collective bargaining agreement. See notes 518-19 infra and ac-
companying text.
For another notable instance of strife between the union and player agents, see note 55
infra, which discusses events involving the NFL Players Association.
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ignored.14 This narrowed focus is logical, however, since these
five interests are the dominant operatives in the infrastructure of
professional sports leagues.
A. Leagues
The concept of an organized professional sports league began
with the formation of the National League of Baseball in 1876.
Several principles behind that league's formation have guided the
course of professional sports." These league principles have
forced individual clubs to cooperate in their decisions regarding
both the market supply of talent that "manufactures" the product
and the consumers who pay the bills and provide the profits.
In many respects, sports leagues are not merely joint ventures.
These leagues are cartels, existing to allocate and control the pro-
duction and distribution markets and to eliminate competition
14. Multiple interests involved in the sports industries, although not discussed at
length in this Article, may be identified. Non-playing personnel who are nonmanagement
officials, such as umpires and referees, are of crucial importance. See notes 180-86 infra for
a discussion of the umpires' associations and the labor laws. The broadcast industries also
affect the sports industries. See note 8 supra. In addition, owners of stadiums and arenas,
including municipalities, have significant influence. Furthermore, minor leagues, where
they exist, should be noted. This list does not exhaust the possibilities. See J. MARKHAM &
P. TEPLrrZ, supra note 4, at 45, for a particularly informative diagram showing various
interests which provide or receive revenue from professional baseball. This data can be
extrapolated easily, with modifications, to make it applicable to other sports.
15. Still extant are the Constitution and Playing Rules of the National League of Pro-
fessional Base Ball Clubs (1876), reprinted in SPALDING'S OFFICIAL BASEBALL GUIDE
(1881). Some of the articles are a model for modem sports leagues. Article III, § 1, for
example, after naming the original clubs and their cities, stipulates that in no event shall
there be more than one club from any city. Article V, § 2 buttresses the notion of territorial
exclusivity by providing that each league club shall have "exclusive control of the city in
which it is located .... " As to other controls over the clubs, art. VII allows for expulsion
of a club, by two-thirds vote, for reasons such as the failure to abide by the league's consti-
tution and rules.
In one respect, the 1876 Constitution is quite different from later procedures. Article
XI, § I is the antithesis of a reserve clause because it expressly allows for players to enter
into contracts with other clubs for the players' future services.
Although the league's business structure has not changed drastically, its playing rules
have changed considerably. Some interesting playing rules from an earlier era include
having to pitch in a motion where the arm stays below hip level; otherwise, a "foul balk"
was called. Rule IV, §§ 2-3. A batter who struck out also had to be thrown out at first
base. Rule V, § 15. A batter could call for a high, low, or fair pitch, a fair pitch being a
combination of a high and low pitch. Rule V, §§ 5-6. The umpire, a solitary soul in those
days, was prohibited from going into fair territory, Rule VII, § 8, but could enlist the spec-
tators' help in making difficult calls, relying on the best testimony available. Rule VII, § 5.
For general sources concerning the formation of the National League, see L.
LOWENFiSH & T. LUPiEN, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND (1980); H. SEYMOUR, BASEBALL:
THE EARLY YEARs (1980).
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over producers (players) and consumers (fans) within the cartel.16
Modem clubs compete only when the legal and political power
plays force them to compete. Change toward competition, there-
fore, has not been voluntary; but the clubs should not be judged
harshly for their resistance to such change. Clubs, acting collec-
tively through a league, are entitled to maximize their income and
profits if they proceed within the appropriate legal strictures.
Even today, a sports league acts as a cartel as it attempts to
eliminate competition within the league for the sports consumer's
dollar by allocating its territorial markets.' 7 A sports league also
spreads itself across an expansive geographical complex, becom-
ing a "natural" monopoly, to discourage effectively the establish-
ment of rival leagues. As a league enters prime markets and
establishes viable properties, it gains substantial advantages. The
opportunity for new leagues to form and to succeed thus di-
minishes. IS
Sports leagues, to varying degrees, force a redistribution of
revenue among the clubs. This redistribution is evident with
broadcast income because league-wide contracts with one or more
of the three major commercial networks yield millions of dollars
16. Several sources discuss professional sports leagues as cartels. See Davis, Self-
Reulaton in ,Baseball1909-71, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 4,
at 349-86. In discussing the congressional maneuverings leading to the 1966 NFL-AFL
merger, James Michener notes that, after the bill slipped through Congress via a conference
committee report, "a cartel could (once again) be established." J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN
AMERICA 390 (1976). The dictionary definition of a cartel seems applicable to the activities
of most professional sports leagues, as it describes a "combination of individual private
enterprises supplying like commodities or services that agree to limit their competitive ac-
tivities (as by allocating customers or markets, negotiating quantity or quality of output,
pooling returns or profits, fixing prices or terms of sale .... )" WEBSTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 344 (1971).
17. Although various authorities would dispute the sweeping tone of the district
court's second decision in NASL v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modfying 465
F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), its description of a sports league and its component parts as
cooperators rather than competitors cannot be ignored. Whether, or to what extent, this
characterization removes a league's activities from antitrust scrutiny is debatable. The
NFL advocated a "single business entity" concept in claiming the Oakland Raiders' pro-
posed move to Los Angeles was exempt from the antitrust laws. Although this argument
largely was accepted in NASL, Judge Pregerson rejected it in the Los Angeles case. Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), modfed,
484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See Maher, Judge Crushes Major NFL Line of De-
fense, L.A. Times, July 25, 1981, § II, at 1, col. 5.
18. The history of professional sports is marked by the departure of many leagues,
although not all the teams have disappeared. In baseball, for example, the Union Associa-
tion, Players League, Federal League, and Mexican League are all defunct. In football, the
World Football League lasted only one year. The American Basketball League also sur-
vived from 1961 to 1963.
[Vol. 31:685
COLLECTIVE B4RGAIINING
that are divided equally among the clubs. While clubs also con-
tract separately with local broadcasters and do not share that reve-
nue with other clubs, the national contracts, at least for baseball,
football, and basketball, provide a strong equal financial base
from which the league and its clubs launch their operations.1 9
In some leagues, there is a division of gate receipts. The Na-
tional Football League (NFL) mandates that the visiting team re-
ceive forty percent of the gate revenues for regular season games
and fifty percent for preseason games. In baseball, the visitors re-
ceive twenty percent of the gate revenues. Basketball and hockey
teams do not split gate revenues. It is noteworthy that the NFL,
which maintains the lowest average salary per player among the
four major team sports, operates with the greatest degree of reve-
nue sharing.20 This phenomenon is not coincidental, and the rea-
sons behind it will be examined more thoroughly in subsequent
discussion.21
Finally, there is the division of resources necessary to stage the
game. The talent pool of players is distributed approximately
equally to all clubs in the league. This equality is accomplished
through a number of devices, including the initial allocations
through a draft of known and available talent, restrictions on
player movement to new clubs, and compensation to a player's
former club for that player's move to a new club. These devices
operate in the name of competitive balance, but they also have
other effects. The devices restrict, to varying degrees, the competi-
tive bidding for players' services, either by outright prohibition or
by indirect persuasion. These restrictions greatly concern the
players, who maintain that such strictures illegally suppress the
market for their services-a concern which also will be examined
more thoroughly in subsequent discussion.2
19. The NFL is "more equal" than the others. Since every team in the NFL receives
in excess of $5 million each year from the national television contracts, with only relatively
small additional amounts being realized from local preseason telecasts and radio contracts,
equality as to television revenues exists among the NFL teams. This equality is not evident
in basketball and baseball. In those sports, league-wide contracts net each team approxi-
mately $1 million annually. Certain clubs may make more from local contracts while
others, because of locale and the limited potentials for television penetration, fare poorly.
Local television revenues in baseball, for example, might range from $5 million per year
for the New York Yankees to well under $1 million for the Kansas City Royals. For
figures on television revenues, see note 7 supra.
20. Id See also note 10 supra.
21. See notes 413-28 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 354-529 infra and accompanying text.
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B. Clubs
The individual clubs in a league enjoy dual status as in-
dependent legal entities and members of a cartel. As independent
legal entities, the clubs act freely, reaping rewards for their indi-
vidual successes and answering for their failures. As members of
a cartel, their actions are circumscribed legally by mutual agree-
ment. In certain respects, the clubs are equal partners in the car-
tel, each contributing to and sharing in the whole. In other
respects, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and the
clubs are mere franchises, subject to the rules of the whole, includ-
ing severe disciplinary action or expulsion for serious violations of
those rules. 3 Unlike other industries in which one component
may separate and seek its own market, this independence is
largely impossible for the sports franchise. The club cannot sever
its ties with the league. Unless there is a rival league or the possi-
bility that one will be formed, a professional sports team must stay
in the league to survive.24
23. The first team expelled from a league for abrogation of its rules was probably in
baseball's National League. The first fully professional team, the Cincinnati Red Stock-
ings, was formed in 1869. The team promoted baseball by touring the country, playing any
team that came to play, and winning a great percentage of its games. The Cincinnati club,
therefore, was naturally included in the newly formed National League of 1876. Three
years later, however, it was expelled for playing games on Sunday and for allowing liquor
to be consumed in the stands. This action backfired on the National League owners, as
Cincinnati became a leader in pressing for the formation of the American Association in
1882--the first in a long line of challengers to the National League monopoly.
The bylaws and rules of the various leagues provide disciplinary action, including ex-
pulsion, against a miscreant team. The Constitution and By-Laws of the National Football
League, for example, define the commissioner's powers regarding disciplinary action.
NFL, NFL Constitution and By-Laws, art. VIII, § 8.13 (1976 & 1981 Supp.) (on file at Case
Western Reserve Law Review). When these powers do not allow the commissioner to act,
specifically in instances such as the cancellation or forfeiture of a franchise, the matter is
referred to the league's executive committee for appropriate action. Id § 8.13(B)(1). The
powers of the executive committee are further delineated in the constitution and bylaws.
Id art. V, § 6.5(b).
In actions that are not severe enough to require expulsion from a league, the commis-
sioner or a league executive board has imposed sanctions against the clubs or the owners.
An example of such an action requiring sanction is the attempt to lure away another club's
player. See, e.g., Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213
(N.D. Ga. 1977); Aroc, Citing SJoO,o0 Fine, Gives Up Control f Padres, N.Y. Times, Aug.
25, 1979, at 11, col. 4. Other infractions involve an owner or general manager speaking out
of turn concerning the progress of the collective bargaining negotiations. Milwaukee Brew-
ers executive Harry Dalton was sanctioned for this reason after he broke a league-imposed
gag rule concerning progress in reaching a new baseball agreement in 1981. Owners Fine
Executive $50,000, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1981, § B, at 9, col. 1.
24. Very few professional sports clubs can survive without league affiliation. Those
unaffiliated clubs that do survive engage more in entertainment than sports competition.
Examples of such unaffiliated clubs include the Harlem Globetrotters and several of its
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It generally is assumed that a club will always strive to field
the best team possible to win and finish high in the league stand-
ings. It is also assumed that striving for this goal produces maxi-
mum current earnings and ensures potential earnings. There are
fallacies, however, in these assumptions. First, some clubs may be
only marginally profitable. A club in this category may determine
that, while it could afford to enter the free agent market, this move
would not improve the team significantly. Perhaps, for example,
the move might result in a mere increase in standing from fifth to
fourth or third place. Unless gate receipts compensate for the ex-
tra expenditures, there is no incentive to diminish the existing
profits without a consequent return on the investment. Several
basketball and hockey clubs and a few baseball clubs have had
this experience of operating a marginally profitable business.25
Second, for clubs that currently approach peak earnings, there
is a disincentive to spend additional sums to improve. This disin-
centive increases as the club achieves its peak earning potential.
Spending may lead to improvement and glory through winning,
but it will reduce profits. If only a few thousand dollars are
needed to reach the top rung, it may be worth the expenditure, but
to spend and merely come close to that goal is unrewarding. In
addition, winning often requires more than the expenditure of a
few thousand dollars, and there are no guarantees of success. This
scenario is most applicable to clubs in the NFL,26 although it ar-
imitators, the old House of David baseball team, and the current team of women basketball
professionals who tour the country taking on pickup teams composed of older males who
were once high school or college players. More typical, however, are the clubs that struggle
to survive when their league is threatened with extinction. Unless these clubs can be ad-
mitted into another established league, the chances of survival are slim. The plight of the
Memphis Grizzlies, as compared with the old ABA clubs such as the New York Nets and
Denver Nuggets, is illustrative of this inability to survive. See note 173 infra.
25. The disparity in spending on free agents by baseball clubs is striking. As of 1980,
the New York Yankees had signed free agents to contracts in amounts totaling $17.3 mil-
lion, the California Angels had contracts in total amounts of $10.5 million, and the San
Diego Padres' commitments stood at $9.8 million. At the opposite end of the spending
spectrum were the St. Louis Cardinals at $240,000, the Detroit Tigers at $90,000, the Oak-
land A's at $50,000, the Toronto Blue Jays at $36,000, and the Cincinnati Reds, with a
grand total of zero dollars. These figures, however, do not reveal the abilities of players in
the farm system and the clubs' efforts to retain their own players rather than resorting to
the free agent market. For other figures on baseball clubs' spending on free agents, see
INSIDE SpoRTs, June 30, 1980, at 14.
26. The Washington Redskins and New York Giants of the NFL often are mentioned
as clubs with no incentive to enter the free agent market because sellouts maximize their
yearly profits. This observation is not completely accurate since both clubs occasionally
have entered the free agent market, albeit gingerly. In this respect, these clubs are no
different than most other NFL clubs. There has been speculation, therefore, about the
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guably may apply to other professional team sports as we. 27
This scenario also should be compared with nonsports indus-
tries. A manufacturer of goods, for example, determines the qual-
ity and price range of its product. This manufacturer also seeks to
maximize both the quantity produced and the price charged for its
product. There probably will be other manufacturers seeking the
same market, many of whom will produce similar goods at differ-
ent quality and price levels. The critical factors, therefore, are the
total cost of manufacturing a certain quality good as contrasted
with the gross income (price x quantity) that can be realized from
such efforts.
There is only one supposed difference between the regular in-
dustrial model and the sports model-the result of a false assump-
tion. In the regular industrial model, it generally is accepted that
businesses will sacrifice quality to widen the difference between
costs and price realized, thus increasing profits. The assumption,
however, is that this sacrifice of quality should not occur in sports
because each club should strive to field the best team possible.
Nonetheless, clubs in all sports, whether through ineptness or by
design, often market products of inferior quality.28 Unfortu-
reasons for the NFL clubs' reluctance or outright refusal to pursue free agents which causes
the NFLPA great consternation. Garvey, NFL Snubs Free,4gents, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12,
1979, § 5, at 2, col. 1.
27. The attitude that it is not necessary to sign free agents or take other steps to im -
prove a club is shortsighted, particularly in team sports other than professional football.
There are numerous instances in baseball, basketball, and hockey where clubs enjoy phe-
nomenal but relatively short-lived success at the gate. For a few years, a club may be
forced to turn people away because the franchise is a gold mine and the waiting list for
season tickets is long. After a couple of losing seasons, however, combined with other
management mistakes such as excessive ticket hikes, this pattern of refusal may change.
The NHL's Boston Bruins experienced such short-lived success in the mid-1970's. The gate
receipts were high with a healthy Bobby Orr and a winning atmosphere, but after some bad
breaks, the team's fortune shifted.
For the 1981-82 season, the Boston Celtics sold 12,000 season tickets and could have
sold out the Boston Garden had it so chosen. The team obviously is riding the crest of a
wave with a 1981 NBA championship, Larry Bird, and a great supporting cast-but this
success may not last. Experience has shown that some clubs appreciate this uncertainty
and prepare (the Celtics have proven to be among the best in this regard), but others fail to
anticipate and regret it later.
28. In describing both perennial winners and losers, this Article does not examine the
reasons for clubs' respective successes or failures. The emphasis is simply that certain
teams continually occupy the same end of the spectrum in almost all of the major team
sports. One or two clubs seem to dominate in each NFL division, in the NBA, and in
baseball's American and National Leagues. In all divisions in the three sports in the past
ten years, either one team has finished first more than half the time or two teams have
turned the competition into a private grudge match, taking first place 80% of the time. In
the NBA's four divisions, for example, the Boston Celtics have won the Atlantic Division
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nately, professional sports industries have their cut-rate dealers
just as the appliance, tire, clothing, and aluminum siding indus-
tries have theirs.
The presence of cut-rate dealers in the sports industries does
not mean that every club owner strives to discount for profit.
Many owners are concerned with quality and are skillful at
providing for such quality in their profit-making equations. There
are always a few owners, however, who could increase their profits
by spending less in the short run without sacrificing quali-
ty-fewer still are the owners who are willing to win at all costs. 29
C. Players
From Tinker, to Evers, to Chance ....
This rhyme may be responsible for three players being admit-
ted to the Baseball Hall of Fame. While some would dispute the
worthiness of the selection of one or even two of the three play-
ers,30 the selection underscores a truth. The name of the game is
six of the past ten years, the Washington Bullets have won five out of the last ten years in
the Central Division, the Milwaukee Bucks are six for ten in the Midwest Division, and in
the Pacific Division, the Los Angeles Lakers are six for ten. A similar phenomenon occurs
in the football and baseball leagues.
There are also clubs that seem to be continually out of contention. In 14 divisions of
the three sports mentioned above, there is not one division in any sport where all the teams
in the division have won at least once over the past 10 to 12 years. In football, the New
Orleans Saints never have had a winning season in their II year history. In basketball, the
Detroit Pistons, after their shift from Fort Wayne, have had a winning record only three
times in 22 years. In baseball, neither the Cleveland Indians nor the Chicago Cubs have
won a pennant since 1954 and 1945, respectively. An expansion team in 1969, the San
Diego Padres finished last in their division the first six years of their existence and did not
have a record over .500 until 1978. See Z. HOLLANDER, THE MODERN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BASEBALL 336-57 (1979); THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 474-598 (J. Reichler ed. 1979);
Sporting News, NBA Guide (1981); Sporting News, NFL Guide (1981).
29. See note 5 supra for a review of owners and their spending habits.
30. There are always disagreements as to who merits entrance into the Hall of Fame.
The lament is raised generally about those who are ignored. "Wahoo" Sam Crawford, who
is in the Hall of Fame, recounted the great players of his time and decried the fact that
William "Dummy" Hoy and Tommy Leach had been ignored. L. RiTrER, THE GLORY OF
THEIR TIMEs 53 (1966). Sam Jones criticized the exclusion of Tony Lazzeri, the old
Yankees second baseman, who anchored the right side with Lou Gehrig for several years.
Id at 229.
The statistics do not reflect the intangible contributions that Joe Tinker, John "Crab"
Evers, and Frank Chance (the "Peerless Leader") made to baseball. Only Chance hit for
percentage, and none of the three players were overwhelming in career hits or runs batted
in. In terms of raw statistics, the trio is at or near the bottom in many categories in compar-
ison to other Hall of Famers. Among shortstops, for example, Tinker's career .263 mark
exceeds only that of Rabbit Maranville. Johnny Evers' .270 average is the lowest average
among the second basemen. Frank Chance, at .297, is tied with George Kelly for lowest
average among first basemen, and has substantially lower total hits (only 1,273) than any
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"show biz," and the players are the entertainers.
And Williams belts another .... 3
Justice Blackmun's strained analysis in lood v. Kuhn32 was
not the proudest moment in jurisprudence; his opening litany was
probably more revealing:
Then there are the many names, celebrated for one reason or
another, that have sparked the diamond and its environs and
that have provided tinder for recaptured thrills, and for remi-
niscence and comparisons, and for conversation and anticipa-
tion in-season and off-season: Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Tris
Speaker, Walter Johnson, Henry Chadwick, Eddie Collins, Lou
Gehrig, Grover Cleveland Alexander, Rogers Hornsby, Harry
Hooper, Goose Gusline, Jackie Robinson ... Nap Lajoie...
Old Hoss Radburne, Moe Berg, Rabbitt Maranville, Jimmie
Foxx, Lefty Grove. The list seems endless. 33
That longpoke to the wallputs Lynn on second, and that brings
up Jim Rice. . . .34
Today, the sports phenomenon is comparable only to the other
entertainment industries. Players, as actors, are both the machin-
ery and the product of this industry. Fans fill the stadiums to see
the Lakers play the "Sixers," but they also pay to see Kareem,
"Magic," and "Dr. J" "do their thing." Athletes are not merely
part of the game; they are the game. The thought, therefore, that
these demigods are mere employees is blasphemous.
Say it ain't so, Joe. .. .
other first baseman. Even so, they are still "Tinker to Evers to Chance," fittingly elected
together to the Hall in 1946. See generally National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum
Yearbook (1981).
31. Williams was "Ted," "The Kid," "Thumper," and most of all "The Splendid
Splinter." When Theodore Samuel Williams is compared to the trio in note 30 supra, even
conceding that they played in the deadball era and he did not, the full weight of his accom-
plishments becomes apparent.
The Hall of Fame literature remembers Williams:
The Red Sox' TED WILLIAMS was one of baseball's greatest hitters and the last
player to bat .400. Combining keen vision with quick wrists and a scientific ap-
proach to hitting, he set numerous batting records despite missing nearly five full
seasons due to military service and two major injuries. His accomplishments in-
clude a .406 season in 1941, two Triple Crowns, two MVP's, six A.L. batting
championships, 521 home runs, a lifetime average of .344, and 18 All-Star games.
Id. at 18.
32. 407 U.S. 261 (1972).
33. Id at 262.
34. The magic that is sports is fast fleeting. This ode to Fred Lynn and Jim Rice was
penned while both were still with the Boston Red Sox. Only Rice remains, as the Red Sox,
responding to many of the major themes of this Article, traded Lynn to the California
Angeles before he could become a free agent and part company with them. Gammons,
Lynn, Fisk could befree--his season, Boston Globe, Dec. 31, 1980, at 29, col. 1.
35. Putting aside the Black Sox scandal, the greatest career misfortune for "Shoeless
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Despite the awesome talents of players in the professional
ranks today, only a select few have enduring qualities. To-
morrow, new players will emerge with fresh images. The profes-
sional life is short, and heroes fade quickly. Except in name, the
player's state is transitory, glorified today, practically forgotten to-
morrow.36  Employee, independent contractor, folk-hero, statis-
tic-the players are "fusions." This ephemeral observation makes
analysis in the legal and business contexts more difficult.
Slaughter's racing home! Pesky hesitates with the ball! It's all
over! The Cards have defeated the Red Sox in seven games .... 37
D. Agent/Attorneys
Individuals who market the talent of professional athletes have
descended on sports industries in the last fifteen years. Neither
the leagues nor their franchises were prepared adequately for this
onslaught.3 The primary qualification for sports agents, many of
Joe" Jackson may have been to play at the same time as Ty Cobb. As Jackson once said to
Cobb, "What a hell of a league that is. Ah hit .387, .408, and .395 the last three years and
Ah ain't won nothin' yet!" Even so, Walter Johnson called him the greatest natural hitter
he had ever seen. See D. WALLOP, BASEBALL 169 (1969).
Although the evidence was strong, not everyone believed Jackson was guilty of rigging
the games in the 1919 World Series. D. GROPMAN, SAY IT AIN'T So, JoE! (1979). This
account defends Jackson and notes the attempts by the South Carolina General Assembly
to persuade baseball owners to exonerate Jackson. Commissioner Happy Chandler ig-
nored a petition for this purpose in 1951. Id at 225-27. Jackson's .356 lifetime average is
third on the all time list. Id at xiv.
36. Except for the most devoted baseball buffs, Justice Blackmun's list of venerable
ballplayers is only vaguely familiar. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. The fleet-
ing nature of sports fame is evident. H. SEYMoUR, supra note 15, at 281-333. Neverthe-
less, Lawrence Ritter's quote taken from Ecclesiasticus 44:7 is fitting: "All these were
honored in their generation, And were the glory of their times." L. RITTER, supra note 30,
at v.
37. Knowledgeable baseball fans will easily identify the inaccuracy in this quote. It
was not all over when Slaughter raced home. The Red Sox had another chance in the top
of the ninth but failed to score when Tom McBride grounded out to Red Schoendienst to
end it. D. NEFT, P- JOHNSON, R. COHEN & J. DEUTSCH, THE SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA:
BASEBALL 278, 281 (1974).
38. Agents were present before the late 1960's, but they tended to be promoters, in
contrast to today's personal representatives. A notable example of the old style was C.C.
(Cash and Carry) Pyle. Originally a theatrical promoter, Pyle represented Red Grange
when the latter turned pro in 1925. Pyle exacted $3,000 a game and an additional $300,000
for movie rights and endorsements for his client. See P. GARDNER, NICE Guys FINISH
LAST 102 (1975). Pyle also helped popularize professional tennis when he enticed the
French tennis star, Suzanne Lenglen, to embark on a tour of the United States in 1926. His
$50,000 guarantee to Ms. Lenglen startled people at the time, but at the conclusion of the
tour, everyone involved had benefitted handsomely. See F. MENKE, supra note I, at
959-60.
In the modern era, Bob Woolf is considered the first of the big time sports attorneys.
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whom are not attorneys, is the ability to articulate the demands of
the athletes they represent. For too many agents, this duty of rep-
resentation knows no ethical bounds. There are, however, credi-
ble agents who have advanced their clients' causes.39 Overall,
Woolf chronicles his early problems of gaining credibility and being able to negotiate di-
rectly with the clubs. R. WOOLF, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS (1976).
39. The player-agent relationship is open to serious abuses. These abuses include mis-
appropriating clients' funds, dealing with athletes with remaining college eligibility, violat-
ing federal securities laws, overcharging clients while taking their fees up-front on the gross
contract amount, and renegotiating player contracts without prior authority and in abuse of
prior oral agreements.
Richard Sorkin's 1978 conviction for grand larceny is an example of an agent misap-
propriating client funds. Sorkin allegedly misappropriated more than $1.2 million from
approximately 50 professional athletes he represented. Sorkin's easy access to the athletes'
funds led him to squander the money, either through mob gambling or bad personal in-
vestments. Montgomery, The Spectacular Rise and Ignoble Fall of Richard Sorkin, Pros'
Agent, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977, § 5, at 1, col. 1. See also Agent: 'Duped Clients,' N.Y.
Times, Feb. 2, 1978, § 4, at 15, col. 3.
Agents often provide funds to athletes still eligible to play college sports. Some agents
sign college athletes before the end of their senior year playing season. The National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules prohibit these activities. Ruby, What.Agents Do
For Clients, INSIDE SPORTS, June 30, 1980, at 106. Other agents develop legal devices that
may violate the NCAA rules. Mike Trope, a successful agent, has provided the college
athlete striving for the professional leagues an open-ended contract to be signed before the
end of his senior year playing season. At the season's end and after the NCAA dictated
waiting period has expired, Trope then signs the "offer," notarizes it, and concludes the
contract. In this way, Trope believes he serves both his clients and the NCAA rules. John-
son & Reid, Some Offers They Couldnt Refuse, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 21, 1979, at 28.
Agents also have provided college athletes with loans to induce them to sign. A small loan
may yield a highly profitable client for the agent. See Florence, Jeans-Clad Trope HardlyA
Penny Ante Agent, The Sporting News, March 19, 1977, at 13. See generally Berry, The
NCAA, the Agent and the Athlete, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 31-54 (M.
Jones ed. 1980).
Courts have held player-agent contracts void because of securities regulation violations.
In Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981), the court held that the contract between
agent and player was unenforceable because the contract provided that the agent recom-
mend securities to the player for investment purposes.
Agents have abused their clients by taking percentage payments upon the signing of the
contract. Although the player's contract may be shortened if he is injured or eliminated
from the roster, the agent takes his percentage receipt immediately, irrespective of the
player fulfilling the contract. Kirkman, Convicted Agent Sorkin Witness as Rep' Probe,
N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 1, 1978, § C, at 24.
An agent's conduct in renegotiating a player's contract during its term is questionable
and may cause difficulties for management. Many agents claim that this tactic is a business
necessity because a player's value may change quickly, and this change must be reflected
immediately in the player's salary since injury may shorten his career. Weiner, Erving's
Manager Says Nets Reneged, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1976, at 51, col. I. Others in the field,
notably Bob Woolf, strongly disagree. Woolf contends that the contract should be binding
equally on both parties, according to the agreed terms. Woolf finds the industry practice of
condoning renegotiation contrary to law and dangerous for sports. Woolf, His Ex-Manager
Talks of Commitment, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1976, at 51, col. I. See also Woolf, Contract
Renegotiating FearedAs Firefor Cooking the Goose, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 7, 1978, at 27, col. I.
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sports agents have helped players increase their salaries and se-
cure additional financial and fringe benefits.
Sports agents perform several tasks. While best known for
their role in the negotiation of player contracts, these agents also
may counsel the athlete, manage the athlete's finances, market the
athlete's name and image, and represent the athlete in the appro-
priate legal forum when disputes arise. A sports agent thus may
be quite valuable to an accomplished player where business affairs
are complex. For the marginal ballplayer, the return received
from the services of an agent is more suspect. This observation
does not suggest that the marginal player should attempt to bar-
gain with a club without an agent. Instead, the individual should
be able to enlist the services of an equally effective, less expensive
collective agent rather than an agent who represents only one
player.40
Collective agents are not, however, part of the custom and us-
age in professional team sports today. Bargaining is a bifurcated
process whereby the players association establishes minimum con-
tract terms through collective bargaining and the agent negotiates
the individual player's contract with the club.4 ' The important
Renegotiating player contracts can have a multiplier effect in that once one player decides
to renegotiate, others will follow. Buck, Argovitz, Herzeg Cross Swords Over Fairness to
Campbell, Houston Post, Feb. 6, 1981, § C, at I, coL 1.
Even a congressional committee has expressed its concerns about player-agent abuses.
The Select Committee on Professional Sports noted "the possible widespread abuses of the
player agent-athlete relationships" and urged future inquiry into the matter. FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. Doc. No. 94-1786, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1977).
40. A lower round draft choice or a player not drafted at all, for example, has limited
bargaining power. Aside from a small signing bonus, not much can be exacted in the
negotiation process. After signing contracts, such players typically do not make the team:
Surely the offices of the players associations could provide whatever legal advice is needed
at a minimal cost. Better still, a standard wage and signing bonus for the rookie year could
be established by collective bargaining. Someone should represent these players' interests,
though perhaps not the single player agent.
41. To illustrate the respective importance of the collective bargaining agreement
guarantees and the individual agent's efforts, the contract between minimum salaries estab-
lished by collective bargaining and the reported average salaries in a league is instructive.
The figures below are accurate, although they vary slightly in different published accounts.
INSIDE SPORTS, Aug. 31, 1981, at 69. Much depends on whether the players or owners
release the figures and whether deferred salaries are discounted or included at full face
amount.
Minimum Average
Baseball $32,500 $143,765
Football 17,000" 78,657
Basketball 40,000 190,000
Hockey 12,500 108,000
*In the NFL, the minimum salary automatically increases from $17,000 to $22,000 if
the player makes the active roster. This minimum then increases for each year of service,
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issues of salary, length of contract, bonuses, and guarantees are
left primarily for individual negotiations.42
The rationale for this bifurcation is largely historical and ar-
guably inappropriate today. Such bifurcation is, nevertheless, the
prevailing state of the art. Consequently, agents and attorneys
play an active, influential role in negotiations. The prominence of
these agents and attorneys is underscored in this Article by their
placement within the five basic interests that shape the infrastruc-
ture of professional team sports. Agents and attorneys are thus a
visible force with whom the other sports interests must bargain.43
E. Players Associations
The evolution of leagues, clubs, players, and agents revealed in
the foregoing discussion foreshadows the emergence of players
reaching a ceiling of $32,000 for players with five or more years of NFL experience, al-
though it is unlikely that any five-year veteran earns only the minimum salary. Id.
42. Whether contracts are guaranteed depends on the particular league. In the NFL,
it is likely that no more than 3% of all contracts are guaranteed. In baseball and basketball,
this figure is over 50%.
The bonus arrangements also vary among the different sports. Certain types of bonuses
are prohibited. In baseball, bonuses can be awarded for time played, innings pitched,
games played, and at bats, but not for the statistical quality of play (e.g., wins by a pitcher,
batting average, and home runs). The NBA prohibits bonuses based on the outcome of a
particular game or series. NBA, Uniform Player Contract, para. 13, reprinted in PRACTIC-
ING LAW INSTITUTE, REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE 1978, at 52 (Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook No. 97, 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE]. Most other types of bonuses,
however, are allowed.
The NFL probably uses bonuses more than any other league. A typical contract might
contain provisions suggesting eight or ten ways a player can earn additional money by
achieving certain performance or recognition standards. For a list of possible football bo-
nuses, see BERRY, SPORTS IN THE 80's: LEGAL AND BUSINESS CHALLENGES (ABA 1980), in
particular, Ch. VIII, "Contract Negotiations."
43. An agent's power is measured by whom he or she represents and how many pro-
fessional athletes are among that agent's clientele. Each sport has several dominant agents.
Bob Woolf is highly regarded in many sports as an agent, but his influence in basketball is
particularly extensive. Woolf recently has represented several first round draft choices,
thus influencing the market price for all NBA athletes. See Ryan, Wool/s The Key, Boston
Globe, Sept. 4, 1980, at 47, col. 5.
Jerry Kapstein is well known in professional baseball. Kapstein once represented five
pitchers from the World Champion Cincinnati Reds. Owners admit that agents who repre-
sent so many sports stars influence the industry. Kapstein, Could This Agent Be Too Power-
ful?, Boston Globe, March 21, 1976, at 90, col. 5.
Art Kaminsky reportedly represents one-third of all NHL players. Kaminsky's concen-
tration in this one sport allows him to make decisions that influence that sport. Eskenazi,
How One Man Dominates Agents' Game, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1980, § 5, at 2, col. 1. See
generally Gammons, The Restraint of Trade, Boston Globe, Dec. 14, 1980, at 49, col. 2.
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collectives. Although these collectives are called associations, they
are actually unions. The metamorphosis of these associations into
viable bargaining units coincides roughly with the ascendancy of
agents and attorneys. The historical development of these player
groups, however, reveals their uncertain role.' Although the tri-
umphs of these associations in the late 1960's and 1970's seem to
indicate a defined, successful role for the player groups, their fail-
ures, which were overshadowed by these triumphs, reveal substan-
tial problems in making a players union a vital force.45 Some of
these problems, which stem largely from the nature of sports in-
dustries, persist and thus merit discussion.
A players union is not an ordinary trade association. It bar-
gains with a special kind of management and attempts to serve a
select group of workers. Although it is questionable whether pro-
fessional ballplayers should be classified with doctors, lawyers, en-
gineers, and other academically trained professionals, this elite
group of athletes is highly trained, though not academically, and
exceptionally skilled. 6 Multitudes seek to enter the athletic pro-
fession; a relative handful succeed.47 The monetary rewards for
44. Several accounts relate the history of attempts to establish players associations or
unions. These attempts are particularly evidenced by baseball's associations, beginning
with the Brotherhood in 1885 and several other unsuccessful attempts before the Major
League Baseball Players Association finally emerged.
In particular, see J. DWORKI, supra note 2, at 8-21 (baseball), 25-39 (baseball), 231
(basketball), 243-46 (football), 261 (hockey); P. GREGORY, supra note 2, at 182-207; L.
LoWENFISH & T. LupiEN, supra note 15, at 27-53, 56-95, 139-53, 183-205.
The chronology of baseball associations is as follows: National Brotherhood of Base-
ball Players (1885-90), The League Protective Association (1899-1902), The Fraternity of
Professional Baseball Players of America (1912-18), The American Baseball Guild (1946),
and the Major League Baseball Players Association (1954 to present).
The NBA Players Association started as an informal group in the 1950's and became a
union in 1962. The NFL Players Association was formed in 1956. Hockey saw a players
group formed in the mid-1950's that became the NHL Players Association in 1957.
45. See J. DwoRsuN, supra note 2, at 8-21 (baseball), 25-39 (baseball), 231 (basket-
ball), 243-46 (football), 261 (hockey); P. GREGORY, supra note 2, at 182-207; L.
LOwENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 15, at 27-53, 56-95, 139-53, 183-205.
46. See note 6 supra.
47. The NFL holds 17 rounds to draft eligible college players. In addition to those 17
players, the typical club may sign another 20 to 30 free agents. These players often have
just completed college eligibility and were not drafted or had signed with a professional
club in earlier years but failed to make the team. Of the new recruits, probably no more
than five from each club will make the active roster. The odds are better than seven to one
against making a club among those considered good enough to be signed initially.
Basketball is equally elitist, and perhaps more so. It has been noted that of the 570,000
boys who play high school basketball each year, perhaps 50 will play in the NBA-0.009
percent or 9/1000 of 1%. See Underwood, 4 Game Plan for America, SPORTS ILLUS-
TATrD, Feb. 23, 1981, at 64. The NBA has 10 draft rounds. Normally, anyone below the
second round does not make the 12 man squad. Many lower round choices do not even
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athletes, though often of short duration, are substantial and poten-
tially overwhelming. Each of these aspects of the athletic profes-
sion threaten the cohesiveness of a union effort. Nonsports unions
may experience some of these problems, but sports unions wrestle
with them on a larger scale.
The membership of a players association is extremely diverse.
Whether because of varying skill levels, amount of star appeal,
differing crafts, or attained salary, the players have different out-
looks and different interests to protect. Nonetheless, the union in-
cludes both the superstar who earns $800,000 a year and the
rookie who earns $30,000 a year. The athlete who has started
every game for the past six years is paired with the newcomer who
may survive the preseason, make the active roster and then be
benched. The pitcher, quarterback, goalie, or dominant NBA
center is allied with the utility man, the member of the kickoff and
punt-return squads, the skater on the fourth line, or the twelfth
man "garbage time" sixth guard. To suggest, therefore, that all
players' interests are equal and the solutions to their problems are
the same, or even compatible, ignores reality.48 There may be
ways to reconcile the differences, such as the union abrogating any
role in the individual salary negotiations beyond a league mini-
mum, but for each temporary solution, there is likely to be an on-
set of new problems.
The varying salary levels of the union members, especially in
the upper salary range, create special problems. A player earning
several hundred thousand dollars per year may not be committed
to striking over meal money, other travel allowances, or even pen-
sions and the volatile freedom issues. 49 It is remarkable that many
players in the upper salary stratosphere identify with those in the
lower ranks. This identification, however, may not continue and
thus may become worrisome to association officials.
The professional athlete's relatively short career span is per-
haps the greatest problem to unions because it results in a con-
sign with the clubs which draft them. These individuals travel to Europe, attend graduate
school, or pursue another career.
48. The players recognize the divisions in their ranks. In preparing for the next round
of collective bargaining negotiations in the NFL, the players' representative for the union,
Gene Upshaw of the Oakland Raiders, states that it will be his job to communicate with all
players and convince them that the union proposal is fair and equitable. Upshaw thinks
that the problems to be addressed are with both the union and management. See Wallace,
N.FL. Players Set Sales Pitch, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1981, § 5, at 5, coL 2.
49. See notes 354 & 442 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the freedom
issues.
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stantly shifting union membership." By the time a protest is
pursued or collective bargaining concluded, a new majority
among the union membership may have emerged 1.5  In addition,
given the shortness of the athlete's professional career, the con-
cerns of the sports professional inevitably must be weighted to-
ward the present.
Aside from the athlete's short career span, there is a floating
membership of players composed of those who are on a major
team one day, released the next day, and then reinstated to be
signed by another club. Players are waived, not claimed, released,
and signed by other clubs. In addition, in baseball and hockey,
there is the shuffle by a certain cadre of players between the minor
and major league rosters. It is difficult, therefore, at any given
time, to identify the union membership-a substantial problem in
labor relations.5
Although nonunion members may have interests in the union
activities of nonathletic organizations, the interest of manifold
nonunion members in sports union activities is particularly strong.
This latter group of nonunion members includes prospective pro-
fessional athletes, such as college players who will be drafted or
signed as free agents, other players who were not selected in the
first round but still want to be considered, foreign league players
looking to move, and ex-league players who want another chance.
There are also the retired players, a relatively larger group than is
found in the usual union. These retired players may range in age
from their mid-twenties to the normal retirement age. In time,
these retirees will become a larger and more vocal constituency. 3
Finally, there are the agents and attorneys whose intimate
50. The average professional life of a ballplayer is between four and five years, de-
pending on the sport and the position played.
51. If a player's professional career averages four years, there will be a 50% turnover
in league personnel and union membership every two years. If the average professional
life is five years, the majority will be replaced in three years.
52. See notes 463-71 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the unit.
53. One of the most vocal groups among the retired players is former NFL players.
After threatened litigation, players who retired before the pension plan became a reality
received some benefits. Every former NFL player with a disability, for example, who
played five or more seasons, is now assured of an income of $10,000 a year. The NFL,
under the Bert Bell pension plan, provides needed assistance to both disabled and needy
former professional players. Because of the increased veteran benefits, it is expected that
the NFL Alumni Association will grow and become more vocal in its demands and con-
cerns. See Anderson, The Silent $28 Million, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1976, § 5, at 5, col. 1;
NFL Old-Timers Get Bigger Benefits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, § 5, at 3, col. 1. But see
Allied Chemical-Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 U.S. 157 (1971)
which held that an employer is not obligated to bargain with the union about retiree's
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dealings with the individual players make the union's role more
delicate. A good union should monitor the activities of the
agents.54 This monitoring may cause difficulties, however, if the
agents feel threatened sufficiently to retaliate.5" Another source of
friction between the agents and the union is more basic. The
agents and the union are in natural conflict since, in many re-
spects, they are doing the same job-representing the athlete.
Moreover, it is possible that either the agents or the union could
totally supplant the other. The two entities are vying for the same
economic unit-the player-and the more they vie, the more
likely it is that conflicts will ensue.
A union exists for the representation of all workers in its or-
ganization. This premise seems simple, but in sports it is complex.
A player who views himself or herself as special likely will feel
loyalties to his or her perceived best interests or to the persons or
entities that can best satisfy these interests, such as an agent, other
counselors, or even the club owners. These loyalties may supplant
this player's allegiance to the union, thereby impeding the union
from fulfilling its representative function.
benefits because they are not "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
54. At least some of the players associations have undertaken monitoring functions.
See, e.g., Baseball Players' Union Takes Aim at "Gouging' Agents; Miller Raps Kapstein,
Boston Globe, Jan. 27, 1977, at 29, col. 1. The NFL Players Association undertook an
ambitious project in this regard by aligning itself with a group of agents to form the Associ-
ation of Representatives of Professional Athletes (ARPA). Among ARPA's early func-
tions, it drafted a code of ethics for its members and to distributed a directory that listed
"approved" agents. See NFL Players Organize A Group to List Agents, N.Y. Times, Jan.
15, 1978, § 5, at 6, col. 5; College Seniors Getting Directory of Pro Agents, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 17, 1978, § 5, at 13, col. 4. Eventually, however, for reasons hotly disputed by both
sides, the NFLPA and ARPA parted ways, and a meaningful monitoring system still is not
a reality.
55. In what became known as the "Trope Revolt," agent Mike Trope and others an-
nounced in May 1980, that they would form a labor organization to rival the NFLPA and
move for decertification of the incumbent union. See Sins, Mortal and Venial, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 1980, at 22, col. 2. The coalition of agents joining together to launch this effort
was viewed, from the beginning, as a group unlikely to continue to cooperate. See, g.,
Visser, It's Trope vs. Argovitz... and Both vs. Garvey, Boston Globe, June 22, 1980, at 61,
col. 2; McDonough, Trope's New Union 'a Joke,' Boston Globe, June 8, 1980, at 94, col. 1.
Although this cooperation did cease, the NFLPA was concerned sufficiently about the new
organization's threat to initiate legal action, that the NFLPA claimed a conspiracy among
the agents in violation of the antitrust laws. Upshaw v. Trope, No. 80-03680 (C.D. Cal.,
filed Aug. 20, 1980). See Move to Form New Union Attacked by NFLPA, SPoRTS L. REP.,
Aug. 1980, at 2. Reports from August, 1981, indicate that all is not peaceful in the NFLPA.
The player representatives in the union affirmed their confidence in Ed Garvey's leadership
but did so with seven negative votes. Gene Upshaw's comments about his mission as
NFLPA president suggest that the cohesiveness of the union still needs improvement. See
note 48 supra.
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II. THE LEGAL OVERLAY
As the various personnae in the sports industries contemplate
how they can best further their interests, laws and legal proce-
dures become important weapons. Legal skirmishes in the sports
industries are almost as old as the leagues themselves.5 6 Disputes
often arise when parties join in profit-seeking ventures. Whether
unintentionally or by design, people in such ventures often fail to
honor their obligations or agree on the meaning of those obliga-
tions. As such deals are broken, the parties seek judicial resolu-
tion of their differences.
This Article has analogized the sports industries to other en-
tertainment industries to highlight the similarities between the two
industries. Moreover, a legal analogy can be drawn between the
two industries because the operative legal principles in the en-
tertainment industries parallel the legal principles now governing
the sports world. Many early sports cases relied on entertainment
law precedent,57 and the legal happenings in the other entertain-
56. As noted earlier in the text accompanying note 15 supra, the National League was
formed in 1876, soon after the practical demise of the National Association of Professional
Baseball Players. This loose alliance of ballclubs was beset constantly by a multitude of
organizational woes. The National League, in its early years, suffered from some of the
same ills but nevertheless advanced professional baseball to the state where rival leagues
were formed to emulate the success of the National League. With the formation of the
leagues came contract-jumping and the inevitable lawsuits. According to H. SEYMOUR,
supra note 15, at 141, 154-56, litigation began as early as 1882 when Cincinnati, of the
newly formed American Association, sued Samuel Washington Wise for not honoring his
contract. Furthermore, in 1884, one of the better known pitchers in the early years of
baseball, Tony Mullane, was sued by the ill-fated and short-lived Union Association.
Other early examples of litigation include: Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F.
198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890); Allegheny Base-Ball Club v. Bennett, 14 F. 257 (C.C.W.D. Pa.
1882); Baltimore Baseball Club & Exhibition Co. v. Pickett, 78 Md. 375, 28 A. 279 (1894);
Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Columbus Base-Ball
Club v. Reiley, 11 Ohio Dec. 272 (189 1); Harrisburg Base-Ball Club v. Athletic Ass'n, 8 Pa.
County Ct. 337 (1890); Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, 8 Pa. County Ct. 57
(1890). All of these cases predated the wave of litigation that attended the formation of the
American League.
57. See, ag., Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, 8 Pa. County Ct. at 59, which
regarded Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852), as having established precedent in
this country and in England. In Harrisburg Base-Ball Club v. Athletic Ass'n, 8 Pa. County
Ct. at 338-41, the court cited several other precedents criticizing Lumley and accordingly
refused to follow its-rationale.
In Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. at 780-81, the court cited Lumley,
then turned to American cases involving entertainers, such as Daly v. Smith, 38 N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 158 (1874) and Mapleson v. Del Puente, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 144 (N.Y. 1883).
See also Philadelphia Base-Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 10 Pa. Dist. Rpts. 309, 310-13
(1901), rev'd, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902). This case discusses Lumley and Daley and
adds English entertainment cases such as Webster v. Dillon, 30 L.T.R.(n.s.) 71 (1857) and
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ment fields greatly influenced the development of sports law for
much of this century. Sports cases now form an independent body
of precedent which testifies to the economic growth of professional
sports. It is evident that this economic success invited legal fights
over the spoils.
Three distinct legal principles have shaped the legal frame-
work of sports,58 although it is the confluence of these principles
that ultimately matters. Each principle has had its day; first con-
tracts, then antitrust, and today, arguably, labor.59 The following
analysis examines the three areas individually, denoting where
each is incomplete and needs reinforcement.
Montague v. Flockton, L.R. 16 Eq. 189 (1873). Lajoie analogizes these cases to the 1890's
sports cases cited in this note and note 56 supra.
58. In addition to contracts, antitrust, and labor concepts, tort and property concepts,
although peripheral, have also been significant in shaping the legal framework of sports
law. Tax law, perhaps less on the periphery than tort and property law, also has been
influential. The extent to which owners could depreciate player contracts and defer com-
pensation ameliorated some of the devastating effects of the maximum tax rates on earned
income and also shaped the economic structure of professional clubs and leagues, particu-
larly before the 1976 Internal Revenue Code revisions. The tax laws' impact, however, is
somewhat separate from the interaction of contracts, antitrust, and labor law discussed in
this Article. For that reason, tax is not considered in tandem with the other areas of law.
For a thorough discussion of the interface of tax law and professional sports, particu-
larly in light of the 1976 revisions, see, e.g., Blum, Valuing Intangibles: What Are the
Choices/or Valuing Professional Sports Teams?, 45 J. TAx. 286 (1976); Horvitz & Hoffman,
New Tax Developments in the Syndication of Sports Franchises, 54 TAXES 175 (1976); Jones,
Amortization and Nonamortization of Intangibles in the Sports World, 53 TAXES 777 (1975);
Lowell, Deferred Compensation/or Athletes, 10 TAx ADVISOR 68 (1979); Raabe, Profes-
sional Sports Franchises and the Treatment of League Expansion Proceeds, 57 TAXES 427
(1979); Strandell, The Impact of the 1976 Tax Reform Act on the Owners of Professional
Sports Teams, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 219 (1978); Weill, Depreciation of Player Contracts-The
Government Is Ahead at the Half, 53 TAXES 581 (1975); Zaritsky, Taxation of Professional
Sports Teams After 1976:. A Whole New Ballgame, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679 (1977).
59. Labor principles will not preempt the sports law field completely. Problems be-
yond the scope of labor relations or labor law are common. See text accompanying notes
172-76 infra. Depending on the nature of the problem, certain circumstances may arise
which are of great importance to the legal framework of sports, but which have a limited
impact on labor law. One such occurrence is the current legal dispute over the attempted
move of the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles. The NFL's action to block this move has
resulted in antitrust litigation by those with financial interest in the Los Angeles Coliseum
and the Raiders. For preliminary actions in this litigation, see Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), modfed, 484 F. Supp. 1274
(C.D. Cal. 1980). See also Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (de-
nial of stadium lease to prospective owner in one league because club owners in a rival
league exercised control over the facility); AFL v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963) (as-
sorted monopolistic practices engaged in by one league to the detriment of the other);
NASL v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modfy'ing 465 F. Sb-pp. 665 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (restrictions on cross-ownership among sports leagues); note 12 supra.
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A. The One-on-One: Contracts
The salvos first began over principles of contract law and its
remedies in the entertainment fields, although it was not long
before the battleground changed to the sports industries. Much of
the early litigation centered around an employer's right to prevent
an entertainer from performing elsewhere. 60 The most famous of
these cases involved a young opera singer, Johanna Wagner, and
her attempts to abandon Her Majesty's Theatre of London and
join a rival troupe.6 1 The court held that it could not order Jo-
hanna Wagner to perform for her first employer, but it could pre-
vent her from performing elsewhere in the same geographical
area.62  This negative injunction became a standard for the
industry.
Two later nineteenth century English cases expanded on the
Wagner theme. The first case, Webster v. Dillon,63 held that it was
not necessary that the written contract include a specific clause
designating the injunction an appropriate remedy. It was suffi-
cient that it appear, from the face of the contract, that the services
were to be exclusive and unique.64 This latter criterion of unique-
ness later became substantially important in similar cases in the
sports field.65 The second case, Grimston v. Cunningham,66 con-
cerned an actor who signed with an English road company tour-
ing the United States. After a dispute over the roles assigned to
him, the actor returned to England and contracted with another
employer. An English court again enjoined the entertainer, al-
though he now wanted to act in England rather than in the United
States. Although it was evident that the new employment was not
a competitive threat to the old employer, injunctive relief never-
60. The early entertainment cases dealing with injunctive and other forms of relief are
discussed strictly from the entertainment perspective in Tannenbaum, Enforcement ofPer-
sonal Service Contracts in the Entertainment Industry, 42 CAL. L. REv. 18 (1954).
61. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852). This case also spawned actions
against the rival employer who attempted to induce Johanna Wagner to break her con-
tract-an early example of interference with a contractual relationship. Lumley v. Gye,
118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853). This approach, particularly when injunctive relief against the
defecting employee might be unobtainable or ineffective, has served occasionally as an
effective alternative in the sports industries. See New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.
v. University of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196 (Ist Cir. 1979); American League Baseball Club of
New York, Inc. v. Pasquel, 63 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
62. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. at 699.
63. 30 L.T.R.(n.s.) 71 (1857).
64. Id See also Montagne v. Flockton, L.R. 16 Eq. 189 (1873).
65. See notes 104-06 infra and accompanying text.
66. [1894] 1 Q.B. 125.
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theless was granted.67 These cases, particularly the latter case,
helped to establish that the services of entertainers are sufficiently
unique to allow pressure, in the form of a negative injunction, to
be applied simply because the employer has lost the entertainer's
services. It is not necessary to establish further losses because of
competitive harm.68
This precedent influenced a case involving actress Bette Da-
vis. 69 Ms. Davis' employer lifted the suspension earlier imposed
on her to make it appear that her contract was still in force. The
employer later enjoined her from making films or appearing on
stage for the remainder of her contract or three years, whichever
was shorter. Despite the court's refusal to bar Ms. Davis from any
other work whatsoever, the length and scope of the injunction
which it upheld were formidable.70 To the extent that these com-
panion entertainment cases have influenced sports injunctions, the
problems which Ms. Davis encountered and the results of her liti-
gation do not bode well for a potentially defecting ballplayer.
The promulgation of sports cases added a new dimension to
the earlier entertainment cases. Sports leagues have been charac-
terized as cartels, internalizing rules that reduce, if not eliminate,
competition for players services.7' Until the advent of various
forms of free agency, there was no bidding for players services
once these players had signed with their first team. The advent of
the draft system in various sports has eliminated even that form of
competition. There was, therefore, no competition until the emer-
gence of a rival league. Consequently, the chronology of sports
cases involving contract jumping is also a tale of efforts, mainly
failures, of new leagues to establish themselves and challenge the
entrenched order.72
67. 30 L.T.R.(n.s.) 71 (1857).
68. See also Marco Prod., Ltd. v. Pagola, [1945] 1 K.B. I11.
69. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209. Note also the discussion
of this case in Tannenbaum, supra note 60, at 25.
70. The length of the injunction allowed in the Bette Davis case can be contrasted
with a much more limited approach, under admittedly different facts, in Machen v. Johans-
son, 174 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (injunction denied) and Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275
Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969) (two year injunction granted).
71. See notes 15-22 supra and accompanying text.
72. Until the advent of the litigious age of the 1960's and 1970's, most of the reported
sports cases focused on the legal problems erupting when rival leagues were formed and
the owners of such leagues went to war concerning rights to players, territories, and other
valuable requisites of professional sports teams. The cases resulted from such events as the
formation of the Players League (1890), the American League (1900), the Federal League
(1914), the Mexican League (1948), the American Football League, American Basketball
League, American Basketball Association (1960's), and the World Hockey Association and
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The "opening shots" in the sports world were fired in 1890" in
a case involving the National Brotherhood of Professional Base-
ball Players' abortive attempts to start its own league. Leaders in
the association, many of whom were considered among the best in
the National League, led the defections to the Players League and
were, not surprisingly, among those first sued. The old clubs
sought restraining orders against the defectors' participation in the
new league.74 These initial cases can be distinguished from the
entertainment precedent described above because the basic en-
forceability of the contracts was at issue, not just the appropriate-
ness of the remedy. The reserve clauses in the players' contracts
raised issues not confronted in the entertainment analogues.75
The early contract litigation focused on the reserve clause,
which was later adjudicated in both antitrust and labor contexts.
Specifically, the courts questioned the legal enforceability of the
reserve clauses in light of the five prerequisites of injunctive re-
lief.76 Initial judicial inquiries resulted in victories for the players.
Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing 7 involved Buck Ewing, an
established National League star who was contracted as player-
World Football Leagues (1970's). There were other causes for litigation: contracts termi-
nated due to injuries, players suspended and blacklisted, and owners disciplined. Until the
advent of grievance arbitration and the individuals increased awareness of his supposed
legal rights, however, the history of the legal problems in sports and of new leagues chal-
lenging the established order were practically synonymous.
73. As stated in note 56 supra, a few cases were decided before 1890, but most of these
cases had limited precedential value. See, e.g., Allegheny Base-Ball Club v. Bennett, 14 F.
257 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1882).
74. See notes 81, 84 supra.
75. The reserve clause, as a baseball institution, is almost as old as the National
League. It is reported to have been used as early as 1879. See R. SMITH, BASEBALL (1947).
The term of the contract at issue in most entertainment cases was for a definite time. The
alleged breach occurred during the running of that time. In contrast, many sports cases
involve the club's right to hold the player to an additional term by invoking the reserve
clause in the old contract. Although this situation did not always exist, there are sufficient
cases of this type to serve as a distinction from the entertainment cases. See Metropolitan
Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890), Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v.
Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
76. As outlined in Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. at 202 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1890) the five elements considered in granting or denying injunctive relief are:
1) The breach must be one for which damages at law would be inadequate compensa-
tion;
2) The party seeking the injunction must have "clean hands";
3) The injunction sought must not be unduly oppressive to the defendant;
4) The contract must have mutuality or be founded on adequate consideration; and
5) The terms of the contract must be definite.
77. Id
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manager of the New York entry in the Players League.78 A
United States district court, however, found that the reserve clause
in Ewing's contract did not define adequately the terms that
would appear in a new contract if the club invoked that clause. In
addition, the court held that reference to trade, custom, and usage
did not resolve that indefiniteness, and it refused to grant injunc-
tive relief or damages.79
In a companion case, Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward,"°
John Montgomery Ward, one of the Brotherhood organizers, suc-
cessfully defeated his National League club's request for an in-
junction on the grounds that the contract clause was indefinite.
Ward further maintained that the contract lacked mutuality since
he could be released on ten days' notice but also could be bound,
at the club's option, for an indefinite period of time.8' After its
78. It is ironic that William B. "Buck" Ewing was one of the players singled out in the
litigation over the Players League. Although he was one of the original organizers of the
Brotherhood in 1885, he had expressed sympathy for his National League owner, John B.
Day of New York, just before the formation of the Players League was announced. Ac-
cording to reports, he almost was convinced to forsake the new league and announce his
support for the National League, but reneged when he found no other renegade players
ready to recant. His credibility with the Players League, therefore, was temporarily dam-
aged. See H. SEYMOUR, supra note 15, at 234.
On the other hand, since Ewing was a leading baseball star at that time, a legal victory
against him would have led to widespread publicity and a significant boost for the National
League. In all, Ewing spent 18 years in the majors. Ewing's election to the Hall of Fame in
1939 earned him a plaque at Cooperstown which reads: "Greatest 19th Century Catcher.
Giant in Stature and Giant Captain of New York's First National League Champions 1888
and 1889. Was Genius as Field Leader, Unsurpassed in Throwing to Bases, Great Long-
Range Hitter. National League Career 1881 to 1899. Troy, N.Y. Giants and Cleveland;
Cincinnati Manager." This information includes Ewing's stint as a manager in 1898 and
1899. Ewing was the first catcher elected to the Hall of Fame, although contemporary
accounts also attest to his abilities at first base and in the outfield. National Baseball Hall
of Fame and Museum Yearbook 27 (1976).
79. Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. at 204. According to the court:
The law implies that the option of reservation is to be exercised within a reason-
able time; but when this has been done the right to reserve the player becomes the
privilege, and the exclusive privilege, as between the reserving club and the other
clubs, to obtain his services for another year if the parties can agree upon the
terms. As a coercive condition which places the player practically, or at least
measurably, in a situation where he must contract with the club that has reserved
him, or face the probability of losing any engagement for the ensuing season, it is
operative and valuable to the club. But, as the basis for an action for damages if
the player fails to contract, or for an action to enforce specific performance, it is
wholly nugatory. In a legal sense, it is merely a contract to make a contract if the
parties can agree.
Id
80. 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
81. Id Although this analysis concentrates on Ewing and Ward from the Players
League era, numerous other lawsuits were filed against players leaving the National
League and American Association to join the Players League. Most attempts to retain the
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loss in Ewing, the club in Ward tried to argue that the reserve
clause was a right to reserve the ballplayer for only the ensuing
season at not less than the present season's salary. The court,
however, found that the clause did not define any of the terms of
the subsequent contract and thus rejected the club's attempts to
explain the ambiguities. On the mutuality issue, the court stated
that the concentration of power in one party to a contract, where a
club could either bind a player in perpetuity or release him on ten
days' notice, could lead to great inequities. The club, for example,
might hold a player until the time had passed when he reasonably
could join another club, then release him with no further obliga-
tions. The unequal bargaining power of the parties allowed eq-
uity courts to find a lack of mutuality and deny claims for
injunctive relief.8 2
For Ewing, Ward, and the other Players League defectors,
these substantial court victories were hollow ones. By the time the
legal dust had cleared, the Players League had disappeared. The
league lasted only a year, largely undermined by the new group of
owners,83 recruited to help finance the operation. This new group
found that it had more in common with the National League own-
ers than with its own players. Although the tale is somewhat more
complicated,84 it does underscore the proposition that more is nec-
players were unsuccessful. See, e.g., Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Hallman, 9 Pa. County
Ct. 57 (1890). The club was successful in only one case. John Pickett, who had been play-
ing for the American Association's Kansas City club, was ordered not to play for any other
team. See American Ass'n of Base-Ball of Kansas City v. Pickett, 20 Phila. Rep. 298
(1890). Pickett, however, evidently was able to ignore the injunction because he is reported
to have played second base for the Philadelphia Players League Club. See H. SEYMoUR,
supra note 15, at 237.
82. In the reported Ward decision, the court only considered whether a preliminary
injunction should issue. Evidently, there was never a full trial on the issue of whether the
contract lacked mutuality. The decision does express great doubts that plaintiff ball club
would have succeeded on the merits. 9 N.Y.S. at 784.
As is so often true in these cases, the preliminary injunction stage is often indicative of
the ultimate decision on the merits. This observation is particularly true when, as in Ward,
there is no jury and the full trial may be before the same judge. Accordingly, many of the
injunction cases were settled after the hearing on the preliminary injunction and before the
trial on the merits.
83. In terms of accuracy, it should be noted that the term "owners!' was avoided in the
Players League. Those supplying the capital were called "contributors." Both players and
contributors were stockholders and shared in administrative functions. See H. SEYMoUR,
supra note 15, at 228-29. As matters developed, however, most of the contributors became
owners, but not in the Players League. These new owners merged their interests with club
owners in the established leagues and earned handsome profits from baseball during the
1890's without the threat of other rival leagues. Id at 244-48.
84. See id at 240-50. See also L. LOWENISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 15, at 39-53.
The Players League, ironically, might have prevailed had the contributors been more per-
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essary to ultimate victory in the business context than merely hav-
ing the law on one's side. Ewing and Ward returned to the
National League, played out their careers in brilliant fashion, and
are now in the Hall of Fame as two early stalwarts of the national
pastime. These players' great dream was defeated, not by the law,
but by business maneuvering. 5
The next round of litigation came ten years after Ewing and
Ward. After the Players League failed, the two remaining
leagues, which had operated in relative harmony since 1884 under
a national agreement, began to dispute. As a result, the American
Association withdrew from the agreement and attempted to suc-
ceed on its own. This shortsighted move, compounded by a
number of economic mistakes and fostered in part by National
League actions, led to the association's demise in 1891. 86 For a
few years, the National League was in control, but professional
baseball was a young and growing sport, and several investors
were eager to participate in its expansion. This eagerness led to
severing. The league had the better players, having lured away almost all of the National
League stars and the great majority of its players. By one estimate, all but 38 National
League players defected. In addition, although attendance figures announced by all the
leagues were undoubtedly inflated, it is fairly certain that the Players League outdrew both
the National League and the American Association. Nonetheless, all owners (contributors)
lost significant amounts of money. The National League was not in a better bargaining
position, but a solution to the above problem was needed, and the National League
maneuvered itself into a position where it could dictate the terms of that solution. In the
process, the players suffered-largely deserted by their erstwhile colleagues, the
contributors.
85. Along with Buck Ewing, John Montgomery Ward was one of the organizers of the
Brotherhood in 1885. Ward soon assumed the chief leadership role in the organization and
worked toward the formation of the Players League, after his playing days ended. Ward
and the players were defeated in 1890, but Ward continued to persevere. Ward retained
baseball connections throughout his life and was seriously considered once for the presi-
dency of the National League. Ward was defeated in this bid, however, by American
League president Ban Johnson, who opposed Ward because earlier he had represented
another player, George Davis, in a dispute that involved one of Johnson's American
League clubs, the Chicago White Sox. See L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 15, at
51.
Nonetheless, Ward stayed involved in baseball, serving briefly as president of the Na-
tional League's Boston Braves. Later, Ward was general manager of the Brooklyn club in
the Federal League, showing that his willingness to unsettle the established order never
died. Ward continued to write and speak about the abuses he saw in the business of base-
ball.
Monte Ward was a consummate player in the pre-1900 era. In his early years, he was a
pitcher, hurling one of the first perfect games. There have been only nine such games in
baseball's history, the latest Cleveland's Len Barker in the abbreviated 1981 season. Len
Barker Pitches Per.fect Game 4gainst Toronto, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981, at 17, col 4.
86. See H. SEYMOUR, supra note 15, at 251-62.
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the birth of the American League in 1900,87 and under the usual
formula, this new league began to lure established players away
from their National League teams.88 The National League teams
retaliated by filing lawsuits against the fleeing players.
The case of Napoleon Lajoie became a legal standard in the
early years of sports litigation. By 1900, Lajoie was a leading Na-
tional League second baseman for the Philadelphia Nationals89
who was forced to accept the $2,400 maximum salary imposed by
National League rules. Dissatisfied with this salary, Lajoie moved
across town to the new Philadelphia club of the equally new
American League. The National League club brought suit, and
battle ensued.
The initial victory went to Lajoie.90 The trial court, relying
heavily on English and American precedent, found that Lajoie's
services as a baseball player were not irreplaceable. Lajoie's work
at second base and home plate was not sufficiently unique. The
court also dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the con-
tract was unenforceable due to lack of mutuality.91
87. Although the American League was "born" in 1900, it actually evolved out of a
minor league, the Western. Under the leadership of Ban Johnson, it became a major
league and changed its name in October 1899 to give itself a more national image. See L.
ALLEN, THE AMERICAN LEAGUE SToRY (1962); R. SMrrH, supra note 73.
88. For the 1900 season, Ban Johnson and his American League engaged in few
player raids on the National League. Johnson, in fact, promised to abide by the National
Agreement and its provisions against raiding. That promise lasted for only one year. In
late 1900, looking forward to expansion of his league into eastern cities for the 1901 season,
Johnson did not renew his application for protection under the national agreement. The
war over the players began shortly thereafter. Of the 185 players on American League
rosters in 1901, 111 were former National Leaguers. L. ALLEN, supra note 87, at 18. Ac-
cording to another estimate, 74 players deserted the National League for the American
League during the two year span from 1901 to 1902. See H. SEYMouR, supra note 15, at
314.
89. Team nicknames are puzzling. It was not always apparent, at least prior to 1900,
when a team had an individual nickname and when it simply took the league name, as
evidenced by the Philadelphia Nationals. This team already may have been referred to as
the Phillies in everyday parlance. Seymour refers to the Philadelphia National League
entry in 1883 as the Phillies. H. SaYmou, supra note 15, at 207. To be conservative, the
team is called the Nationals in this Article, just as many of their counterparts of the day
were similarly designated.
The league that went the furthest in this regard was the Federal League. Its teams all
bore a contraction of the city where they played and the name of the league. The Chicago
team, for example, was the Chifeds. The Buffalofeds was the most striking example of this
rather absurd technique. Perhaps there was a natural reluctance to contract that name any
further, the Buffeds might have been mistaken too easily for pushovers.
90. Philadelphia Base-Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 10 Pa. Dist. Rpts. 309 (1901), rev'd,
202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
91. Id at 317.
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As in Ewing and Ward, the court noted that the club could
terminate the contract any time after ten days notice. At the same
time, the club could extend the agreement periodically for a total
of three years. In light of the earlier sports cases, albeit in other
jurisdictions, the trial court's holding was neither irrational nor
particularly surprising. The case, nevertheless, was appealed. In
the interim, Lajoie played the 1901 season and batted .422--still
an American League single season record.92
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not note Lajoie's rec-
ord, but it did view the case substantially differently than the trial
judge. The Supreme Court's opinion of April 21, 1902, contains
much analysis that became indelibly impressed on professional
sports industries.93 The court thought that the evidence warranted
a stronger finding as to Lajoie's baseball acumen. The court con-
cluded, with a touch of sensationalism, "[H]e may not be the sun
in the baseball firmament, but he is certainly a bright particular
star."'94 The court, however, had more difficulty resolving the mu-
tuality issue and noted several pertinent considerations. First, it
was not necessary for both parties to a contract to have identical
rights or remedies. Second, in examining Lajoie's contract, it was
noted that his "large salary" was, in part, consideration received
for the ten day termination power given the club. The court thus
attempted to neutralize the termination powers through the salary,
leaving the possible length of the contract reasonable for both par-
92. In the post-1900 baseball era, Lajoie's .422 mark is exceeded only by the efforts of
another second baseman, Rogers Hornsby. The "Rajah's" .424 in 1924, one of the three
seasons in which he exceeded .400, is the best in the National League, as Lajoie's record is
unsurpassed in the American League. Hornsby's mark is second in the National League if
Hugh Duffy's .438 in 1894 is counted. All three players richly deserve their respective
places in the Baseball Hall of Fame.
Napoleon Lajoie, called Larry, had a long career in baseball. Lajoie's undoubted abili-
ties in the field were accompanied by the honor of having a team named after him. Cleve-
land's American League entry was managed by Lajoie, and it was called the Cleveland
Naps. Lajoie was not referred to as the "little second-sacker," an appellation often applied
to the gritty, undersized players filling that position. At six feet two inches, Lajoie was the
"Big Frenchman," one of the taller players during that era.
Lajoie's on-field achievements rank him among the game's greatest players. Over the
course of 21 years in the majors, Lajoie came to bat 9,589 times, had 3,251 hits, and com-
piled an enviable career batting average of.339. Lajoie was elected to the Hall of Fame in
1938, the second year of its existence, and was the first second-baseman so honored. Only
the big five--Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Walter Johnson, Christy Mathewson, and Honus Wag-
ner-preceded him into the Hall. See Hall of Fame Yearbook, supra note 78, at 22; D.
N nT, R. JOHNSON, R. COHEN & J. DEUTSCH, supra note 37, at 109.
93. Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
94. Id at 217, 51 A. at 974.
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ties.95 Since plaintiff had exercised its right to renew the contract
for the 1902 season, the defendant was enjoined from playing for
any other club during that time.
In this case, however, the league's victory was hollow. Lajoie
did not return meekly to the Nationals, nor did the American
League admit defeat. Instead, Lajoie was traded to Cleveland,
where he was safe from the impact of the Pennsylvania injunction
since the Ohio courts refused to adhere to the Pennsylvania de-
cree.96  Lajoie was inconvenienced only because he could not
travel with his club to Philadelphia. This arrangement lasted only
until the two leagues came to a new national agreement a year
later.97 It is ironic, but fitting, that Ewing, Ward, and their new
league "won" in court, but "lost" where it counted, while Lajoie
and the American League "lost" in court but "won" from a busi-
ness standpoint.
There is also the larger impact of these cases. Given the litiga-
tion that arose after these cases, the Lajole doctrine prevailed. In
most cases, ballplayers have been considered unique and can be
95. In comparing the club's right to terminate the contract with the bargained for
salary which Lajoie was to receive, the court noted:
The term mutuality or lack of mutuality does not always convey a clear and defi-
nite meaning....
In the contract now before us, the defendant agreed to furnish his skilled pro-
fessional services to the plaintiff for a period which might be extended over three
years by proper notice given before the close of each current year. On the other
hand, the plaintiff retained the right to terminate the contract upon ten days' no-
tice, and the payment of salary for that time, and the expenses of defendant in
getting to his home. But the fact of this concession to the plaintiff is distinctly
pointed out as part of the consideration for the large salary paid to the defendant,
and is emphasized as such. And owing to the peculiar nature of the services de-
manded by the business, and the high degree of efficiency which must be main-
tained, the stipulation is not unreasonable. Particularly is this true when it is
remembered that the plaintiff has played for years under substantially the same
regulations.
Id at 219, 51 A. at 974-75.
As noted in the text, Lajoie's "large salary" was $2,400, the league-imposed maximum,
and one of the selling points that the new American League used to induce players to
forsake the National League. It is evident, however, that the court also was influenced by
the fact that the contract was partially executed and that the club had paidLajoie substan-
tial sums of money under what is alleged to be an unenforceable agreement.
96. See Philadelphia Baseball Club Co. v. Lajoie, 13 Ohio Dec. 504 (1902).
97. It was, of course, in 1903 that the first of the modern World Series was held, aris-
ing out of the new national agreement between the National and American Leagues. It
was somewhat fitting that one of the participant clubs was the Pittsburgh Pirates, since that
team earned its nickname in the 1890's for allegedly pirating away a player that should
have been returned to the American Association after the demise of the Players League.
Pittsburgh was not as fortunate this time. In a major upset, the Boston Pilgrims, later the
Red Sox, swept the first World Series championship, five games to three. D. NEFf, R.
JOHNSON, R. COHEN & J. DErTSCH, supra note 37, at 28.
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held to somewhat one-sided contracts that might have enforce-
ability problems in other settings.98 There is more to these cases,
however, than the narrow aspects of their holdings.
The central motive of these cases was to challenge the opera-
tion of sports leagues as cartels. An important aspect of a league's
operations is an allocation system of player resources. The cases
of the 1890's and 1900's challenged this system. The challenge
was partially successful in Ewing and Ward but lost due to other
circumstances. The challenge was totally unsuccessful in Lajoie.
Although some later cases, under contract analysis, questioned the
system,99 none of them made serious inroads. Thus, the net effect
of these cases did not prevent the leagues from evolving into car-
tels. Players and rival leagues would have to look elsewhere for
legal assistance.
In addition to this hesitant affirmation of the system, the devel-
opment of the contract cases had other effects. Restraints were
imposed on owners, both in the old and new leagues, from engag-
ing in outrageous conduct. The courts gave new application to the
equitable clean hanids doctrine."oo Leagues could thus bind play-
98. Well into this century, courts looked with great skepticism on contracts that con-
tained one-sided cancellation clauses. These contracts often were found to be lacking in
mutuality of obligation and were voided, as in the leading case of Miami Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 F. 693 (5th Cir. 1924). For 25 years after Laoie, there-
fore, courts applied the mutuality doctrine more vigorously in other industrial settings.
This discrepancy has eroded slowly, so that the Lajoje approach for sports contracts differs
minimally from other problems. This development occurred over a long period of time.
See Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967
DUKE L. 465.
99. See, e.g., Weeghan v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), aff'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir.
1914); Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Connecticut Profes-
sional Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); American League Base-
ball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914). But see
Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 216 F. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1914); Long Island Am. Ass'n
Football Club, Inc. v. Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
100. The clean hands doctrine was thoroughly reviewed in Weeghan v. Killefer, 215 F.
168 (W.D. Mich.), afjd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914). Although the court thought that the
player's contract with his original club was unenforceable due to a lack of mutuality, it
nevertheless held that the player was under some moral obligation to the club. When the
new club attempted to sign the player, with knowledge of the old "contract," it was engag-
ing in questionable conduct. The new club's later attempt to enforse its contract was frus-
trated because it did not come into court with "clean hands."
For other applications of the clean hands doctrine, see New York Football Giants v.
Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961); Minnesota Mus-
Ides, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969). For cases where the court consid-
ered the doctrine but held that it did not bar plaintiffs' suits, see Washington Capitols
Basketball Club v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.), aj7'g 304 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1969);
Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1966).
[Vol. 31:685
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ers internally, but bidding by competing leagues and owners was
subject to certain structured, if primitive, rules. Although it is dif-
ficult to conclude that the courts gave either the old or new
leagues an advantage on the "clean hands" issue, there is a temp-
tation to declare that the new leagues, seen as underdogs, have
been favored slightly. The established leagues, already possessing
substantial advantages, were regarded with hostility when their
conduct was questionable.10 1 These decisions represented the
courts' imperfect attempts to prevent a league from becoming too
dominant. There were limits to relying on a contract to enforce all
the desires of a club or league, but the courts did not, in any sense,
reorder the system.
Since these early cases, other efforts to circumscribe the indis-
criminate granting of contract and equitable remedies that perpet-
uate league dominance have had only limited success. One court
refused to extend an injunction against basketball player Rick
Barry beyond the one year option in his contract. Thus, the fact
that Barry did not play that year and refused to honor his contract
was not grounds for prohibiting him from joining the new Ameri-
can Basketball Association when the year elapsed. 10 2
A football player of less repute did not play one year, with
minimal effect. In Dallas Cowboys v. Harris,10 3 Jimmy Harris
found that his year of "retirement" merely caused his contract to
be tolled, and he faced continuing obligations under that contract
for at least one additional year. The Harris case also raised an-
other unsettled issue. Harris' attorneys claimed he was not suffi-
ciently unique to allow a club to obtain a negative injunction
against him. The Texas courts did not reject this argument, but
the appellate court was not convinced that sufficient evidence was
adduced at trial to support Harris' contentions."° Some jurisdic-
101. Compare New York Football Giants v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc.,
291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961) with Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1960). In analyzing conduct that was arguably indistinguishable
for legal purposes, these two courts reached different results. In the process, the new Amer-
ican Football League prevailed in both instances. In the Giants case, the New York NFL
club was held to have unclean hands; as to the Oilers, the Houston AFL club was held to
be free of taint. Contra Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C.
1969) (established league favored).
102. Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969).
103. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
104. Jimmy Harris came to professional football hoping, if anything, to be a defensive
back. Harris' role as quarterback on some of Oklahoma University's greatest teams in the
mid-1950's is largely forgotten. Harris was not a passing quarterback of much note in
college, however, and this lack of notoriety undoubtedly caused his shift when he turned
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tions have kept the uniqueness issue at least nominally open, 0 5
while other jurisdictions seem to hold that at least for the major
professional team sports, the presumption of uniqueness is almost
irrebuttable 10 6
The Harris case, however, is probably more important for the
issues it left unresolved. The case did not settle the question of the
appropriate duration of such injunctions nor did it allow a frontal
attack on the NFL's tolling provisions, which are still embedded
in that league's standard player contract.' 0 7 In general, the case
sidestepped several issues that Harris attempted to raise, such as
an antitrust complaint that went beyond the strict contract com-
plaint.'0 8 Instead, the court limited its inquiry to the question of
professional. On the other hand, Harris did not have to pass for Oklahoma. The rest of the
Oklahoma backfield consisted of Tommy McDonald, Clendon Thomas, and Billy Pricer,
all of whom enjoyed successful professional careers as running backs. Id
105. See, e.g., Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex. CL App.
1974).
106. Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506
(1961). On the problems of uniqueness, the court noted:
The increase of salary from $8,500 to $11,500 agreed to by plaintiff, the Cleve-
land Basketball Club's willingness to pay $13,000, and the latter's eagerness to
secure his services, all point to a high regard for his playing abilities. Whether
Barnett ranks with the top basketball players or not, the evidence shows that he is
an outstanding professional basketball player of unusual attainments and excep-
tional skill and ability, and that he is of peculiar and particular value to plaintiff.
Id at 137, 181 N.E.2d at 514. Furthermore, the court stated: "Professional players in the
major baseball, football, and basketball leagues have unusual talents and skills or they
would not be so employed. Such players, the defendant Barnett included, are not easily
replaced." Id at 139, 181 N.E.2d at 517.
107. The following provisions appear under the "Extension" clause of the NFL Player
Contract:
If Player becomes a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or any
other country, or retires from professional football as an active player, or other-
wise fails or refuses to perform his services under this contract, then this contract
will be tolled between the date of Player's induction into the Armed Forces, or his
retirement, or his failure or refusal to perform, and the later date of his return to
professional football. During the period this contract is tolled, Player will not be
entitled to any compensation or benefits. On Player's return to professional foot-
ball, the term of this contract will be extended for a period of time equal to the
number of seasons (to the nearest multiple of one) remaining at the time the con-
tract was tolled. The right of renewal, if any, contained in this contract will re-
main in effect until the end of any such extended term.
NFL Team Player Contract para. 16, reprintedin REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATH-
LETE, supra note 42, at 29.
108. The court's treatment of Harris' antitrust claim was dismissed in the following
summary fashion:
The contract sued on here does not violate the anti-trust laws of the State of
Texas and of the United States. . . . Harris is not being black-listed or boy-
cotted. Quite the contrary, at least two professional football teams are eager to
employ his services. His trouble is that he has personally signed contracts with
both of them and the only difficulty is to determine under which of them Harris is
obligated.
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which of two contracts should prevail and noted that an injunc-
tion, were it to issue, would not be unduly harsh and oppressive
to Jimmy Harris or, by implication, to other players similarly
situated.109
The initial contract cases gave limited victories to the players.
The leagues rewrote their contracts, but with the advent of the
Lajoie decision, even this rewriting became largely unnecessary.
The injunction, though theoretically an extraordinary weapon, be-
came the usual remedy in practice and a significant roadblock for
most professional ballplayers and any new leagues that wanted to
tap the talent pools of the established leagues. Although the
courts enunciated some limitations on the indiscriminate use of
injunctions, these limits were only temporary setbacks because
ways were found to avoid them. For those who sought to loosen
the hold of established leagues on professional sports, it was obvi-
ous that new legal plans of attack would have to be devised.
When it came to the one-on-one contract, the players were over-
matched and undersized.
B. The Slam Dunk: Antitrust
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890'10 to ad-
dress the emergence of the huge industrial monopolies that
threatened to consume the nation's economy. There is no legisla-
tive history, however, to indicate that this enactment evidenced
congressional concern with professional baseball and its monopo-
listic tendencies. The other professional team sports were not yet
in existence."' Although the Players League was born and died
in the year of the bill's passage and the American League arrived
amidst bitter feuding with the National League ten years later,
there is no record of antitrust litigation concerning those two
leagues and their complaints against the established order. It was
only with the attempt to create the Federal League in 1914112 that
Dallas Cowboys v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d at 47.
109. For a different reaction to the harshness contention, see Connecticut Professional
Sports Corp. v. Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
110. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976)).
111. See notes 140-42 infra and accompanying text.
112. The Federal League organizers obviously learned much from their American
League predecessors of the previous decade. The Federal League in 1913 styled itself as a
minor league. It did not immediately attempt to lure players away from the established
leagues. It concentrated instead on securing a solid base of both players and franchises
before launching into expansion. In August 1913, plans were announced for the addition
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the resulting problems were approached legally and the antitrust
laws became potentially applicable.
The first sports antitrust case, American League Baseball Club
of Chicago v. Chase,1 3 was cast in much the same posture as
Ward, 4 Ewing,115 and Lajoie. 16 A well-known first baseman,
Hal Chase," 7 signed with Buffalo of the new Federal League
while under contract with the American League team in Chicago.
Although the court initially held that Chase's services were suffi-
ciently unique to suggest the appropriateness of injunctive relief,
the court further held that the contract evidenced an "absolute
lack of mutuality" and would not be enforced."8  As in Ward, the
court focused on the club's right to exercise both a ten day termi-
nation clause that could end the player's contractual rights and an
option clause that could extend such rights. In this respect, the
case was in agreement with Ward and departed from Lajoie. The
court went further, however, and examined both the federal and
state antitrust implications of the system under which the estab-
lished baseball leagues operated. The court thought that baseball
could not be construed as interstate commerce under the Sherman
Antitrust Act and, therefore, no violations occurred. The court
of new clubs. The established major leagues were somewhat in disfavor with players, par-
ticularly because of a holdout by Ty Cobb at the beginning of the 1913 season over his
contract. Salaries were low. The players attempted again to unionize through the Players
Fraternity. Moreover, there were owners in the Federal League willing to spend some
money. The time to challenge had arrived. See L. LoWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note
15, at 73-100.
113. 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
114. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
117. Harold "Prince Hal" Chase was known for his adventures outside the ballpark. In
contemporary accounts, he is described as an "incorrigible gambler." L. LoWENFISH & T.
LUPIEN, supra note 15, at 88. Chase was thought capable of fixing games, though he was
never caught. Id Chase was also a superb ballplayer and briefly managed the young and
struggling New York Highlanders, today's New York Yankees. D. NEFT, R_ JOHNSON, R.
COHEN & J. DEtrrSCH, supra note 37, at 56, 61.
118. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6
(Sup. Ct. 1914). The court's discussion focused on the contract's absolute lack of mutuality,
the former national agreement for the governance of professional baseball, and the rules
and regulations of the national commission. The court left no doubt about its objections to
such sweeping terms favoring one side of the agreement. The court summarily denied the
request for an injunction against Chase. Id at 456, 149 N.Y.S. at 14. Other litigation
arising from Federal League efforts to raid players from the National and American
Leagues, brought differing results. Chase was supported in Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F.
168 (W.D. Mich.), aft'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914); Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Johnson,
190 IR. App. 630 (1914). But see Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 216 F. 269 (E.D.
Mo. 1914).
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determined, however, that "organized baseball" was an illegal
combination "in contravention of the common law." It was "as
complete a monopoly. . as any monopoly can be made" and it
invaded the "right to labor as a property right" and the "right to
contract as a property right" and was the result of a combination
illegally restraining the rights to exercise one's profession. 119
This judicial constraint, provided by the application of state
law restraint of trade concepts, was nevertheless inadequate. The
constraint depended on each jurisdiction's interpretation of the
common law aspects of trade restraints and was directed mainly at
the contracts of individual players. The Federal League, in fact,
did not last much longer than the Players League had in 1890.120
The Federal League folded amidst allegations that the established
leagues engaged in activities beyond holding players to allegedly
improper contracts. One Federal League owner thought he was
undercut in numerous ways, but his primary grievance was that
fellow owners sold out to the established leagues. Ned Hanlon,
owner of the Baltimore Terrapins, brought suit against each of the
sixteen teams in the National and American Leagues, the two
league presidents, a third person who, with the league presidents,
comprised the National Commission, 121 and three persons having
119. 86 Misc. at 461, 149 N.Y.S. at 17.
120. The Federal League lasted two seasons: 1914-1915. Unlike the short-lived Play-
ers League, few established stars in the American and National Leagues defected to the
Federal League. A few notable players did defect, including Mordecai "Three Finger"
Brown and Hal Chase. See note 30 supra. It is said that Walter Johnson was prepared to
defect but was persuaded not to defect at the last moment. The Federal League also lacked
the gate attendance of the defunct Players League. Perhaps, fear of pending litigation, see
note 122 infra, rather than fear of gate competition, prompted owners in the established
leagues to admit Federal League owners back into their ranks. There is no question, how-
ever, that the Federal League competition was proving costly to the National and Ameri-
can League owners. To keep their players, these owners were forced to pay significantly
higher salaries. By some estimates-though few players actually moved to the Federal
League-salaries in the existing leagues actually doubled for those players sought by rival
leagues. See L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 15, at 86-91. For another account of
baseball during this period, with particular emphasis on the rise and fall of the Federal
League, see H. SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE (1971).
121. The National Commission arose from peacemaking efforts between the National
and American Leagues that resulted in the new national agreement in 1903. Its duties were
described in the court of appeals' decision in National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920):
The National Commission. . . is an unincorporated body composed of the presi-
dents of the two leagues and a third person, selected by them. It is an administra-
tive body, and is not a profit-making concern. The club which wins the
championship pennant in any year in one major league competes for the world's
championship in that year with the winner of the pennant in the other. It is one
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powers in the Federal League. t22 The complaint alleged that a
conspiracy among the defendants, in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, had damaged the plaintiff severely in its attempts to
create a viable baseball team. The plaintiff prevailed at the trial
level, winning a verdict for $80,000, which was trebled under the
provisions of the Act.'23 The Court of Appeals held, however,
that the defendants' activities were not within the scope of the
Act. 24 The Supreme Court then considered the matter.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc.
v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,125 wrote for a
unanimous Court. Justice Holmes concluded that baseball, while
a business, was a state concern and did not involve interstate com-
merce within the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act:
championship in that year with the winner of the pennant in the other. It is one
of the functions of the National Commission to regulate these contests ....
The National Commission exists by virtue of the national agreement ....
id at 683.
One of the National Commission's functions was to oversee the World Series. The
"Black Sox" World Series scandal of 1919 did not speak well for the commission's success
and was a leading cause of its demise. By all accounts, the commission operated loosely
and ineffectively. Baseball owners thought that an authority figure was needed. The own-
ers chose Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis, who had already gained their admiration
through his sympathetic treatment of their cause in the early stages of the Federal League
litigation. See note 122 infra. In 1920, the National Commission ceased to exist, and the
Commissioner of Baseball became a fixture. For a particularly good account of this era,
see E. AsINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (1963).
See also B. VEECK & E. LINN, THE HUSTLER'S HANDBOOK 252-99 (1965).
122. This suit was not the first antitrust litigation arising out of attempts to found the
Federal League. The Federal League owners, named as defendants in the Baltimore Ter-
rapins lawsuit, were plaintiffs in an earlier action filed against the National and American
Leagues. L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 15, at 91. This earlier suit was important
in two respects: First, it provided leverage for the federal owners to settle with the estab-
lished leagues, resulting in the Federal League's demise; and second, Ned Hanlon and
Baltimore, however, were excluded from the settlement benefits, thus motivating their pre-
cedent-setting lawsuit. The settlement resulted from the dilatory tactics of the district court
judge hearing the case. This judge, Kennesaw Mountain Landis, later became baseball's
first commissioner. See note 121 supra.
Throughout the hearings, Judge Landis often expressed sympathy for the established
baseball owners and their attempts to keep the players they previously had under contract.
The judge then took the matter under advisement. It eventually became evident to both
sides that the judge was giving them an opportunity to settle. Settle they did, to the satis-
faction of everyone but the Baltimore interests. See L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra
note 15, at 89-91.
123. The lower court awarded treble damages pursuant to § 7 of the original Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). This provision eventually was repealed by Act of
July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283, because § 5 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976), a provision almost identical to § 7 of the Sherman Act, superceded the original Act.
Today, an action similar to that in Federal Baseball would be brought under the Clayton
Act.
124. 269 F. at 688.
125. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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The business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely
state affairs .... [Tihe fact that in order to give the exhibi-
tions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines
and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to
change the character of the business .. . IT]he transport is a
mere incident, not the essential thing. That to which it is inci-
dent, the exhibition, although made for money would not be
called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of
those words. As it is put by the defendants, personal effort, not
related to production, is not a subject of commerce.1 26
Major league baseball's immunity from the federal antitrust
laws continues today despite dramatically expanded definitions
given to interstate commerce by a host of landmark cases in the
last several decades. 127 To many critics, the Court's inaction re-
garding baseball is stare decisis run amuck.' 28  Shortly after
World War II, in a case involving a ballplayer blacklisted from
the Major Leagues because of his defection to the short-lived
Mexican League, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ex-
amined the changed nature of professional baseball and ruled that
126. Id at 208-09.
127. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate trade
"among the several States." In early cases, this provision was interpreted to exempt intra-
state activity from congressional regulation unless it had a "direct effect" on interstate com-
merce. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Supreme Court
departed from this strict standard in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), where it applied a more lenient "practical effect" test in upholding the constitution-
ality of the National Labor Relations Act. Subsequent cases further expanded Congress'
regulatory power to include all activities which have a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
128. Typical of quotes concerning the courts' reliance on stare decisis to continue base-
ball's antitrust exemption are the following: "To hold that the Court must protect business
interests built in reliance on prior decision could dangerously limit the adaptability and
growth of the law, to say nothing of the one-sided nature of this approach when consider-
ing the interests of the other parties involved." Note,Antirust and Professional Sport: Does
Anyone Play by the Rules of the Game?, 22 CATH. L. REV. 403, 424 (1973).
"[W]hen notions of a stare decisis lock judicial thinking into a 1922, or even a 1953,
legal framework, the law not only appears inconsistent, but periodically the courts are
again confronted with either compounding the error or reversing a long-standing prece-
dent." Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemptiom The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 737, 746 (1971).
See also Rogers, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the
Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. REv. 611 (1977); Note, Appi'cability of the Antitrust Laws to
Professional Baseball, 2 MEM. ST. L. REv. 299 (1972); Note, Baseball-An Exemption to the
Antitrust Laws, 18 PrrT. L. REv. 131 (1956); Note, Curt Flood at Bat Against Baseball's
Reserve Clause, 8 SAN DiEro L. REv. 92 (1971); Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and
the Reserve System" Reappraisal ofan Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 859 (1971);
Note, Monopsony in Manpower: OrganizedBaseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J.
576 (1953).
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baseball's activities were covered by the Sherman and Clayton
Antitrust Acts. 129  The case was settled, however, before the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule. Other cases arising
from the same general set of circumstances were decided contrary
to the Second Circuit's opinion, 13  and the matter remained un-
resolved. In 1953, however, the Supreme Court ignored the logic
of the second circuit opinion and in Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc. , 3' aflimed that baseball was exempt from federal antitrust
laws. The principal theme was that Congress, aware of Federal
Baseball, had not taken the initiative to reverse what had become
the accepted statutory interpretation.1 32
129. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'g 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1948). A divided court held that the advent of radio and television broadcasting of base-
ball games was sufficient to distinguish the instant case from Federal Baseball, thus stating
a valid claim under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts. In a subsequent proceeding,
the court refused to issue an injunction pendente lite in favor of plaintiff. Gardella v.
Chandler, 174 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1949).
The Gardella decision, nevertheless, was adhered to in Martin v. National League Base-
ball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.), a§'g Martin v. Chandler, 1948-1949 Trade Cas. 63,125
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
At least one ballplayer believed these decisions to be decisive. Max Lanier, Fred Mar-
tin (party in the above mentioned case), and Lou Klein switched from the St. Louis
Cardinals to the Mexican League. Lanier's remembrances about the affair are enlighten-
ing, even if a bit inaccurate. Below are excerpts from D. HONIG, BASEBALL WHEN THE
GRASS WAS REAL (1975).
"Of course, everybody who went to Mexico was suspended from the big leagues for five
years. I thought that was a little stiff. Heck, we didn't go down there to hurt anybody. We
just didn't think we were making enough money." Id at 219.
"We were supposed to be suspended for five years, but in '48 we started a lawsuit
against baseball, and that's how we got back. We had them by the tail then because the
suspension was illegal." Id at 221.
130. In Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953), the court sided with the
dissent in Gardella, quoting the dissenting language with approval. Id at 414.
131. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
132. In a per curiam opinion, the Court said:
Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to bring
such business under these laws by legislation having prospective effect. The busi-
ness has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was
not subject to existing antitrust legislation. The present cases ask us to overrule
the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation applicable.
We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of
the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.
Id at 357.
Although per curiam, the Toolson decision had two dissenters. Justice Burton, joined
by Justice Reed, highlighted the changed business of baseball over the years since the Fed-
eral Baseball decision, as substantiated by testimony elicited in congressional hearings.
Consequently, these justices would have disregarded Federal Baseball and applied the anti-
trust laws unless there was congressional action specifically granting baseball an exemption.
Id at 364-65.
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In 1972, in Flood v. Kuhn, t3 3 the Court again affirmed its
hands-off posture, and candidly admitted that the application of
the antitrust laws to all other sports made baseball "[w]ith its re-
serve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust law
* . . an exception and an anomaly." 134 In acknowledging that
other professional sports leagues and clubs were covered by the
antitrust laws, the Court had difficulty distinguishing baseball:
It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century,
one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare deci-
sis, and one that has survived the Court's expanding concept of
interstate commerce. It rests on a recognition and an accept-
ance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs. 135
Justice Blackmun insisted, accordingly, that the Court adhere
to its previous decisions. Justice Blackmun maintained that if
there were any "inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsis-
tency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the
Congress and not by this Court." 136 Justice Marshall, however,
may have had the final word in his dissent when he stated that the
Court was depriving the baseball players of "needed" muscle and
that an accommodation between labor and antitrust law was re-
quired in sports. The Justice's view was that the players had not
agreed to the reserve clause, and thus, if the antitrust laws applied
to baseball; the labor exemption would not be applicable, since
the reserve clause was not the product of collective bargaining but
was management imposed.1 37
The recounting of baseball's antitrust immunity is an illustra-
tion of the wave theory of legal development. Applying contract
principles to baseball was no great aid to those challenging the
established order, especially in light of Lajoie and its progeny.
Antitrust held limited promise because prior opinions focused on
whether the matter was covered under the interstate rubric. The
Supreme Court's adherence to a rigid concept of stare decisis ex-
acerbated the problem. After Flood in 1972, therefore, it was evi-
dent that a third wave of legal theory was needed.1 38  The
133. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
134. Id at 282.
135. Id
136. Id at 284.
137. Id at 295-96.
138. As noted by district court Judge Cooper in his opinion in Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F.
Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aqt'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), a "d, 407 U.S. 258 (1972),
there are alternatives to antitrust:
In such matters as labor relations and family disputes, to name just two, Con-
gress (in the case of collective bargaining) and the courts have determined that
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emergence of this wave is remarkable because the impetus for its
development came principally from one man, sitting as a labor
arbitrator. 39 Before examining the ensuing legal developments in
baseball, however, it is necessary to focus on other sports indus-
tries and recount their treatment under antitrust law.
Between the time of Federal Baseball and the subsequent chal-
lenges to sports leagues' practices under the antitrust laws, many
changes occurred in both the law and the sports businesses. The
most dramatic change was the growth of other professional sports.
The forerunner of the NFL was founded in 1920.140 The NHL
such disputes as do arise therein are best resolved by the parties without outside
interference and that resort to a court-imposed solution should be a matter of last
resort. This is almost invariably the case whenever two parties must continue to
work together amicably toward a common end after the dispute is settled. . . .
Nevertheless, we believe that here, as well, the parties themselves are best able to
reach a satisfactory accord, and that all avenues toward such an approach cer-
tainly have not yet been fully exhausted.
Far more complicated matters accompanied by an exclusive self-centered con-
cern and by seemingly hostile and irreconcilable attitudes, frequently find their
way to amicable adjustment and the abandonment of court claims. Why not
here-with the parties positive and reasonable men who are equally watchful
over a common objective, the best interests of baseball?
Id at 284.
139. Considering the number of times baseball's possible control by the antitrust laws
has been raised and the failure to succeed on that issue, the ingenuity of Marvin Miller of
the MLBPA must be admired. Similarly, the persistence of players such as Andy Messer-
smith and Dave McNally in using alternative strategies to reach their objectives must be
respected. The merits of the disposition of the Messersmith and McNally arbitration and
subsequent court proceedings, see text accompanying notes 189-99 infra, and the process of
deciding the issues is a testimonial to the dispute resolution process.
Some people are not convinced that the antitrust battle is over. There have been re-
peated, unsuccessful court challenges to the baseball antitrust exemption. See, eg., Boise
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 636 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2049
(1981); Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1974). Ironically,
where a baseball club asserted antitrust violations against another business that held the
concession franchise at the club's ballpark, the concessionaire was unable to raise the anti-
trust exemption. See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley Co., 512 F.2d 1264
(9th Cir. 1975).
It is apparent that congressional efforts to remove the exemption will continue, al-
though the chances of success are not great. The summer of 1981 marked another attempt
to remove the exemption, with such notables as Howard Cosell and baseball team owner
Ted Turner asserting in testimony before a congressional committee that there were no
solid reasons to exempt baseball. See L.A. Times, July 17, 1981, § III, at 4, coL 1; id, July
16, 1981, § III, at 4, coL 1; Justice Department Official Says Pro Sports are Just Businesses,
L.A. Times, July 15, 1981, § III, at 5, coL 1.
140. The loosely organized American Professional Football Association was estab-
lished in 1920, with Jim Thorpe as president. Joe Carr, of Columbus, Ohio, was named
president in 1921, and the league name was changed to National Football League the next
year. The first signs of vitality for the new enterprise, however, came only when the Chi-
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emerged in 1917.141 Basketball, after several unsuccessful at-
tempts at attaining professional status, finally gained a foothold
when the Basketball Association of America, the forerunner of the
NBA, was established in 1946.142 The increasing number of pro-
fessional sports, coupled with the advent of electronic media expo-
sure, catapulted sports contests from major league stadiums into
peoples' living rooms. Attendance, which had declined in the
1930's, increased markedly.1
43
Other entertainment industries such as motion pictures, and
cago Bears signed University of Illinois star Red Grange in 1925. OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPE-
DIC HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, supra note 11, at 18-21.
Elements of professionalism had crept into football as early as 1892, when Pudge Hef-
flefinger received $500 to play for a Pittsburgh team. In addition, in the first two decades of
this century, spirited league play flourished in Ohio, especially in the Akron-Canton area.
Id at 12-15.
The NFL had a rocky beginning. Between 1926 and 1932 the number of teams in the
league decreased from twenty-two to eight. The 1930's saw significant changes, however,
both in the game rules and in the league organization, and the seeds were planted for the
NFL to become the monolith it is today. For brief accounts of the early history of profes-
sional football, see id at 10-33.
141. Professional hockey reportedly originated in the 1900's. Shortly thereafter, the
Stanley Cup, the top prize among the amateur hockey teams of Canada, became the sym-
bol of supremacy in professional hockey. The NHL had some predecessors, including the
Pacific Coast League, the Eastern League, and the National Hockey Association. All of
these leagues lasted for a reasonable time, but the expiration of the association in 1917 led
to the creation of the National Hockey League. By 1926, all of its rivals were defunct and
the NHL remained alone. The NHL was Canadian initially but admitted the Boston Bru.
ins in 1924. The clubs which composed the league varied for a few years, but by 1942 a six
team league was firmly established, with two Canadian clubs (Montreal and Toronto) and
four United States teams (Boston, New York, Chicago, and Detroit). The league's boldest
venture came in 1967 when it doubled its size by expanding into six new cities. See F.
MENKE, supra note 1, at 637-39.
142. The first professional basketball game may have occurred as early as 1896, in
Trenton, New Jersey, with each player getting $15 and the captain of the teams receiving
the princely sum of $16. Less substantiated is a claim of a game involving paid players in
Herkimer, New York in 1893. Z. HOLLANDER, THE MODERN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASKEt-
BALL 271 (1979). Regardless of which game was played first, it is obvious there was a
substantial lag between those early games and the emergence of the NBA in 1946. There
was, however, no absence of attempts to establish that association. There was a National
Basketball League (1893-1903), a Philadelphia League in 1904, expanded later to include
clubs from New York and New Jersey, a Central League that joined the Philadelphia con-
nection, a New York State League in 1911, and the American Basketball League
(1926-1931), featuring the original Celtics (operating out of New York, not Boston) and the
Cleveland Rosenblums. The National Basketball League was born in 1937; although it
eventually merged with the Basketball Association of America to form the modern NBA, it
never gained recognition as a major league. General background on these leagues can be
found in id at 271-90 and F. MENKE, supra note 1, at 172-73. See also THE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF SPORTS TALK 75 (Z. Hollander ed. 1976).
143. Attendance figures for sports events are illustrated best by those of baseball, the
only fully established professional sport during the 1930's. In 1930, attendance was 10
million, dropping to 6 million by 1933, a significant but not horrendous drop considering
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later television, also were expanding."' The machinations of the
powerful in these industries came under scrutiny. With Supreme
Court decisions widening the scope of congressional regulatory
authority under the interstate commerce clause,145 it was not long
before antitrust cases involving the entertainment fields reached
the courts. Beginning in the 1930's and continuing with great mo-
mentum into the 1940's, antitrust actions in the theatre, motion
picture, and other entertainment industries were litigated. With
minor exceptions, these industries were held subject to antitrust
constraints. 146
With this precedent on one hand and Federal Baseball and
Toolson isolated on the other, the Court faced the question of the
applicability of antitrust law to professional boxing. In the end,
the Court held that boxing was subject to the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts. 47 Thereafter, with the reticence of only a small minor-
ity of the Court, football, hockey, basketball, and other sports,
the depression. By 1937, however, attendance had increased again to 9.5 million. By 1948,
the figure more than doubled to 21 million. See P. GARDNER, supra note 38, at 12, 20.
144. Numerous sources chronicle the growth of the motion picture and television in-
dustries. Several general works of these industries also discuss the ensuing legal problems.
See, e.g., J. FELL, A HISTORY OF FILMS (1979); M. HuETrrG, ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE
MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY (1944); THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY (T. Balio ed. 1976).
In several informative passages, Fell describes the industrial consolidation of the film in-
dustry in the United States as the industry's center shifted from New York City to
Hollywood. J. FELL, supra, at 82-83. Fell also notes the attending phenomenon of an
industry based on a "star" system. Mary Pickford's salary, circa 1915, went from $500 to
$2,000 per week. When Charlie Chaplin secured a new contract in 1916 at $13,000 a week,
Pickford responded by renegotiating with her studio for a new contract at $10,000 per
week, plus a bonus of $300,000 against profits. Id at 87.
For the historical developments of the television industry, see L. BROWN, TELEVISION:
THE BUSINESS BEHIND THE Box (1971); S. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA (2d ed.
1972); L. LICHTY & M. TOPPING, AMERICAN BROADCASTING: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE
HISTORY OF RADIO AND TELEVISION (1975); R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECO-
NOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION (1973).
145. American Medical Ass'n v. U.S., 317 U.S. 519 (1943), Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940), NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944); Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Paramount Famous Lasky
Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); Binderup v. Pathe Exch., 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
For an early article discussing the implications of the decisions before Griffth and Para-
mount, see Reich, The Entertainment Industry and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 20 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1946).
147. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955). See also United
States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955), which held that federal antitrust laws extended to
the production and operation of legitimate theatrical productions throughout the United
States. Both cases considered and rejected arguments that the Federal Baseball and Tool-
son rationales should be adopted.
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likewise were subjected to scrutiny under the antitrust laws.'48
Lawyers for various leagues continued, unsuccessfully, in the
early 1970's to press the courts for antitrust immunity.14 9 Profes-
sional sports leagues also made several unsuccessful attempts to
convince Congress to grant their leagues the same sweeping im-
munity that baseball enjoyed. 5 These efforts failed, but certain
exemptions, particularly those relating to league-wide television
contracts 5 ' and the NFL-AFL merger, became law.'52  The ef-
148. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F.
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (basketball); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadel-
phia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Nassau Sports v.
Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972) (hockey); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n,
Inc. v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972), rev'd, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972)
(hockey); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (hockey).
149. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351
F. Supp. 462,466 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Cheevers, 348
F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass. 1972), rev'd, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972); Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1971). After decisions in
these cases, the owners shifted the bases of their challenges. In Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp.
73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aft'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979),
the applicability of the antitrust laws was conceded. Attempts to distinguish the general
applicability of antitrust laws from the facts in the particular case followed thereafter. See
Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Attempts also were made to argue
for a labor exemption under the antitrust laws. See notes 239-519 infra and accompanying
text.
150. The Court in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 258, acknowledged several unsuccessful
efforts in Congress to change or modify the antitrust laws. Justice Blackmun noted that,
rather than stripping baseball of its immunity, most proposals would have expanded anti-
trust exemptions to other sports leagues. Id at 282-83.
151. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1976).
152. The authorization for the NFL-AFL merger appears in language now contained
in 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Originally part of the Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800,
§ 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 1515, it reads in pertinent part:
In addition, such laws shall not apply to a joint agreement by which the member
clubs of two or more professional football leagues, which are exempt from income
tax under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 U.S.C.
501(c)(6)] combine their operations in expanded single league so exempt from
income tax, if such agreement increases rather than decreases the number of pro-
fessional football clubs so operating, and the provisions of which are directly rele-
vant thereto.
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
When it appeared this authorization might flounder if introduced through normal legis-
lative channels, it was appended to an Income Tax Investment Credit bill and presented to
Congress through a Conference Committee report. Under this procedure, Congress was
forced either to accept the entire bill without amendment or reject it. Despite opposition to
the merger by certain influential members of Congress, the bill passed. H.R. REP. No.
2308, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4372,
4377-78.
The circumstances under which the merger authorization cleared Congress have been
criticized by many commentators. See, eg., J. MICHENER, supra note 16, at 390.
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fects of congressional action perhaps still are not fully appreciated
or resolved.
Once it was evident that antitrust laws applied to professional
sports other than baseball, the litigation increased, peaking in the
mid-1970's 53 This litigation included actions by players and
owners against management both within and across leagues.
The antitrust actions by players fall into two broad categories.
The first category relates to actions by leagues to exclude a player
from the league. These actions include exclusions for failure to
meet league eligibility requirements 54 and exclusions such as
blacklists or suspensions for alleged misconduct or for transferring
to a new league.15 5 The second category concerns restraints on a
player's freedom of movement from one team to another, whether
from the minor league to the major league, 5 6 from a team in one
league to a team in a rival league, 57 from one team to another
team in the same league, 58 or through the league's draft system
which restricts the player to dealing with only one club in a
153. See, ag., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kapp v.
NFL, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F.
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972);
Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Philadelphia World Hockey
Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston
Professional Hockey Assen, Inc. v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972).
154. See, e.g., Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979); Deesen v. PGA, 358 F.2d
165 (9th Cir. 1966); Linseman v. WHA, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Bowman v.
NFL, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325
F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
155. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413
(6th Cir. 1953); Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949);
Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
For cases discussing discipline for player misconduct, see Blalock v. LPGA, 359 F.
Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215
(C.D. Cal. 1969); Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Molinas v. Podoloff,
133 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1954). A case that might have been significant, given the alle-
gations of misconduct and the terms of the suspension, was Rentzel v. Rozelle, No. C-
63828 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1973). A preliminary order by the court denied the player's request
for injunctive relief. The case, however, was settled before trial on the merits.
For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Weistart, Player Disciline in Professional
Sports: The Antitrust Issues, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 703 (1977).
156. See, e.g., Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
157. See, e.g., Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972); Nassau
Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc.
v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 472 F.2d 127 (lst Cir.
1972).
158. See, ag., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976).
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league. ' 59
For purposes of this analysis, it is unnecessary to probe each
case. It is more important to concentrate on the problems that
remain after the decisions by various courts. Courts apparently
have been receptive to the general argument that sports leagues
are special. 161 One problem is that leagues must set certain mini-
mum standards; not everyone who strives to be a professional
player can be accommodated. Exclusion of players from sports
leagues, however, must meet a reasonableness test, and arbitrary
exclusions will be overturned. 161  The rule, for example, that a
player could not join the NBA before his college class graduated
was held to be an arbitrary exclusion. 62 When the World Foot-
159. See, eg., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kapp v.
NFL, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978); Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp.
843 (W.D. Pa. 1976). The challenges to the various leagues' draft systems still occur, even
when the draft is made part of the collective bargaining agreement. Basketball player
Howard Wood was drafted by the Utah Jazz as the 27th player taken in the 1981 draft.
Wood's attorney announced he was filing an antitrust complaint contesting the NBA sys-
tem of player allocation. Since the draft is part of the league's collective bargaining agree-
ment and was approved in the 1976 Robertson settlement, see note 1 suqra, Wood's chances
for success appear to be minimal. The basic issue of a nonunion player being bound by the
union agreement with the league is an important one, discussed at notes 475-529 infra and
accompanying text. As to the Wood litigation, see Vecsey, Testing the Pro Basketball Draft,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1981, at 20, col. 1.
160. As the court stated in NASL v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980): "There is
a substantial degree of judicial recognition, in antitrust cases, that the business structure of
league team sports is unique." Id at 674.
This attitude has pervaded the legal literature for several decades. In United States v.
NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), the court stated:
Professional football is a unique type of business. Like other professional
sports which are organized on a league basis it has problems which no other busi-
ness has. The ordinary business makes every effort to sell as much of its product
or services as it can. In the course ofdoing this it may and often does put many of
its competitors out of the business. The ordinary businessman is not troubled by
the knowledge that he is doing so well that his competitors are being driven out of
business.
Professional teams in a league, however, must not compete too well with each
other in a business way ... If all the teams should compete as hard as they can
in a business way, the stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones
into financial failure. If this should happen not only would the weaker teams fail,
but eventually the whole league, both the weaker and the stronger teams, would
fail, because without a league no team can operate profitably.
Id at 323.
For other judicial expressions concerning the unique nature of sports leagues, see Kapp
v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73,79-81, 88-89 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 503-04 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Molinas
v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
161. See, eg., Bowman v. NFL, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975); Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
162. See, ag., Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
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ball League (WFL) failed, Commissioner Rozelle's edict that no
NFL club could sign WFL players during the remainder of that
NFL season was similarly held to exclude illegally an entire
class. 1 63  The outright blacklisting of players simply for joining
another league is probably illegal."64 On the other hand, suspen-
sions of players for infractions of reasonable rules, particularly
those involving practices that threaten the sport's integrity, are up-
held 1 65 unless the procedures for determining the grounds for sus-
pension are arbitrary or unduly discriminatory. 66
The freedom of movement cases are harder to summarize, al-
though a pattern emerges. Many trial court opinions have held
the draft, the reserve and options systems, player compensation,
and other restrictive devices to be illegal per se. 167 The appellate
courts, however, noting the special features of sports leagues, have
held that the restraints are more properly subject to a "rule of rea-
son" analysis.' 68 This shift in analysis is important. Even when
no reasonable justification has been found for a particular re-
straint, courts have not held all such restraints per se unreasona-
ble. Such practices, if properly designed, might continue, and the
leagues have been encouraged to use collective bargaining to ar-
163. See, e.g., Bowman v. NFL, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975).
164. The argument can be made that this result might have occurred in Radovich v.
NFL, 322 U.S. 445 (1975), had the case not been settled after the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement that professional football was, indeed, subject to antitrust laws.
165. See Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Molinas v. Podoloff, 133
N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1954). See also Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F.
Supp. 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
166. The courts seem to be willing to scrutinize closely the procedures used when the
player's peers, and thus his other competitors, sit in judgment. In Blalock v. LPGA, 359 F.
Supp. 1260 (W.D. Ga. 1973), suspension was ruled illegal largely because the procedure
used had the player's competitors determine the proposed action against her. In contrast,
in Molinas v. Podoloff, 133 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1954), when the league commissioner
suspended the player, the court disallowed the player's allegations of procedural inadequa-
cies. In Molinas, however, there was no serious factual doubt as to the player's involve-
ment in gambling.
167. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), modofed,
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1975), modi-
fied, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
168. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. disrmissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). See also Kapp v.
NFL, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). Although the courts'
preference for a rule of reason as opposed to a per se approach undoubtedly has been
influenced by their concern for the unique nature of sports leagues, see note 160 supra,
another reason may be an increasing judicial reluctance to adopt a per se analysis except in
the most narrow of circumstances. Recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court raise
serious questions about the continued viability of a per se approach. See Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
[Vol. 31:685
COLLECTIVE BAJRGAINING
rive at acceptable structures.1 69 If the restraints were illegal per se,
it is doubtful that even collective bargaining could save them,
since the restraints probably would be held illegal subjects of bar-
gaining. In fact, certain players associations took this position
while many of these cases were pending.1 70 The net effect of sub-
jecting such restraints to a rule of reason is to allow management
to impose these restrictions, either by unilateral edict,171 which is
risky, or through collective bargaining. The player antitrust cases,
therefore, did not determine conclusively the types of restraints
that could be imposed, but merely set the stage for the next wave
of cases.
The ultimate effects of owner disputes resulting in antitrust lit-
igation are less defined. Suits by owners in one league against
their rivals usually focus on the alleged monopolistic tendency of
the other league to sequester markets, players, facilities, or even
prospective owners. 172 Other suits have been brought by "outsid-
169. In Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), aJ'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the court stated:
Far more complicated matters accompanied by an exclusive self-centered con-
cern and by seemingly hostile and irreconcilable attitudes frequently find their
way to amicable adjustment and the abandonment of court claims. Why not
here-with the parties positive and reasonable men who are equally watchful
over a common objective, the best interests of baseball?
Id at 284.
In Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977),
the court stated: "We encourage the parties to resolve this question (whether restrictions
on player transfer are necessary) through collective bargaining. The parties are far more
situated to agreeably resolve what rules governing player transfers are best suited for their
mutual interests than are the courts." Id at 623.
170. Most notable among the unions that refused to bargain during the pendency of
antitrust actions was the NFLPA whose collective bargaining agreement had expired. The
1974 strike was a bitter disappointment to the association since the owners made no conces-
sions. Nonetheless, while the Mackey litigation was pending, see note 153 supra and text
accompanying notes 276-95 infra, the association maintained that the Rozelle Rule and
other restraints were per se illegal and could not be the subject of bargaining. See Koppett,
Labor Talks Constant Part of Conversation by Athletes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1976, § 5, at 3,
coL 1.
171. There are currently no provisions in either the 1980 Baseball Basic Agreement or
the 1976 NHL Agreement relating to the drafting of amateurs. The absence of these provi-
sions means that the amateur draft continues to be a management prerogative in these two
sports. In light of baseball's continuing immunity from the antitrust laws, the risks are
minimal. The risks, however, are not so low with hockey. The draft has been attacked
successfully in other sports. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976). There is
evidently a current challenge of the NBA draft, despite its insulation within that league's
collective bargaining agreement and the consent agreement arising from the Robertson liti-
gation. See note 159 supra. The absence of any similar insulation for NHL owners
through a collective bargaining provision is therefore a puzzle.
172. For noteworthy cases relating to various alleged monopolistic league tendencies,
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ers," who are denied the opportunity to be owners.' 73 There also
have been internecine fights, either among owners' 74 or by an
owner challenging a commissioner's powers.' 75 Only a few gen-
eral conclusions can be made about these disputes. First, these
fights will continue while the economics make challenge alluring.
Second, the battleground will continue to be in the antitrust area
because these cases fall mainly outside either labor concerns or
labor protections. Finally, the antitrust route is arduous, uncer-
tain, and unreliable as an effective protector of the underdog. 176
see Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc, 570 F.2d 982 (4th Cir. 1977) (sequestering of facilities); AFL
v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963) (sequestering of markets); NASL v. NFL, 505 F.
Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modifying 465 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (sequestering of
owners); ABA Players Ass'n v. NBA, 404 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sequestering of
players); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (sequestering of players).
173. Courts generally have recognized a league's right to control who will be accepted
as an owner. See Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court in Levin
held that plaintiffs were actually seeking to become partners, not competitors, with those
who excluded them. The court thus distinguished this situation from exclusions such as the
four-year rule, deemed illegal in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). In that case, the player, Spencer Haywood, wanted to be a
competitor, not a partner, in the league with other players.
Levin involved those who sought to become owners by buying an existing franchise.
Different considerations exist when owners of clubs outside the league apply for a new
franchise. This application process was engaged in by several teams in the ABA during the
year prior to its merger with the NBA. The Denver Nuggets and the New York Nets
applied for NBA franchises. See AB,4 Player Union Opposed, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1975,
at 43, col. 6. Later, the rest of the ABA teams also filed applications. A.B.A. Clubs.4pply to
N.B.A., N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1975, § 12, at 31, col. 1. The NBA owners successfully fore-
stalled action on the entire matter until the terms of the merger could be settled. Such was
not the case with the Memphis Grizzlies of the short-lived WFL. When that league folded,
only the Grizzlies and two other franchises had somewhat viable operating capabilities.
The three teams combined to form one team on paper. The owners applied for admission
to the NFL, but the application was denied. Suit was then filed, citing the NFL's refusal to
deal as an antitrust claim. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, No. 79-4373 (E.D. Pa. filed
Dec. 3, 1979). For a report on the complaint, see Former WFL Franchise Owners Bring
Antitrust Action Against NFL, SPoRTS L. REP., Jan. 1980, at 1. This suit is still pending.
174. The dispute between the Los Angeles Coliseum and the NFL is actually a fight
between Al Davis of the Oakland Raiders and the other owners of NFL teams. See note 69
supra. See also San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974)
(refusal by NFL Board of Governors to permit Seals to transfer from San Francisco to
Vancouver, B.C. precipitated unsuccessful antitrust challenge by the Seals' owners).
175. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
876 (1978); Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga.
1977).
176. Even when the antitrust suit is successful, and most have not been, the plaintiff's
expectations may not be met. Joe Kapp's case is a classic example. See notes 149 & 153
supra. Kapp won the battle but lost the war. The court found that the various league rules
imposed on player dealings were antitrust violations, but the jury awarded Kapp no dam-
ages. The memories still must haunt Kapp, and although he says he would sue again, one
wonders. Kapp Victory Seems Empty, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1981, § C, at 11, col 1.
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If greater aid is to be found, it may emerge through yet unarticu-
lated legal devices. This hope, however, is faint. It is more likely
that changes in consumer tastes and advances in technologies may
force professional sports leagues to be truly competitive enter-
prises.
t7 7
C. The Pick-and-Roll. Labor
From the previous discussion of the contracts and antitrust
cases, it is obvious that, even with victories in hand, the players
perceived the need for a more comprehensive legal solution. Cer-
tain restrictive practices, long embedded in professional sports,
had been eliminated, but their replacement was undefined. The
critical time period was from 1974 through 1976 when it became
imperative for labor law and labor relations to assume a central
role in shaping the structure of modem professional sports. 78
Such a role represented a significant departure from the role of
unionism in sports only a few years earlier.
Until 1969, however, it was unclear that the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) would take jurisdiction over profes-
sional sports. The Board had characterized horse racing as a local
activity beyond its purview. 79  Baseball umpires then began
177. See notes 531-33 infra and accompanying text.
178. In the mid-1970's, the collective bargaining agreements in all four major team
sports were ending. Owners and players were largely at an impasse. Though the baseball
owners had prevailed in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the players were determined
to successfully challenge the restraints on their movement. It appeared for awhile that
Bobby Tolan of the San Diego Padres would be a successful vehicle for this challenge.
Chass, Tolan's Case Rated Serious, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1975, at 21, col. 2. Tolan's griev-
ance, however, was withdrawn before the arbitrators could determine his fate. Tolan's Case
Is Withdrawn, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1975, § 3, at 39, col. 7. The task was left to Andy
Messersmith and Dave McNally. See notes 216-37 infra and accompanying text. Of
equally crucial impact in the mid-1970's were the Kapp, Mackey, and Smith cases in foot-
ball. See note 153 supra & notes 276-324 infra and accompanying text. In basketball, the
concern was over the future of the NBA and its rival, the ABA. This rivalry precipitated
the Robertson litigation. See note I supra.
Hockey also was involved in litigation. Much of this litigation occurred in 1972 on the
heels of the WHA's formation, and the mid-1970's found the two leagues still wrestling
with some of the problems spawned by that circumstance. By 1974, there was no major
litigation in hockey, but the issues between rival leagues remained and had to be addressed
during the difficult collective bargaining of the mid-1970's.
179. Centennial Turf Club, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 698 (1971); Walter A. Kelley, 139
N.L.R.B. 744 (1962); Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 20 (1950). But see Celebrity
Sports Center, 169 N.L.R.B. 183 (1968); Harrah's Club, 150 N.L.R.B. 1702 (1965), en-
forced, 362 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 915 (1967); Aspen Skiing Corp.,
143 N.L.R.B. 707 (1963).
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pressing for Board recognition.1 80 Baseball was not the best sport
to advance the cause of sports unions, since the umpires faced the
Federal Baseball'81 precedent and Justice Holmes' declaration
that baseball was not interstate activity.182 As expected, the base-
ball leagues relied on Holmes' declaration, urging that the Board's
jurisdiction under the federal labor law be limited to businesses
engaged in interstate commerce and controlled by the employers.
The leagues argued further that, without Board regulation, the in-
dustry would be subject to many different labor laws depending
on the locality in which the dispute arose. The Board, however,
accepted the union's argument:
i8 3
The system appears to have been designed almost entirely by
employers and owners, and the final arbiter of internal disputes
does not appear to be a neutral third party freely chosen by
both sides, but rather an individual appointed solely by the
member club owners themselves. We do not believe that such a
system is either likely to prevent labor disputes from arising in
the future, or, having once arisen, to resolve them in a manner
susceptible or conducive to voluntary compliance by all parties
involved. Moreover, it is patently contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Act for the Board to defer its undoubted jurisdic-
tion to decide unfair labor practices to a dispute settlement sys-
tem established unilaterally by an employer or group of
employers.18 4
The Board also observed that many employees--other than
those involved in the petition for representation filed in the
case--were not involved in any kind of self-regulation system.'" 5
If the Board declined jurisdiction over the industry, such employ-
ees would be deprived of any representation or dispute settlement
machinery. The Board, examining the legislative history, found
no intent to exclude sports when Congress refused to include base-
ball under the antitrust laws:
Nowhere in Congress' deliberations is there any indication that
these basic rights [freedom of association, self-organization,
and selection of representatives of their own choosing] are not
to be extended to employees employed in professional baseball
180. The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
181. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
182. Id at 208-09. See text accompanying note 126 supra for Justice Holmes'
statement.
183. 180 N.L.R.B. at 191.
184. Id Major League Rodeo, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 113 (1979); North Am. Soccer
League, 236 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1978); North Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1975);
Volusia Jai Alai, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1975).
185. 180 N.L.R.B. at 191.
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or any other professional sport. We do not agree that Congress,
by refusing to pass legislation subjecting the sport to the anti-
trust laws when it considered the regulation of baseball and
other sports under the antitrust statutes, sanctioned a govern-
mentwide policy of 'non-involvement' in all matters pertaining
to baseball. Indeed, to the extent that Congressional delibera-
tion on the antitrust question has reference to the issue before
us, it indicates agreement that players' rights to bargain collec-
tively and engage in concerted activities ought to be protected
rather than limited.18 6
This decision coincided roughly with the first collective bar-
gaining agreements forged between the nascent players union1 87
and the various major league teams. According to Larry
Fleischer, director of the NBPA in 1962, it was not until 1966 that
the owners were willing to talk with him. In 1967, however, the
players and NBA owners entered into the first collective bargain-
ing agreement in professional sports history.18 8  Agreements in
baseball and football followed shortly thereafter. The MLBPA
reached an agreement with the owners in 1968, shortly after
the arrival of the influential Marvin Miller as director of the
MLBPA.8 9 The agreement was modest compared to those made
subsequently, but it provided some significant gains for the play-
ers. The agreement raised the minimum salary to $10,000, pro-
vided for arbitration of grievances, and demanded a study
committee to examine the reserve clause.190 Both the NFL and
the about-to-be merged AFL, completed similarly significant, yet
rudimentary, agreements a few months later.'9' With collective
186. Id at 192.
187. There have been players groups at various times since the 1880's in baseball. To
label these organizations unions, however, ignores the players' attempts to disavow that
their players groups were unions. Consequently, it is still safe to characterize their union
activities as "nascent" in the late 1960's. See notes 2 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
188. ProposedAmendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Hearings on HR.A 7152
Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comn on Education and Labor, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 65-67 (1972) (statement of Lawrence Fleisher) [hereinafter cited as 1972
Hearings].
189. For an account of the enormous impact Marvin Miller has had on labor relations
in baseball, see L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN, supra note 15, at 195-205.
190. Id at 203. The $10,000 minimum salary may seem low compared to today's base-
ball minimum of $32,500, but it was an increase of almost 50% from the $7,000 base that
existed before the 1968 agreement. The committee appointed to study the reserve clause
merely established the principle that restraints on player mobility were proper topics for
collective bargaining.
191. Although the players associations in football obtained agreements with the owners
in 1968, the association did not establish with finality that their groups were the recognized
bargaining agents. After the NFL-AFL merger and the consequent merging of the two
players associations, the owners initially refused to recognize the combined bargaining
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bargaining agreements in these three sports and agreements in
hockey soon to follow, the union movement in professional team
sports was a pervasive reality, although the strength of these as-
sociations had not been tested fully. 192 All leagues showed a simi-
lar pattern; their early agreements skirted many tough issues and
each succeeding agreement weakened traditional management
prerogatives. Powers and rights slowly shifted away from the
owners to include the players as well.
The ascendancy of players associations and the advent of col-
lective agreements were based, in part, on a growing sentiment
among the players that their grievances were being ignored and
that unanimity was needed. Fortunately for the players, there
were people available from whom they could seek advice on
resolving these grievances. 193
In addition to a growing awareness of the possible strengths of
collective efforts, three types of concerted action helped develop
the potency of collective bargaining in sports. The first type of
concerted action was the strike weapon. The second, noted ear-
lier, was antitrust litigation. Finally, the third, an outgrowth of
collective bargaining, was the arbitration of grievances and salary
disputes arising under the collective agreement (rights disputes).
While the second and third approaches, particularly baseball sal-
ary arbitration, have achieved the most obvious gains, strikes and
threats to strike should not be underestimated.
The first indication players would strike for their rights sur-
faced in the NBA in early 1964. Upset over the owners' position
regarding contributions to be made to the newly established
player pension fund, the players threatened a boycott at the
league's All-Star game. The players delayed the start of the con-
test for several minutes until, in a locker room confrontation, they
received guarantees that the owners would take positive action. 194
unit. This nonrecognition served to complicate the 1970 negotiations over a new agree-
ment. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 188, at 13-15 (statement of Ed Garvey).
192. Id
193. The individuals giving advice to players were not uniformly in favor of a strong
and cohesive union. Creighton Miller, director of the NFLPA, largely favored a concilia-
tory posture. See note 2 supra. Some players who were especially critical of Miller's stance
started a movement to form a rival group, the American Federation of Professional Ath-
letes, which considered affiliation with the Teamsters. A leader in this movement was ex-
Cleveland Browns player Bernie Parrish. See J. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 244-45. For
Parrish's own account of the problems with Miller and the attempts to form another associ-
ation, see B. PARRISH, THEY CALL IT A GAME 237-61, 271 (1971).
194. NBA4 Players Threaten Strike in Dispute Over Pension Plan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15,
1964, at 34, col. 3.
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The first full-scale, league-wide strike occurred in the NFL in
the fall of 1968. As with the NBA dispute four years earlier, the
bone of contention was the owners' contribution to the pension
fund. This contribution was the sole issue preventing the first col-
lective agreement in football, and negotiations became difficult
and heated. After reaching an impasse in negotiations, the players
boycotted the preseason training camps. The owners then retali-
ated with a lockout. Only then, with the battle lines firmly drawn,
did the sides agree to talk. Within a few days, the parties reached
an agreement. 95 It was not a long or bitter strike, but the boycott
and resulting lockout influenced the parties' willingness to resume
talks and reach an agreement.
Baseball has seen numerous threats of strikes and, particularly
in light of the 1981 strike, more than its share of actual ones. The
first threat was in 1969 when the parties disagreed on the percent-
age of receipts the players' pension fund should receive from the
leagues' national television contract. A shortlived training camp
boycott resulted.196 Again in 1972, pension issues led to a walkout
that delayed the start of the baseball season for several days.
Games were cancelled and, under the agreement that was eventu-
ally reached, were never rescheduled. This episode was followed
by a lockout during spring training in 1976197 and by a walkout in
the waning stages of the baseball preseason in 1980, with the
threat of a full-scale strike in May of that year. The proposed
1980 strike was narrowly averted by a new collective bargaining
agreement that granted several additional benefits to players but
postponed a decision on the thorny free-agent question.1 98 When
the members of the joint player-owner committee appointed to
study the question could not agree, the owners announced that
they would implement their proposal for a free agent system
which had been included provisionally in the 1980 accord. The
players responded by declaring a strike. Although delayed by le-
gal maneuvering, 199 the strike was called in June, 1981 and con-
tinued into August, setting a new record for sports strikes. The
success of the strike and the declaration of winners and losers will
195. See J. WEISTART & C. LokELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 6.01, at 779 (1979). The
NFL also experienced a three day strike and subsequent seventeen day lockout in 1970.
Id § 6.09, at 828.
196. Id § 6.01, at 779.
197. See J. DwoRKiN, supra note 2, at 34-35.
198. Id at 35-37.
199. See, eg., Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 516
F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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continue to be debated. It is evident, however, that the strike suc-
ceeded in stimulating awareness that a labor dispute could
threaten a league's existence or, at a minimum, the conclusion of a
playing season. Thus, while neither the player boycotts nor lock-
outs by owners have been unqualified successes, they have prod-
ded the two sides toward reaching new agreements, as evidenced
by the 1981 baseball agreement and the agreements in years past.
In 1974, however, a football strike was definitely a fail-
ure-and nearly a disaster. The collective bargaining agreement
at issue that year had expired, and the owners and players were
far from agreement, particularly over any changes in player mo-
bility rules. The players voted to strike, and most of them did
strike. Rookies were urged not to report to training camps, but
many reported. Other aspiring professional players arrived on the
scene and were labelled "scabs" by the striking players. Public
sentiment was assuredly against the players. The players' position
weakened daily as more of them relinquished the fight and re-
ported to preseason camp. After forty-four days, the strike ended
in a whimper, with all players returning to camp under a fourteen-
day moratorium that became moot when the players decided not
to resume the strike at the end of the period.2°°
If the players had not initiated a second line of attack, the
union movement in football might have died. Although dissen-
tion racked the players association, there was still the antitrust
weapon. The decision in Kapp v. NFL20 1 held early promise, but
it was so diffuse that its ultimate effects were uncertain. This dif-
fusion did not exist in Mackey v. NFL20 2 and its companion case,
Alexander v. NFL.203 After an extended trial, the players scored
an important triumph in Mackey and scored again in Alexander.
The direct result of these cases was a multimillion dollar cash set-
tlement20° and the owners' promise to negotiate a new collective
200. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 195, § 6.01, at 782-83. See also NFL
Owner Offer Rejected by Players, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1974, at 21, col. 1; Players Halt
Strike 14 Days; Report to Camps Wednesday, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1974, at 31, coL 1.
201. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aj7'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 907 (1979).
202. Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), moded, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). For a discussion of Mfackey, see notes
276-95 infra and accompanying text.
203. [1977-2 TRADE CASES 1 72,983], D. Ct. Minn. (1977).
204. Defendants in this section will make settlement payments totaling $13,675 million
in full satisfaction and release of all claims, costs, and attorneys' fees in the section. De-
fendants will also make settlement payments totaling $2.2 million in full satisfaction and
release of all claims, costs, attorneys' fees, and reimbursement of all costs incurred by the
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pact. It has been suggested that the players had the owners' backs
to the wall and yet did not exact a sufficient settlement in their
1977 collective bargaining agreement.2"5 At this point, it is impor-
tant only to note that antitrust was a direct, powerful, and most
influential force in moving sports management and labor toward
collective bargaining. In addition to football, this force has af-
fected basketball and hockey.206
Baseball, of course, was different, particularly with Federal
Baseball20 7 and Flood "2°8 casting lengthy shadows over its business
methods. Since antitrust was not available in this sport, the viable
alternative was arbitration. In 1973, the players association and
the owners negotiated several arbitration provisions in the new
collective bargaining agreement.20 9 These provisions were the
portent of change for the national pastime.
In 1974, Oakland pitcher Jim "Catfish" Hunter and Oakland's
owner, Charles 0. Finley, had a confrontation. Hunter had
finished the previous season with an impressive 25-13 win-loss
record. The twenty-eight-year-old pitcher had been a twenty
game winner for four consecutive seasons and had compiled a to-
tal of eighty-eight wins during his four years with the Oakland
A's. The A's and Hunter had agreed on a two year contract
whereby $50,000 of Hunter's salary would be paid to him directly
and the remaining $50,000 would be paid to a deferment plan of
Hunter's choice. Hunter had requested a specific deferred pay-
ment provision which would enable him to avoid immediate tax
liability. Finley agreed to the provision but later discovered that
he, personally, would incur resultant tax liability. Finley insisted
that the contract clause did not require him to assume this burden.
During the 1974 season, consequently, Hunter routinely received
NFLPA in connection with the Mackey case. Notice to Persons Who Are Now or Have
Been Under Contract to a Member Club of the National Football League At Any Time
From September 17, 1972 to March 1, 1977, reprintedin The Sporting News, May 21, 1977,
at 17, col. 2. Several football players, both active and retired, responded to the notice and
challenged the terms of the settlement. The courts, however, upheld the settlement agree-
ment. See note 342 infra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 413-28 infra and accompanying text.
206. See Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
207. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See notes 122-26 supra and accompanying text.
208. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). For a discussion of Flood, see notes 133-37 supra and accom-
panying text.
209. Basic Agreement Between the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs
and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League Baseball Play-
ers Association art. V, D(6)-(8); art. X (Jan. 1, 1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Baseball
Basic Agreement].
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the portion of his salary that was to be paid directly to him, but
the deferred payments were not made to the designated invest-
ment company. The season ended with the deferred payments
still not made, despite Hunter's repeated requests. Hunter
claimed that Finley's failure to make payments constituted a
breach of contract, thus enabling the pitcher to exercise his right
to terminate the contract. Hunter then announced that since he
had no contract, he was a free agent. Finley insisted that no free
agent question was involved, that the only dispute concerned the
method of payment, and that the dispute was merely a matter of
contract interpretation. Finley offered the other $50,000 to Hunter
as direct payment, but Hunter rejected this offer as contrary to his
contractual rights.
The case was submitted under the applicable collective bar-
gaining procedures to Arbitrator Peter Seitz. Seitz ruled in
Hunter's favor, finding no ambiguity in the contract language out-
lining the club's obligations. According to Seitz, the club failed to
perform, thus enabling Hunter rightfully to terminate. The arbi-
trator rejected Finley's contention that no breach could occur until
the arbitration established whether the club was obligated to meet
Hunter's demands. Seitz further ruled that Hunter no longer had
a valid contract with the A's. Hunter was, therefore, a free agent
and could entertain offers from any other major league club.210
On December 31, 1974, the "Catfish"22 ' accepted an offer from
210. The Hunter free agency saga captured the media's attention since baseball was a
sport historically immune from antitrust The following chronological reports highlight the
unfolding of the drama: Koppett,.4 HunterRuledFreeAgent, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1974,
at 51, col. 5; Koppett, Real Hunter Fuss Is On Bidding, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1974, at 45,
col. 5; Anderson, Caffsh and His Country Lawyer, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1974, at 63, coL 5;
Koppett, Finley Hope Hangs By a Legal Thread, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1974, at 47, col. 1;
FinleyAccused of Perury, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1974, at 13, col. 6; Smith, Dred Scott and
Some Other Guys, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1974, at 41, col. 2; Chass, Yankees Sign Up Cash
Hunter In Estimated $3.75-Million Deal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 5; Chass,
Hunter Salary Is "Only'S150,000, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1975, at 43, col. 1. For an account of
the established procedure to allow the clubs to bid for Hunter's services, see B. LIaBY,
CATFISH: THE THREE MILLION DOLLAR PITCHER 7-41 (1976).
211. Great speculation centered around the origin of James Augustus Hunter's famous
nickname "Catfish." The popular theory is that the owner of the Oakland As, and
Hunter's eventual adversary, Charles 0. Finley, revived the name given Hunter as a child
to make his star pitcher more colorful. The childhood story supposedly relates that Hunter
had been gone from home several hours, and his parents were worried and looking for him.
Hunter wandered home on his own, carrying two catfish. His parents thus called him Cat-
fish. See H. FROMMER, SPORTS RoOTs 35 (1979); THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPORTS TAL,
supra note 123, at 51. Doubt, however, is cast on this story by a conflicting account in a
Hunter biography. Hunter contends that the appellation was a complete invention. Finley
was looking for a nickname for Hunter and mentioned it in casual conversation to Hunter's
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the New York Yankees for an unprecedented salary package.
Hunter received a $1 million signing bonus, $150,000 salary per
year for five years, life insurance benefits worth $1 million, and a
substantial amount of deferred compensation. 1 2 Only later was it
learned that the bidding for Hunter had exceeded the Yankees'
offer. At trial in the Joe Kapp case, evidence disclosed that
Hunter rejected a $3.8 million offer from the Kansas City Royals.
This testimony, by Hunter's lawyers, was admitted for the limited
purpose of showing how open competition for players might affect
salaries.21 3 This evidence apparently did not impress the Kapp
jury, since it awarded no damages to Kapp even though he had
been forced to deal in something less than a free market.21 4 Later
events, however, have demonstrated the value of free agency to
players. Perhaps the Hunter situation was a harbinger, but it in-
volved special circumstances. An obstinate owner materially
breached a contract, thus freeing his star player. These circum-
stances are rare.215
The players needed to mount a frontal attack on baseball's re-
serve system. This attack came, at length, through the grievances
of pitchers Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and
Dave McNally of the Montreal Expos.216 These players claimed
to be free agents, contending that the sacred reserve clause was
only a one-year option. When their request to be declared free
agents was denied, a grievance was filed.
The leagues and clubs asserted that the contract had not ex-
brother, Pete, who recounted that Jim liked to fish and, as a boy, would eat only catfish.
"That's it," Charlie said, "We'll call you Catfish. Catfish Hunter." B. LiBy, supra note
210, at 52.
212. B. LIBBY, supra note 210, at 157.
213. Hunter Bids Told to Kapp Jury, S.F. Chronicle, March 19, 1976, at 55, col. 5.
214. Kapp v. NFL, 586 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1978).
215. The case involving Ken Harrelson is another example of Finley's ability to gener-
ate conflict. Finley had been at war with members of the Kansas City As, making state-
ments and imposing restrictions. Harrelson, a first baseman, on the team, was quoted in
the newspapers as calling Finley "a menace to basebalL" The "Hawk's" account is that
Charley Finley's actions in the last few days have been bad for baseball. I think they have
been detrimental to the game." K. HARRELSON & A. HiRSHMBERG, HAWK 187 (1969).
Whatever the case, Finley announced he was terminating Harrelson's contract and that
Harrelson was on longer with the As. For Harrelson, although initially stunned, the tim-
ing could not have been better.
The episode occurred in August 1967. The American League had a four-way fight for
the pennant, involving Minnesota, Chicago, Detroit, and Boston. Harrelson, a promising,
young, hard-hitting outfielder was available, and the bidding began. When it was over,
Harrelson's $12,000 a year salary had increased over $100,000 per year. Id at 200-04.
216. Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.).
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pired because, under the option clause, the contract created a new
option.21 7 As long as the clubs duly "reserved" their players each
year, new options would be created perpetually. The owners not
only contested the grievance on the merits but also contended that
the matter was not properly the subject of arbitration.218 To sup-
port this contention, the owners referred to the 1973 Basic Agree-
ment, article XV, which stipulated that the agreement "does not
deal with the reserve system. ' 219 The agreement further stated
that contractual language should not prejudice the position of ei-
ther side. The owners' position was that article XV deprived the
arbitrator of power to arbitrate on the core of the reserve sys-
tem.220 As the arbitrator noted: "This system of reservation of
exclusive control is historic in baseball and is traceable to the
early days of the organized sport in the 19th century."'" If the
arbitrator accepted management's interpretation of article XV, he
would be confronted with a paradox. On the one hand, the stan-
dard players contract was incorporated in the basic agreement and
part of the core of the reserve system, as characterized by the
league, was in that contract. On the other hand, the owners relied
on the language of article XV to mean that the agreement did not
"deal" with the reserve system.2 2 Arbitrator Seitz noted that the
legality of the reserve clause was at issue in Flood, that the parties
had "agreed to disagree" about its continuation from the 1968
agreement onward, and that the reserve system remained, there-
fore, "untouched" and in existence.22 The arbitrator accordingly
found that the contract provisions represented a type of "cease
fire" over the issue while the matter was litigated. Since the basic
agreement incorporated the players contract,224 and since the
players contended they were free agents once their individual con-
tracts expired, the arbitrator found that he did, in fact, have au-
thority to resolve the dispute.'
The arbitrator interpreted the Uniform Players Contract lan-
guage, which provided for renewal "for the period of one year," as
a renewal clause which "does not warrant interpreting the section
217. Id at 102.
218. Id at 101-02.
219. 1973 Baseball Basic Agreement, supra note 209, art. XV.
220. 66 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. at 102.
221. Id at 104.
222. Id at 106-07.
223. Id at 107-08.
224. 1973 Baseball Basic Agreement, supra note 209, art. III.
225. 66 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. at 110.
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as providing for contract renewal beyond the contract year."
"When that year comes to an end, the Player no longer has con-
tractual duties that bind him to the Club." '226 In light of the con-
siderable impact the award would have on the parties, the
arbitrator repeatedly urged them to negotiate a new system.227
Realistically, the owners were faced with two alternatives. The
first alternative was to allow McNally and Messersmith to become
free agents. This decision would have allowed the owners to ar-
gue that the principle of stare decisis, not being as embedded in
the arbitration system as in the judiciary, 8 would not bind an-
other arbitrator to Arbitrator Seitz' interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. This option would have created uncer-
tainty, especially given the expiration of the collective agreement
and the imminent expiration of numerous individual contracts.
The owners' second option was to negotiate more vigorously with
the association about changes in the reserve system-a process ini-
tiated in the summer of 1976.
The owners, however, chose to litigate. This choice was made
226. Id at 116.
227. Id at 117-18.
228. For a discussion of the use of precedent in the arbitration of labor-management
disputes, see E. ELKOURI & F. ELKOUm, How ARBITRATION WORKs 365-68 (3d ed. 1973).
In contrast to the judicial system, where the stare decisis concept renders prior decisions
authoritative, prior arbitration awards are considered "helpful," but not binding. Arbitra-
tors emphasize the unusual circumstances of each dispute they resolve.
A word as to arbitrators' opinions. Unlike judges who write opinions for the legal
profession and people in general, arbitrators may write their opinions solely for
the parties before them. The opinion may serve an independent educational pur-
pose; and to serve that purpose, it must be adapted to the character of the particu-
lar parties. Accordingly, particular language, a simplification, an exaggeration, a
sermon, a "wise-crack," an emphasis, or an ellipsis which may seem out of place
or in bad taste for an article for general distribution may have been deliberately
employed for the eyes of the particular parties; and conversely what may seem
otherwise proper may be out of place or in bad taste in the particular situation.
Such, at least, is the view of some umpires.
H. SHULMAN & N. CHAMBERLAIN, CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 7 (1949).
Precedential value is greater in a permanent umpireship where one arbitrator resolves
disputes for the duration of the agreement than under a relationship in which different
arbitrators are selected on an ad hoc basis. See Shulman, Reason, Contract Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1019-21 (1955). The involvement of the judiciary in
arbitration has meant the courts often are asked to determine whether an award applies to
a particular controversy or whether a new dispute is presented by the facts, thus requiring
invocation of an arbitration process in which precedent will not necessarily be followed.
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.
1981); Boston Shipping Ass'n, Inc. v. Longshoreman's Ass'n, 108 L.R.R.M. 2449 (Ist Cir.
1981). "Absent a provision in the contract to the contrary, the arbitrator could reasonably
conclude that strict adherence to stare decisis would impair the flexibility of the arbitral
process contemplated by the parties." Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Local Joint Executive
Board of Las Vegas, 578 F.2d 250, 251 (9th Cir. 1978).
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despite the arbitrator's indication that he would resolve the issue
adversely to the owners and despite the Supreme Court's declara-
tion in the Steelworkers Trilogy 229 that the courts will not reverse a
labor arbitration award in the absence of "clear infidelity" to the
agreement. Not surprisingly, the courts, pursuant to the Steel-
workers standards, affirmed the award. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major
League Baseball Players Association 3 ' concluded that the arbitra-
tor had jurisdiction to resolve the issue. Steelworkers Trilogy in-
structed that courts only should conclude that an issue cannot be
arbitrated when there is explicit language or bargaining history
excluding the issue from the arbitration clause.231 Accordingly,
arbitrability--one of the more difficult issues presented-was re-
solved against the owners.232 The court noted that article XV and
its predecessor, article 14, were adopted as both sides maneuvered
in anticipation of the Flood case. 3 The association was willing to
negotiate language which indicated it had not addressed the free
agent issue. The association was concerned that the players, un-
happy with the handling of the reserve clause issue, might initiate
litigation on the duty of fair representation. The association
wanted to avoid this issue while Flood was pending. The owners
wanted to utilize the labor exemption defense in the Flood litiga-
tion 234 to establish that the agreement addressed the issue." The
court concluded that "manifest infidelity," a prerequisite for find-
ing that the arbitrator erroneously interpreted the agreement, was
not present.
These rulings prompted new collective bargaining. Excluding
229. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
230. 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
231. Id at 620-21. According to the Eighth Circuit:
We cannot say that Article XV, on its face, constitutes a clear exclusionary provi-
sion. First, the precise thrust of the phrase "this Agreement does not deal with the
reserve system" is unclear. The agreement incorporates the provisions which
compromise the reserve system [the incorporation of the uniform Players Con-
tract]. Also, the phrase is qualified by the words "except as adjusted or modified
hereby." Second, the impact of the language "This Agreement shall in no way
prejudice the position.., of the Parties" is uncertain. Third, the "concerted
action" which the parties agreed to forego does not clearly include bringing
grievances.
Id at 622-23.
232. Id at 626.
233. Id
234. Id at 624.
235. Id at 625.
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those players bound by long term contracts, the owners faced the
prospect that all players would become free agents at the end of
the 1976 season, or soon thereafter, because of the Seitz award and
its affirmance in Kansas City Royals. The Eighth Circuit, follow-
ing Mackey, 236 urged the parties to resolve their problems through
collective bargaining:
[W]e intimate no views on the merits of the reserve system. We
note, however, that club Owners and the Players Association's
representatives agree that some form of a reserve system is
needed if the integrity of the game is to be preserved and if
public confidence in baseball is to be maintained. The disa-
greement lies over the degree of control necessary if these goals
are to be achieved. Certainly, the parties are in a better posi-
tion to negotiate their differences than to have them decided in
a series of arbitrations and court decisions. We commend them
to that process and suggest that the time for obfuscation has
passed and the time for plain talk and clear language has -ar-
rived. Baseball fans everywhere expect nothing less. 3 7
The call for collective bargaining was sounded over issues
most critical to the lifeblood of professional sports. Free agency
and resultant compensation, full arbitration of grievances, the
draft of nonleague players, and even the- rules of the games were
all potential roadblocks to successful negotiation. Aided by con-
certed union activities, antitrust litigation, and an arbitrator who
severed the reserve lock in baseball, labor law and labor relations
moved to the forefront. Sports was no longer merely the business
of giving exhibitions; 38 it was a complex of industries, each with
challenges to meet in the 1980's.
III. THE LABOR LAW OF SPORTS
The long drive to collective bargaining in professional sports
has culminated in agreements of pervasive impact on the indus-
tries. These industries now address most issues of vital impor-
tance to both labor and management. The approaches taken by
different leagues in their respective agreements reflect, to a degree,
fundamental variations among the sports leagues themselves. As
to some provisions, however, it is unclear whether they are re-
sponses to the exigencies of a particular sport or whether labor
and management simply have recast old themes, without regard to
future realities and needs. Nonetheless, labor law and labor rela-
236. See notes 281-88 infra and accompanying text.
237. 532 F.2d at 632.
238. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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tions are at the forefront in influencing league operations. A labor
law of sports is developing and is preeminent today as a legal cat-
alyst for the industries.239
This section concentrates on the most significant develop-
ments. First, there is a growing body of case law encouraging
both labor and management to opt for collective bargaining.
These cases underscore the benefits attainable through the labor
exemption of the antitrust laws, both as insulation for manage-
ment and as bargaining leverage for the players. 2"° Second, there
are major trends toward collective bargaining covering such issues
as player mobility, the possible range of mandatory subjects of
bargaining, and arbitration as a labor-management dispute reso-
lution process. Finally, there are the unresolved issues, the most
notable of which are continuing problems over definition and con-
trol of the bargaining unit and questions about exclusivity in
sports labor dealings. These analyses describe the heart of the
present situation and foreshadow the discussion in the Article's
final section concerning the future of labor law in the sports
industries.
A. Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Labor Exemption
As in American labor management relations law generally, la-
bor litigation in the sports industry must refer to the antitrust liti-
gation which preceded it. The historical context for antitrust
litigation is considerably different for sports than for other indus-
tries. In industrial relations, the courts utilized the antitrust laws
as a repressive weapon and attempted to thwart trade union orga-
nizations and their collective bargaining goals.24' In contrast,
trade unions or players associations in professional sports have
benefitted from the modem labor-antitrust cases. Despite the le-
gal restraints otherwise imposed on the union, the courts have
provided athletes an advantage in their battle to gain credibility at
the bargaining table and to negotiate effectively over player mo-
bility issues.
239. Despite the preeminence of labor law in the sports industries today, it should be
repeated that there are still legal areas vital to sports which are relatively untouched by
labor considerations. See notes 59 & 172-75 supra.
240. See note 169 supra.
241. See, eg., Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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1. Background Cases
The antitrust cases begin with United States v. Hutcheson242 in
which the Court held that if a union acts in its own "self-interest"
and does not combine with nonlabor groups, its conduct is immu-
nized from antitrust liability.243 This provision is the so-called
statutory exemption to antitrust liability. Under this exemption,
the Court invoked the policies of other modem labor legislation,
such as the Clayton Antitrust Act2' and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act245 to interpret antitrust legislation in a manner compatible
with some aspects of contemporary trade union behavior.246 The
Court thought the Hutcheson rule would harmonize and reconcile
the competing policies of the statutes involved. The Court con-
centrated on the antitrust laws, which prohibit practices designed
to suppress or eliminate competition between firms, and the labor
laws, which promote freedom of association among workers to
foster the collective bargaining process and to remove labor cost
competition between firais.247
In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,24 8 the Court held that
union-employer agreements aimed at boycotting unorganized lo-
cal contractors and manufacturers and barring the importation of
equipment manufactured outside of the local area,249 were a com-
bination which constituted a conspiracy to monopolize the trade.
The Court noted that the labor and antitrust statutes sometimes
promoted separate and competing policies. The policy of preserv-
ing a competitive business economy, for example, may conflict
242. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
243. Id at 232.
244. Clayton Act of 1914, §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
245. Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 1-15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
246. 312 U.S. at 234-36.
247. See, ag., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), where the Court stated:
A combination of employees necessarily restrains competition among them-
selves in the sale of their services to the employer, yet such a combination was not
considered an illegal restraint of trade at common law when the Sherman Act was
adopted, either because it was not thought to be unreasonable or because it was
not deemed a "restraint of trade." Since the enactment of the declaration in § 6
of the Clayton Act that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
ofcommerce... nor shall such [labor] organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in the restraint of
trade under the antitrust laws," it would seem plain that restraints on the sale of
the employee's services to the employer, however much they curtail the competi-
tion among employees, are not in themselves combinations or conspiracies in re-
straint of trade or commerce under the Sherman Act.
Id at 502-03 (citation omitted).
248. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
249. Id at 799-800.
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with the policy of preserving "the rights of labor to organize to
better its conditions through the agency of collective bargain-
ing."250 In Alen Bradley, the unlawful conspiracy was between
labor and nonlabor groups and was aimed at controlling the mar-
keting of goods and services.251 Justice Black, writing for the
Court, stated: "A business monopoly is no less such because a
union participates, and such participation is a violation of the
Act."2
52
The next two major decisions were made in 1965. These cases
represent the so-called nonstatutory exemption of antitrust liabil-
ity where the union, through an agreement with an employer
group, attempts to promote its interests and, in so doing, induces
restraints in a product market. The first case was UMW v. Pen-
nington25 3 in which a coal company cross-claimed in a suit by the
trustees of the Welfare and Retirement Fund to recover royalty
payments owed under the agreement. The cross-claim alleged an
unlawful conspiracy between the UMW Welfare and Retirement
Fund trustees and the large coal operators to violate the antitrust
laws. The argument, essentially, was that the union agreed with
the large coal operators to abandon its established stand against
mechanized equipment and technological innovation in the mines
in exchange for higher wages and royalty payments. 254 The union
allegedly imposed a wage and benefit package that smaller opera-
tors could not meet. It was further alleged that the union engaged
in a collusive bidding agreement designed to drive such operators
from the market.255
Justice White, writing for two other Justices, 256 noted that na-
tional labor law sanctioned multiemployer bargaining. Such bar-
gaining was held not to violate the antitrust laws in that a union
might "as a matter of its own policy and not by agreement with all
or part of the employers of that unit, seek the same wages from
other employers. '257  Justice White, in contrast to Justice
250. Id at 811.
251. Id at 806.
252. Id at 811.
253. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
254. Id at 656-60.
255. Id at 660-61.
256. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined Justice White. Justices Black,
Douglas, and Clark joined in a concurring opinion. Justices Harlan, Stewart, and
Goldberg dissented from the opinion, but concurred in the judgment.
257. 381 U.S. at 664.
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Goldberg's position in his separate opinion,'-" rejected the view
that an agreement was immunized because its subject matter con-
stituted a mandatory subject of bargaining for labor and man-
agement under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).259
Despite the mandatory nature of the issues, the nonstatutory ex-
emption would not prevail where the resulting agreement imposed
terms on small employers that revealed the "predatory" intent of
unions and large employers to injure the small employers. Addi-
tionally, if the agreement interfered with the union's ability to act
in its self-interest,260 it was unlawful. The Alen Bradley and Pen-
nington cases dramatize a single, recurrent theme in sports cases.
There is great judicial concern about possible injury to a third
party not immediately involved in the union-employer relation-
ship. This concern was for nonunion and nonlocal manufacturers
and contractors in Allen Bradley;261 in Pennington, it was for the
small coal operators.262
The second 1965 Supreme Court decision, Local 189, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. ,263 indicated that public in-
jury due to product restraints could give rise to antitrust liability
when trade unions negotiated such restraints. In Jewel Tea, an
employer refused to sign a multiemployer collective bargaining
agreement which litigated the hours for the sale of meat. The
Court's plurality opinion 2 "4 initially rejected the argument that the
subject matter involved in the union's demand was a mandatory
bargaining subject within the meaning of the NLRA. Second, the
Supreme Court declared that courts should not defer to the pri-
mary jurisdiction of the Board265 because courts are not "without
experience in classifying bargaining subjects as terms of condi-
tions of employment. 266 The Court also found deference to the
Board particularly inappropriate where the "controlling legal is-
sue" was "wholly unrelated" to determinations in which the
Board normally engages, such as unfair labor practice orders. Fi-
258. Id at 697.
259. Id at 664-65. But see id at 710 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
260. Id at 666.
261. See notes 248-52 supra and accompanying text.
262. See notes 253-60 supra and accompanying text.
263. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
264. Justice White delivered the Court's opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan joined. Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Goldberg dissented from the opin-
ion but concurred in the reversal of the Seventh Circuit. Justices Black, Douglas, and
Clark dissented.
265. 381 U.S. at 686.
266. Id
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nally, the Court noted that if the parties were remitted to the
Board's primary jurisdiction, there was a "substantial probability"
that the plaintiff might be left without jurisdiction, either because
the statute of limitations expired 267 or because no unfair labor
practice existed.268
The Court, in finding no antitrust liability, weighed the legiti-
macy of the union's claim that the impact of the subject matter
on employment opportunities significantly affected its members
against the argument that the union's demands restrained product
consumption and thus injured a third party. Because the union's
interest in protecting its members' employment opportunities was
"immediate" and "legitimate," the labor exemption 269  was
deemed applicable and immunized the union from antitrust liabil-
ity. The third party in Jewel Tea was the consuming public, which
could not purchase goods at convenient hours. In the sports case,
the injured party is either the player, a competing league which is
injured in its ability to attract players, or the consuming public.
The peculiar relevance of Jewel Tea to the sports cases is best seen
by reference to leading cases involving league-imposed restraints
on player mobility.270 Another important theme in Pennington,
Jewel Tea, and their antecedents27' is the statutory exemp-
267. Id at 687. Section 10(b) of the NLRA imposes a six-month limitation period. 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). Jewel's complaint was filed more than six months after it signed
the 1957 collective bargaining agreement.
268. Justice White stated:
Finally, we must reject the unions' primary-jurisdiction contention because of the
absence of an available procedure for obtaining a Board determination. The
Board does not classify bargaining subjects in the abstract but only in connection
with unfair labor practice charges of refusal to bargain. The typical antitrust suit,
however, is brought by a stranger to the bargaining relationship, and the com-
plaint is not that the parties have refused to bargain but, quite the contrary, that
they have agreed. Jewel's conspiracy allegation in the present case was just such a
complaint. Agreement is of course not a refusal to bargain, and in such cases the
Board affords no mechanism for obtaining a classification of the subject matter of
the agreement. Moreover, even in the few instances when the antitrust action
could be framed as a refusal to bargain charge, there is no guarantee of Board
action. It is the function of the Board's General Counsel rather than the Board or
a private litigant to determine whether an unfair labor practice complaint will
ultimately issue. . . . And the six-month limitation period of § 10(b) of the Act
• . . would preclude many litigants from even filing a charge with the General
Counsel. Indeed, Jewel's complaint in this very case was filed more than six
months after it signed the 1957 collective bargaining agreement.
381 U.S. at 687.
269. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
270. See, e.g., notes 156, 162-63 & 230 supra. See also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (basketball); Nassau Sports v.
Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972) (hockey); text accompanying notes 276 & 296
infra.
271. It is unclear whether this constitutes a distinction between the sports cases and
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tion272 which concerns a union's self-interest as a prerequisite to
antitrust immunity. In Jewel Tea, the Court attempted to define
self-interest. When the agreement is "intimately related to wages,
hours, and working conditions"273 and the union members' con-
cern is "immediate and direct,"'27 4 an agreement "pursuant to
what the labor unions deemed to be in their own labor union in-
terests"2 75 is appropriate.
2. The Sports Cases
The most important of the modern sport-labor cases is Mackey
v. NFL.276 Judge Larson, the trial judge in that case, concluded
that the Rozelle Rule was an illegal combination or conspiracy
and restraint of trade in violation of antitrust law and thus denied
professional football players the right to contract freely for their
277 TeRzservices. The Rozelle Rule permitted a player whose contrac-
tual obligation to a team expired to sign with a different club. The
signing club was required, however, to compensate the player's
former team. If the two clubs did not reach a satisfactory agree-
ment, the commissioner had discretion to award compensation in
the form of players or draft choices.278 The gravamen of the
Mackey complaint was that the unbridled discretion of the com-
missioner thwarted the free movement of players between teams
in the NFL.
The district judge held that the Rozelle Rule constituted a
form of group boycott or a refusal by teams to deal with play-
ers-a per se violation of the antitrust laws.279 The court also fo-
cused on the NFL's contention that the Rozelle Rule was a part of
the collective bargaining agreement and thus a labor exemption to
the antitrust laws. In rejecting this contention, Judge Larson
stated that the labor exemption was aimed at the collective bar-
gaining process which had not operated with regard to the Rozelle
those in which it is alleged that employers violate antitrust law where they boycott union-
ized employers. Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 105 L.R.RM. 3311 (9th Cir.
1980). Cf Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local Union 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975).
272. See note 242 supra and accompanying text.
273. 381 U.S. at 689.
274. Id at 691.
275. Id at 688.
276. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), mod#Fed, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
277. Id at 1007.
278. Id at 1004.
279. Id at 1009-10.
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Rule. Stressing this point, Judge Larson noted that the NFL was
a "weak union" when the first collective bargaining agreements
were negotiated, and consequently, no genuine collective bargain-
ing had occurred.28
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took a slightly different
approach. That court rejected the NFLPA's argument that only
employee groups were entitled to the labor exemption and that
the defendant-owners, therefore, could not use the exemption to
shield their behavior.281 The court stated:
Since the basis of the non-statutory exemption is the national
policy favoring collective bargaining, and since the exemption
extends to agreements, the benefits of the exemption logically
extend to both parties to the agreement. Accordingly, under
appropriate circumstances, we find that a non-labor group may
avail itself of a labor exemption.282
With regard to the labor exemption, the court noted that the
parties bargained collectively over the Rozelle Rule. The owners
relied on this fact to assert their immunity from antitrust liability.
On the other hand, the plaintiff-players association contended that
the Rozelle Rule resulted from the clubs' unilateral action and,
therefore, defendants could not assert a "colorable claim of ex-
emption." The court noted that there had been "little discussion"
concerning the Rozelle Rule and that both sides failed to assert
"concrete proposals. ' 283
The players' bargaining representative attributed the failure to
pursue modification of the negotiations to the fact that "negotia-
tions have bogged down on other issues and the union was not
strong enough to persist. '2 4 Nonetheless, the 1968 agreement in-
corporated by reference the NFL constitution and bylaws of
which the Rozelle Rule was a part. The agreement also explicitly
provided that free agent rules were not to be amended during its
term. In the negotiations prior to the 1970 agreement, the players
association deliberately determined not to make the Rozelle Rule
an issue. As noted above, there was limited discussion regarding
the Rozelle Rule, although the agreement contained a "zipper" or
"integration" clause which stated: "[This] Agreement represents a
complete and final understanding on all bargainable subjects
280. Id at 1009-11. Inadequate finances and the organization's recent formation con-
tributed to economic weakness and an inability to conduct a strike.
281. 543 F.2d at 612.
282. Id
283. Id at 612-13.
284. Id at 613.
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of negotiation among the parties during the term of this
Agreement. 285
By the commencement of the Mackey litigation, the 1970
Agreement had expired. The Eighth Circuit noted that the play-
ers association, "[slince the beginning of the 1974 negotiations
. . . , [had] consistently supported the elimination of the Rozelle
Rule. The NFLPA and the clubs have engaged in substantial bar-
gaining over that issue but have not reached an accord. '2 6 The
court reduced certain principles governing the "proper accommo-
dation of the competing labor and antitrust interests involved
here."'287 The court stated:
We find the proper accommodation to be: First, the labor pol-
icy favoring collective eminence over the antitrust laws where
the restraint on trade primarily only affects the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship .... Second, federal labor
policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agree-
ment sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of
bargaining.... Finally, the policy favoring collective bar-
gaining is furthered to the necessary degree to override the anti-
trust laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is
the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.288
The court rejected the district court's conclusion that the Ro-
zelle Rule was a nonmandatory and illegal subject of bargain-
ing.289 The court noted that although the rule concerned
interteam compensation, rather than "wages, hours, and other
terms or conditions of employment," the district court found that
the rule's effect was "to restrict the player's ability to move from
one team to another and [to depress] player salaries. '290 The
court concluded: "Accordingly, we hold that the Rozelle Rule
constitutes a mandatory bargaining subject within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act."2 91
The court observed that the collective bargaining agreement
not only referred to the issues in dispute but also contained a zip-
per (integration) clause, which presumably precluded any further
bargaining during the contract period. The court further observed
that there was no bona fide arm's-length bargaining; the provi-
sions of the Rozelle Rule, unchanged since their unilateral pro-
285. Id at 612.
286. Id
287. Id at 614.
288. Id (citations omitted).
289. Id at 615.
290. Id
291. Id
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mulgation, did not "inure to the benefit of the players or the
union;" 292 and finally, no "indirect benefit" could be found on the
ground that the Rozelle Rule was a quid pro quo for pension ben-
efits and the right to negotiate salaries individually.
293
The circuit court, changing direction slightly, rejected the dis-
trict court's conclusion that such a group boycott constituted a per
se violation and adopted the rule of reason liability test. In so
doing, the court expressed its view that the parties could avail
themselves of the nonstatutory labor exemption when their collec-
tive bargaining agreement covered the controverted mandatory
subjects of bargaining. The agreement was not the product of
"bona fide arms-length negotiations" and thus the nonstatutory
exemption protection was not available.294 The court stated:
It may be that some reasonable restrictions relating to player
transfers are necessary to the successful operation of the NFL.
The protection of mutual interest of both the players and the
clubs may indeed require this. We encourage the parties to re-
solve this question through collective bargaining. The parties
are far better situated to agreeably resolve what rules governing
player transfers are best suited for their mutual interests out of
ourt.. . . However, no mutual resolution of this issue ap-
pears within the present record. Therefore, the Rozelle Rule, as
it is presently implemented, must be set aside as an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade.295
Prior to the Eighth Circuit's Mackey decision, the District
Court for the District of Columbia, in Smith v. Pro-Football,296
held that the draft system of allocating prospective professional
football players to the clubs violated the antitrust laws and was
not protected by the labor exemption. At the time this case was
decided, the mechanics of the NFL draft provided that the team
with the worst winning percentage chose first. Every team had
one choice in each of the seventeen rounds of the annual draft.
No team could negotiate with a player drafted by another team.
As the court found in Smith, the "net result" was a series of re-
straints contained in the NFL constitution and bylaws which
suggested that "if the player [could] not reach a satisfactory agree-
ment with the team holding the rights to his services he [could] not
292. Id at 616.
293. Id
294. "We find substantial evidence to support the finding that there was no bona fide
arm's-length bargaining over the Rozelle Rule preceding the execution of the 1968 and
1970 agreements." Id at 616.
295. Id at 623 (citations omitted).
296. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), modited, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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play in the NFL .... "297
In Smith, the district court noted the defendant's argument
that the NFL draft was a mandatory subject of bargaining be-
tween the parties and, therefore, was immune from antitrust lia-
bility. The court correctly analyzed the labor-antitrust cases as
providing "no support whatever for the league's argument that ar-
rangements related to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,
prior to their embodiment in an agreement, fall within the exemp-
tion merely because they related to mandatory subjects."2 98 In-
deed, as demonstrated earlier, the cases do not support this view,
even when the subject matter is outlined in a collective agree-
ment. 299 The court also concluded that the "unfettered" operation
of the collective bargaining process is a prerequisite to the labor
exemption. "[A] scheme advantageous to employers and other-
wise in violation of the antitrust laws cannot under any circum-
stances come within the exemption unless and until it becomes
part of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union in
its own self-interest." 3" The court noted that the draft was insti-
tuted prior to the time the association entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Since the plaintiff was drafted before the
union's recognition agreement was in effect, the plaintiff's cause of
action accrued before any exemption could dispose of his case.30 1
Despite the narrowness of the Smith holding, the court's dis-
cussion of the labor exemption, though dictum, is important.
The court's position was that the subject matter must constitute
a mandatory bargaining subject within the meaning of the
NLRA.30 2 The court referred to a Supreme Court case which es-
tablished the propriety of mechanisms such as the hiring hall303
for allocating employment opportunities among bargaining unit
employees. The court also examined the similar role that seniority
plays in collective bargaining agreements for industrial unions.3 4
The court concluded that "each feature" of the draft would be
considered a term or condition of employment. "It is clear that
the union and the teams could collectively bargain in monetary
compensation, benefits, incentives, and guarantees to be paid to
297. Id at 741.
298. Id at 742.
299. See notes 264-65 supra and accompanying text.
300. See note 298 supra.
301. Id
302. Id at 743.
303. Id at 743 (citing Teamsters Local v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961)).
304. 420 F. Supp. at 743.
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first year players as mandatory subjects."3"5 The test, according to
Judge Bryant, was whether the decision implemented with regard
to mandatory bargaining subjects was "arrived at as a result of
genuine, arms length bargaining and not. . . 'thrust upon' a weak
players union by the owners. '3 6 The court complicated the anal-
ysis by stating that the agreement not be at the "behest" of nonla-
bor groups. 30 7 The court thought that the agreements at issue,
unlike those in the major Supreme Court cases, operated solely to
the employees' disadvantage. In the court's view, the employees
were not "parties" to the agreement.
In declaring the draft a violation of antitrust law, the court
also addressed the owners' arguments that competitive balance
could not be obtained without the draft system and with a free
market for player talent, the current balance would be "irretriev-
ably destroyed" as players migrated to the richest teams and most
glamorous cities. 30 8 The court found the evidence on this point
"equivocal." On the one hand, a free market might indeed allow
the wealthiest owners to purchase most of the player talent and
cause the glamour of a particular city to attract a player to that
city's team.0 9 On the other hand, the court noted that there was
"abundant convincing testimony" that many other factors were
involved in a player's choice of location. The court stated:
[The defendants] were unable to produce any credible evidence
of a significant correlation between the opportunity to draft
early in the draft. . . and improvement in team performance.
In fact, the defendant's evidence in this regard indicates a cor-
relation too low to be regarded as supporting their claim that
the draft is essential to the survival of the league. For example,
despite the existence of all the league's restraints on player
movement, in the last three seasons, nine teams have captured
22 of the 24 spots available in the playoffs leading to the Super
Bowl. This shows neither competitive balance in division races
nor effectiveness of drafting by early-selecting teams.310
The court also declared that no "experiential" evidence existed,
to substantiate the owner's claim that in the absence of player
movement restriction the best players would move to the small
group of teams offering money, glamour, and success. Indeed,
the little empirical evidence available with regard to the move-
305. Id
306. Id at 743.
307. Id at 744.
308. Id at 745-46.
309. Id at 746.
310. Id
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ment of free agents and former World Football League players
since the 1975 season ended does not show any such trend.31
The court concluded that the current system could not be pro-
tected by the rule of reason since there were "significantly" fewer
restrictive alternatives available. The court noted that testimony
indicated the draft's purpose was to identify and distribute the top
player talent. A possible solution, therefore, might be to reduce
substantially the number of rounds in the draft. Another "possi-
ble acceptable method of player distribution" would allow several
teams to draft a particular player while limiting the total number
of players a team could sign. While the court noted several varia-
tions of this plan, it did not intend "that these examples be re-
garded as necessarily being within the rule of reason; they are,
rather, examples of less restrictive alternatives to the present sys-
tem, and meant to show that the present draft is not a reasonable
system. 's 2
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed,
with one member of the panel dissenting. 13 The appellate court,
however, did not adopt all of the lower court's rationale. The ap-
pellate court concluded that the draft differed from a classic group
boycott in that the plaintiff, an injured NFL draftee, was not a
competitor or potential competitor for the NFL clubs' product
market l.3 1  Accordingly, the draft could not be regarded as a per
se antitrust violation.3 15 The belief that the factors involved in the
draft's formulation were beyond judicial expertise buttressed the
court's view that the rule of reason should govern when consider-
ing the draft's compatibility with antitrust law.
On this basis, the court ruled that the trial judge's findings of
fact should not be disturbed. 6 Judge Wilkey, writing for the ma-
jority, maintained that the draft had an anticompetitive effect
which stripped college players of the opportunity to market their
talents.317 The NFL's contention that the need for competitive
balance among the teams justified the draft was rejected on the
311. Id
312. Id at 747 n.6.
313. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Judge McKinnon dissented in part and concurred
in part. Judge McKinnon agreed with the majority's conclusion that the district court
should not have found the draft to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws; he disagreed
with the majority's holding that the draft was a violation of the rule of reason.
314. Id at 1178-79.
315. Id at 1182.
316. Id at 1183.
317. Id at 1185.
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ground that it affected not only the best players but also average
players "who were, in a sense, fungible commodities. ' 318 The
players, however, still could negotiate with only one team and
might not play if they failed to reach agreement. Judge Wilkey
expressed no view on the labor exemption issue, which was not
central to the outcome of the case.
The Aackey and Smith cases are of more than historical inter-
est. The collective impact of these cases has been vital to the
structure and processes of labor-management relations in the
sports industries. While sports leagues have not seen the last of
antitrust litigation involving the labor exemption, the players can
no longer expect to achieve uniformly favorable results in such
cases. 3 9 The Mackey and Smith courts were willing to invoke the
labor exemption because the cases involved mandatory subjects of
bargaining within the meaning of the NLRA. This characteriza-
tion of the issues is appropriate given the ultimate relationship be-
tween the reserve and option clauses on one side and the wages
and other income provisions of the players on the other. The
more restrictive the clauses, the more depressed the players' salary
market. The proposition that a mandatory subject is a prerequi-
site to the labor exemption, however, geems to be ill-founded. The
Supreme Court has considered this issue relevant to the exemp-
tion question but has left open the possibility that legal nonman-
datory subjects, which would have only a remote impact on the
product market, might also qualify for antitrust immunity under
the exception.320
In any event, whether the drafting of college or amateur play-
ers is a mandatory bargaining subject is a more difficult problem
because the individuals affected are outside the bargaining units.
These individuals are, at the time of the bargain, applicants or
potential applicants rather than members of the association or
union. The economic impact of such players on the salary struc-
ture of veteran players is considerable. Rules increasing the bar-
gaining power of draftees necessarily create upward pressure on
the salaries for all players in the bargaining unit.3 21 As others
318. id at 1187.
319. See notes 329 & 342 infra and accompanying text.
320. See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Cf. Dolly Madison Indus., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970).
321. See, e.g., Anderson, The NFL'S Dangerous Trend, N.Y. Times, April 29, 1981, at
21, col I (impact of Johnny Johnson's $1 million contract upon veteran members of the
Los Angeles Rams).
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have suggested, bargaining on these issues is analogous to bar-
gaining about a hiring hall,322 inasmuch as the procedure controls
who enters the bargaining unit.
In this context, it is possible to analogize to the Supreme
Court's holding that an employer may be refusing unlawfully to
bargain by not discussing the contracting out of work from a bar-
gaining unit. The rationale is that an intimate relationship exists
between the contracting out of work and the conditions of em-
ployment in the bargaining unit. As two commentators have
noted:
The fact that bargaining over the subject directly affected a
group of employees outside the unit was not a sufficient reason
for the employer to act unilaterally. Indeed, the very fact that
the two bargaining units were in direct competition for the
same work was critical to the decision.
But for the fact that the employees benefit, and the employ-
ers suffer from the competition, rather than the other way
around, the common draft proposal seems to raise the precise
question answered [in the subcontracting case] .... The
method by which players are allocated between bargaining
units bears an extremely close relationship to the terms and
conditions in those units (common draft case), just as the
method by which work is allocated between units bears an ex-
tremely close relationship to the terms and conditions of em-
ployment in the original unit (contracting out). The difference
is only that two employers are in direct competition for the
same athletic services rather than two groups of employees be-
ing in competition for the same work."
The problems of the duty of fair representation, while more
complex for unions negotiating for nonunit employees, apparently
can be solved. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Allied
Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co.,324 stated that federal labor law "does not require a union af-
firmatively to represent non-bargaining unit members or to take
into account their interests in making bona fide economic deci-
sions on behalf of those whom it does represent."325 The Court
concluded, however, that the relationship between incumbent em-
ployees and those individuals who had retired permanently from
the bargaining unit was not sufficiently intimate to render pension
322. Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Princiles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of
Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE LJ. 1, 8 (1971).
323. Id at 15-16.
324. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
325. Id at 181 n.20.
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and other retiree benefits a mandatory subject of bargaining
within the NLRA's meaning. The Court refused to create any
"affirmative" obligation.3 26 In the draft case, no question of the
duty to bargain is likely to arise because professional sports own-
ers will now have a substantial incentive to negotiate with the as-
sociations. By virtue of their need to grasp firmly the labor
exemption to avoid antitrust liability, negotiation on the subject
would be a sine qua non for any collective bargaining agreement.
The troublesome part of the Aackey and Smith rationale is the
so-called "arm's-length or bona fide" bargaining requirement.
Judge Bryant and Judge Larson, the trial judges who presided in
the two cases, attempted to measure the strength of the union
which negotiated the contract. While the proposition that the
clause in question was "thrust" upon a "weak union" was avoided
studiously by the Eighth Circuit, both courts adopted similar ap-
proaches.327 All of these approaches are predicated on a misun-
derstanding of federal labor law policy and the realities of the
collective bargaining process.
The failure of a union or employer to discuss, bargain, or do
more than acquiesce to an established practice concerning a
mandatory subject of bargaining generally has limited practical or
legal significance. In Mackey, the parties negotiated a zipper
clause as part of the collective bargaining agreement. This clause
waived the union's right to bargain over any negotiable item.328
To be sure, such clauses do not waive the right to bargain when
management engages in unilateral conduct which alters existing
employment conditions during the term of an agreement. 329 A
326. Id Cf. W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 191-200 (1977).
327. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), modofed, 593
F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackay v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1975), modoed,
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
328. 543 F.2d 606 n.13.
329. See GTE Automatic Elec. Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 297 (1979) (employer unlawfully
refused to negotiate with union regarding the implementation of a savings plan for union-
ized employees when plan was not available to nonunion employees and had not been
conceived at the time the union signed the waiver clause); Western Foundries, Inc., 233
N.L.R.B. 1033 (1977) (Board held that when employer unilaterally implemented an em-
ployee profit-sharing plan which excluded from its coverage those employees who were
represented by a union Board, despite the existence of a zipper clause, the employer vio-
lated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to bargain about this exclusion); Unit Drop Forge
Div. Eaton Yale Towne, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 600 (1968), modfed, 412 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1969) (where contract provided that parties agree upon changes in incentive plans, job
change resulting in employee being transferred from incentive pay plan to hourly wage rate
was subject to bargaining, despite general waiver clause). See generaly,, Cox & Dunlop,
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more particularized waiver aimed at the precise subject matter
under dispute is required under such circumstances. This particu-
larized waiver requirement contrasts with Aackey where the em-
ployer adhered to the status quo and the players sought the
changes. Quite clearly, the union in Mackey waived its rights to
bargain over the Rozelle Rule. The union's ability to extract con-
cessions was limited so severely that it was willing to waive its
right on all issues which it was not able to effectively address at
the bargaining table.330 The search for an arm's-length or bona
fide bargain--or indeed an inquiry aimed at determining whether
the union actually received its quid pro quo for the concession of
the player mobility issues-ignores the reality that the quid pro
quo exists only in the general sense expressed in the zipper clause.
If the union had not negotiated the zipper clause and relinquished
bargaining rights, it might not have had a collective bargaining
agreement at all.
The heart of this phenomenon is obviously union restraint.
Any rule which requires a bona fide or arm's-length bargain dif-
ferent from that which the players association achieved in Mackey
is a rescue mission aimed at propping up a weak union (which has
contractual provisions thrust upon it that it does not view to be in
its self-interest). A quid pro quo for a concession on a particular
issue or group of issues is not a prerequisite to good faith bargain-
ing under the NLRA. The Eighth Circuit adopted, in effect, a test
which considered the strength or weakness of the labor organiza-
tion involved. Under established labor law principles, Mackey
seems to have been decided wrongly. As noted earlier,33' the case
gave needed muscle to the football players' efforts to establish col-
lective bargaining, particularly in the wake of the abortive 1974
strike and subsequent events. The theme, however, that "hard
cases made bad law" cannot be ignored.
Emanations of Mackey were quite evident in the proceedings
in McCourt v. Caiffornia Sports, Inc. 332 McCourt had the added
distinction of being the first major sports case to confront the la-
bor exemption when the clause in controversy was specifically in-
corporated into the league's collective bargaining agreement. At
issue was what the Sixth Circuit characterized as a "modified Ro-
The Duy to Bargain Collectively During the Term of the Existing Agreement, 63 HIARv. L.
Rv. 1097 (1950).
330. See note 328 supra.
331. See notes 202-05 supra and accompanying text.
332. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978).
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zelle Rule," this time for professional ice hockey. 3
The plaintiff, Dale McCourt, signed an NHL Standard Players
Contract to play for three years with the Detroit Redwings, for
which he was to be paid $325,000. In his rookie year with the
team, McCourt was the leading scorer. Rogatian Vachon had
been the Los Angeles Kings' star goaltender for six years when he
became a free agent. After rejecting a substantial offer from the
Kings, Vachon signed a contract with the Redwings. This con-
tract subjected the Redwings to a so-called equalization payment
under the NHL bylaws as incorporated in the collective bargain-
ing agreement. This compensation procedure is a "final offer"
mechanism under which each team places a final offer before an
impartial arbitrator who must select one of the parties' positions.
The arbitrator cannot modify the offers or compromise. 34
The Sixth Circuit accepted the Mackey criteria as the applica-
ble law in deciding whether the arbitration procedure violated an-
titrust law as an impediment to player mobility. The court also
accepted the proposition that the restraint "primarily affected"
hockey players and that the subject matter was a mandatory bar-
gaining subject under the NLRB.335 The Sixth Circuit in Mc-
Court stated:
The court in Mackey held under the circumstances before it
that such arm's-length bargaining was missing. So did the dis-
trict court here. The underlying facts in the two cases, however,
are quite different.
In Mackey it was shown that the National Football League
Players Association, at least prior to 1974, had stood in a rela-
tively weak position with respect to the clubs. The Rozelle
Rule had remained unchanged in form since it was unilaterally
promulgated in 1963, even before the Players Association was
formed. The Eighth Circuit specifically found that the Rozelle
Rule was not bargained over in the negotiations leading to the
1968 or 1970 collective bargaining agreements....
The court noted that the NHL and the players association had
signed their first collective bargaining agreement that provided
333. Id at 1194.
334. Id at 1195-97. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between NHL Member Clubs
& NHL Players' Association, By-Law § 9A (Nov. 27, 1973) [hereinafter cited as NHL
Agreement], reprintedin PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL AND
COLLEGE SPORTS TEAMS AND LEAGUES 283-95 (Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Lit-
erary Property Course Handbook No. 84, 1977) [hereinafter cited as REPRESENTING PRO-
FESSIONAL SPORTS].
335. Id at 1197-98.
336. 600 F.2d at 1198.
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that the Standard Player Contract and bylaws were "fair and rea-
sonable terms of employment." The court stated that the district
court, which found no quid pro quo for the relinquishment of free
agent status for the players, had failed to take into account,
the well established principle that nothing in the labor law
compels either party negotiating over mandatory subjects or
collective bargaining to yield on its initial bargaining position.
Good faith bargaining is all that is required. That the position
of one party on an issue remains unchanged does not mandate
the conclusion that there was no collective bargaining over the
other issues.337
The court recognized that the players association exerted great
pressure at the collective bargaining table in presenting proposals
for an alternate reserve system. The association also threatened to
strike and to commence antitrust litigation. The NHL agreed that
the entire collective bargaining agreement could be voided if the
NHL merged with the WHA. Such nullification might be neces-
sary if the merger would depress the salary market and make the
reserve system "too onerous" because of the players' loss of com-
petitive advantage. 338 The trial court found that the players asso-
ciation had received new benefits that were not "directly related"
to the negotiation of the reserve clause.3 39 The Sixth Circuit con-
cluded, however, that the players association satisfied the arm's-
length, bona fide requirement articulated in Mackey since they
vigorously opposed or "bargained against" the reserve system.
The essential difference between the compensation procedure
in McCourt and that which was declared unlawful in Mackey was
that a neutral third party, and not the commissioner, determined
the compensation. The court's judgment about the procedure was
appropriate because the parties focused on that procedure in their
negotiations. It was not necessary that the association achieve a
specific quid pro quo. The Sixth Circuit correctly viewed self-in-
terest as not simply gaining or extracting specific concessions from
the other party at the bargaining table. Mackey should have
reached the same conclusion.
The disputed matter in Mackey was addressed in the collective
bargaining agreement and a zipper clause was negotiated which
waived the union's right to bargain in the future on this subject as
well as others. This waiver is compatible with modem collective
337. Id at 1200.
338. id at 1202.
339. Id at 1202-03.
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bargaining and reflects a policy and practice which is recognized
and promoted in these kinds of labor exemption antitrust cases.34
A more stringent and narrow interpretation of self-interest and
furtherance of the collective bargaining process is not in step with
the contemporary trade union movement which negotiates collec-
tive bargaining agreements in the context of numerous established
relationships.34 1
The matter is not yet entirely resolved. The Eighth Circuit
opinion in Reynolds v. NFL342 indicates there still may be a need
for the judicial examination of player mobility under collective
agreements. In Reynolds, the court considered the allegation that
the post-Maekey agreement was "more restrictive" than the Ro-
zelle rule. It was noted, however, that almost as many players had
played out their options in two years under the collective agree-
ment's provisions as during eleven years under the Rozelle
Rule.343 Reynolds indicates a preference for bestowing the labor
exemption upon agreements negotiated in the wake of antitrust
340. Casenote, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding an Anticompetitive Pro-
vision Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest: McCourt v. California Sports Inc.,
21 B.C.L. REV. 680 (1980). The author observed:
In the Sixth Circuit's view, a union's failure to advance its interests because of the
employers' hard bargaining does not mean that the labor exemption must be dis-
allowed. Such a failure, the court notes, is "a part of and not apart from the
collective bargaining process," the "ultimate objective" of which is an agreement
accepted by the parties. Thus, examining the tenor of the McCourt opinion, the
court's reluctance to accept the NHL's argument that the union interest, as well as
the collective bargaining policy, had been advanced, and its interpretation of the
significance of the new player benefits, it is submitted that, at least as far as the
labor exemption issue is concerned, the Sixth Circuit views the integrity of the
collective bargaining process as more important than the labor interests which a
union may seek to further via that process.
Id at 711.
341. Id The author discussed the change in the labor movement and the way rational
labor policy should shift to accommodate that change:
The Court should respond to. . . changes in congressional labor concerns by
ascribing greater weight to the national policy favoring collective bargaining and
correspondingly less weight to that of advancing the interests of organized labor.
This could result in a balancing test very similar to Justice Goldberg's, under
which collective bargaining policy would be viewed as important enough to allow
the labor exemption to protect any market restraint which results from bona fide,
arm's length collective bargaining on mandatory subjects. If the Court were to
view unions and employers as bargaining equals, neither the origin of an an-
ticompetitive provision, nor its effect on union interests would be relevant to the
nonstatutory exemption issue. In addition, the Mackey-McCourt distinction be-
tween different types of market restraints would be unnecessary, since the Court
would not require two labor policies to be advanced to protect a restriction which
affects business competitors, but only one where no third party is affected.
Id at 713.
342. 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
343. Id at 287.
[Vol. 31:685
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
litigation,3 " but it leaves the door ajar for a case-by-case exami-
nation of the nature and effects of certain practices and pro-
cedures.
An even more formidable problem can arise in connection
with negotiations the second or third time around, particularly
when the parties are unable to resolve their differences and agree
on a new collective bargaining pact. This delay is hardly an un-
likely prospect in football, for example, where the NFLPA is seek-
ing a substantial increase in salary percentage of total revenues345
and promoting the novelty of wage seniority.346 There is no obli-
gation to reach a collective bargaining agreement, but only an ob-
ligation to intend, in good faith, to consummate such an
agreement. The distinction has caused endless litigation and ag-
ony for labor law scholars.347 The philosophy of the statute is at
war with the view that collective bargaining agreements or any
portion thereof may be imposed on private parties. While con-
tract terms frequently survive the agreement's expiration,34 gen-
erally the terms may not last if the parties reach an impasse in
their bargaining. At that point, the employer may unilaterally,
over the union's objection, institute an offer not inconsistent with
its last position.349 The issue then would become whether failure
344. The court stated in its conclusion:
We emphasize today, as we did in Mackey. . . that the subject of player move-
ment restrictions is a proper one for resolution in the collective bargaining con-
text. When so resolved, as it appears to have been in the current collective
bargaining agreement, the labor exemption to antitrust attack applies, and the
merits of the bargaining agreement are not an issue for court determination.
Id at 289.
345. See Forbes, Garvey, Players Want More When NFL Contract Expires, Miami Her-
ald, March 1, 1981, § C, at 8, coL 1.
346. See Oates, Is NFL Readyfor Equal Payfor 411, L.A. Times, July 22, 1979, § III,
at 1, col 3.
347. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (exemplifies tension between
"good faith bargaining" and the exercise of bargaining strength in "free collective bargain-
ing"); NLRB v. American Nat1 Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) ("the Act does not en-
courage a party to engage in fruitless marathon discussions at the expense of frank
statement and support of his position. And it is equally clear that the Board may not,
either directly or indirectly, compel concessions"); NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d
736, 758 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970) ("while the absence of concessions
would not prove bad faith, their presence would . . . raise a strong inference of good
faith"). See also Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. Rev. 1401 (1958).
348. See, ag., Nolde Bros. Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 430
U.S. 243 (1977).
349. See, ag., American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622
(D.C. Cir. 1968); NLRB v. United States Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1963);
Schatzki, The Em/loyer'r UnilateralAct-A Per Se Violation--Sometimes, 44 TEx. L. REV.
470 (1966).
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to agree waives the employer's protection from antitrust liability.
The Eighth Circuit in Mackey was careful to note the following:
"In view of our holding, we need not decide whether the effect of
an agreement extends beyond its formal expiration date for pur-
poses of a labor exemption. 3 50
A rule withdrawing immunity because the previous contract
expired before a new agreement was reached is contrary to na-
tional labor law. The parties would be forced to enter into a col-
lective bargaining agreement to avoid antitrust sanctions, when
labor law is opposed to any such requirement. On the other hand,
the employer cannot alter its stance subsequent to an impasse in
negotiations and unilaterally impose a package different from that
which has been on the bargaining table. Such action would be a
refusal to bargain and an unfair labor practice by the employer.35'
Weistart and Lowell have stated:
[W]hile the absence of union acceptance might normally fore-
close application of the exemption, it is not clear that this result
should obtain where the unilateral action follows an honest at-
tempt to secure agreement through collective bargaining. Some
of the existing cases suggest that the availability of the labor
exemption will be determined by a variable standard which
takes account of the extent of bargaining which has actually
occurred. Future impasse cases on this point will likely present
situations which differ markedly in the degree to which the sub-
stance of the employer's unilateral action has been influenced
by the give and take of prior bargaining. In some situations, a
court might well conclude that the union has had a sufficient
impact in shaping the content of the employer's offers and that
the matter ought to be resolved free of intervention by the
courts.
3 5 2
While it might be fair to say that the union should "shape" the
employer's unilateral imposition of employment conditions, to
fashion a requirement that the employer's positions adopt some of
the substantive content of the union's proposals would be incon-
sistent with federal labor law policy. What seems appropriate is
that the employer's position emerged from the collective bargain-
ing process. Good faith bargaining must occur, even to the point
of impasse, regardless of the lack of substantive influence of the
union's proposals in the negotiations. If an impasse occurs and
the employer's unilateral terms were offered to the union, the em-
ployer should be deemed not to have violated any labor law. A
350. 543 F.2d at 616 n.18.
351. See NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
352. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 195, § 5.06, at 590.
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union acceptance is not required to satisfy either the self-interest,
bona fide, or arm's-length requirements in the collective agree-
ment. To hold that the labor exemption is not available when the
parties fail to renegotiate a contract after good faith bargaining is
inconsistent with these principles.
Finally, there remains the situation where two leagues are
competing for the same players. If new leagues appeared, a possi-
ble though not imminent occurrence, a new round of competition
for players' services would ensue. Since player restraints affect
parties other than the consuming public, the relevance of Jewel
Tea3 53 is limited in this context. In a one league sport, the players
or the public are assumed to be the product market, but the labor
exemption antitrust cases indicate that the agreement will be scru-
tinized more carefully when third parties are involved. Nonethe-
less, problems affecting sports leagues' business practices remain,
and further litigation is certain.
B. Current Trends in Collective Bargaining
Comprehensive labor agreements have been negotiated in all
major team sports. The early, rudimentary agreements empha-
sized security for the professional athlete. The foregoing section
concentrated on the existing possibilities for agreements under the
antitrust labor exemption. Both the courts and parties have urged
the use of collective bargaining on most issues. From this pres-
sure, certain patterns emerge.
Since the first priority of the players associations in their early
agreements was to ensure security for the professional athlete, the
negotiations centered around pension plans, minimum salaries,
fringe benefits such as life and medical insurance, and other ac-
coutrements. With such stability now assured, the main concerns
today are the unsettled player mobility issues and the proposed
mandatory bargaining subjects which might afford players greater
control over the rules of the games. These are the table setters for
what may be done on the road.
1. The Player Mobility Issues
Players often have argued that the key to their security is free
agency-the freedom to bargain with and join another club when
their old contracts expire. The owners have countered with nu-
merous devices binding a player to a given club unless the owner
353. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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decides to trade the player or release him after he is no longer
useful. Drafting of eligible amateurs, contracts with options and
reserve clauses, and procedures providing compensation to a
player's former team if that player moves to a new club have im-
peded a free and open player market. The current collective bar-
gaining agreements, spurred by concerted union activity and
favorable antitrust and arbitration decisions, have moved signifi-
cantly away from these traditional restraints. Most leagues, how-
ever, still impose restrictions on the player's ability to market
himself freely. The stringency of these restrictions, however, var-
ies from one league to another, such that an examination of spe-
cific provisions is warranted.
The modified free market has escalated players' salaries con-
siderably. This trend may decrease as owners realize that their
particular sport cannot support such salaries. Collective bargain-
ing provisions have shaped the parameters of free agency, but the
economics and dynamics of each sport may be other shaping
forces. Baseball and basketball players generally have benefitted
more from free agency than football and hockey players. This
discrepancy is due, in part, to differences in the collective bargain-
ing agreements of each sport and the nature of the particular
sport. The following discussion, therefore, examines the structure
of baseball, basketball, football, and hockey and then briefly ex-
amines developments in soccer.
a. Baseball. The 1973 agreement, negotiated soon after the
Flood decision, provided the first method of resolving salary dis-
putes through arbitration. Baseball also has negotiated collective
bargaining agreements, instituting so-called grievance-arbitration
machinery. This procedure provides for dispute resolution
through the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
or disputes where a third party makes a final, binding decision.
The 1973 agreement mandates that "[a]ny Club, or any Player
with both a total of two years of Major League service in at least
three different championship seasons" could submit a salary dis-
pute to "final and binding" arbitration.354 In the 1976 agreement,
eligibility was both broadened and narrowed. Any player's salary
dispute could proceed to arbitration if both sides consented. Sal-
ary arbitration could be obtained as a contract right with the same
minimum service eligibility as contained in the 1973 agreement,
354. 1973 Baseball Basic Agreement, supra note 209, art. V, § D(6).
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but the player must have had less than six years service.'"
The procedure established by the Basic Agreement of 1976 is
called final offer arbitration. The parties propose salary figures
which need not have been submitted during prior negotiations.
The arbitrator, pursuant to criteria established by the contract be-
tween the association and the clubs, 35 6 must select one of the
party's positions as his award.
Salary arbitration has produced major gains for players.3 57
The 1980 provisions, which give players with six or more years of
service free agent status if the team does not consent to arbitration
of the salary dispute,358 also promise to be significant.359 These
provisions, in conjunction with the important 1976 contract
clauses in the collective agreement regarding the free agent draft,
have altered significantly the market value of players' services.360
In the wake of the Messersmith award,'361 baseball owners were
confronted with the ominous possibility that all players without
contracts would become free agents after the expiration of the op-
tion year provided in the Uniform Players Contract. The 1976
agreement accordingly provided that player contracts entered into
before August 9, 1976 were renewable through an option clause
for one year beyond the contract's term. At the end of the option
year, the player could exercise free agent rights. Players who en-
tered into contracts on or after August 9, 1976 could become free
agents after six years of major league service. 362 A reentry proce-
dure was devised to select players on the eligible list. A player
may be selected by a maximum of thirteen teams, exclusive of his
former team which also could negotiate with the player. If less
than two teams select a player, that individual may negotiate with
355. Basic Agreement Between the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs
and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major League Baseball Play-
ers Association art. V, § E (Jan. 1, 1976), reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS, supra note 334, at 125-29 [hereinafter cited as 1976 Baseball Basic Agreement].
356. Id, reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 125-29.
357. One of the most publicized gains from salary arbitration was the $700,000 award
received by Chicago Cubs relief ace, Bruce Sutter. Sutter of Cubs IsAwarded$700,000 Pact
by rbiifdtdr, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1980, § C, at 11, col. 4. See also Chass, Arbitration
Victory Gives Kemp $600,000, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, § C, at 13, col. 5.
358. Memorandum of 1980 Baseball Agreement (May 23, 1980).
359. See Durso, Rich Getting Richer? High Cost of Survival, Sporting News, July 26,
1980, at 8, col. I.
360. See Moore, Crisis in the Grand Old Game, S.F. Examiner & Chronicle, March 8,
1981, § C, at I, col. 3.
361. See note 216 supra and accompanying text.
362. 1976 Baseball Basic Agreement, supra note 355, art. XVII, § B(2), reprinted in
REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 152-53.
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any club.363 The clubs may sign only a limited number of players.
The quota constitutes a ratio to the number of players on the eligi-
ble list. Clubs which sign players who have entered into contracts
prior to August 9, 1976 need not compensate the player's former
team. All other teams, however, must be compensated through an
amateur draft selection.364 Since players selected through the am-
ateur draft in baseball normally enter the minor leagues, often
with only marginal chances of making the major leagues, the ama-
teur draft selections are not as important as in other sports. The
threat of losing a draft selection, therefore, is no deterrent to sign-
ing a free agent.
Baseball players' salaries have increased dramatically since
1976. According to the owners, the average salary in 1980 was
$149,000-a twenty-three percent increase from 1979.365 The av-
erage free agent earned $228,300 in 1980. The bidding war has
escalated since 1976. Outfielder Dave Winfield, for instance, hav-
ing toiled eight years with the San Diego Padres, signed a ten-year
contract with the more financially secure New York Yankees at
approximately 1.5 million dollars per year.366 The Boston Red
Sox, faced with the possibility of losing Fred Lynn to free agency,
traded him below value to the California Angels. The Angels pre-
viously had made a deal with Lynn's agent for a four year con-
tract at 1.4 million dollars a year.367 Even players falling well
below the superstar category have realized enormous rewards
through free agency.368
Nonetheless, the game has prospered, although this phenome-
non may be transitory. 369 Leonard Koppet has noted the follow-
ing increases between the 1978 and 1979 seasons: attendance
increased 30%; gross income increased 31%; the average ticket
price increased 20%; radio and television income increased 8%;
363. Id § C, reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPoRTs, supra note 334, at
153-58.
364. Id, reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPoRTs, supra note 334, at 153-58.
365. Grebey: Pay Averaging $149,000, Why Strike?, Sporting News, May 17, 1980, at
38, col. 1.
366. Yanks Sign Winfieldfor Up to $25 Million, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1980, § A, at 1,
col. 2.
367. Angels Obtain Lynn From the Red Sox for Tanana, Rudi, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24,
198 1, at 19, col. 5; Anderson, With Lynn, Burleson and lobson, Angels Have Red Sox Look,
N.Y. Times, March 7, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
368. Boswell, Free Agentry: Ceiling Unlimited, Officials Grumble About Huge Salaries
for "Mediocrity,' L.A. Times, Dec. 18, 1979, § III, at 3, ol. 2.
369. See Atkin, 'Safe,' the Umpire Called, as Baseball Puts Surprise Finish To Strike
Talks, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 27, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
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and the top price for a team sold increased 75%.370 Since it was
postulated that free agency would destroy the competitive balance
necessary to maintain loyalty and enthusiasm, and thus, adversely
affect attendance and income, it is particularly noteworthy that the
number of teams within five games of first place increased during
this period by thirty-three percent.37' Despite the New York
Yankees primacy in the free agent market, they have not yet
equalled their dominance of the days before collective agreements
and free agency. Between 1921 and 1964, the Yankees won
twenty-nine of forty-four American League pennants and twenty
world championships. 372 Between 1976 and 1980, however, two-
thirds of the clubs have not been in championship series, only
fourteen of the twenty-six clubs finished first or second, and be-
tween eight to ten teams "are consistently excluded by Players
from trade considerations. '373 These statistics support the view
that competitive balance has not "benefitted" during this period,
but it does not prove its deterioration. Moreover, turnover among
baseball players has decreased during the period of free agency as
compared to the 1960'S.374 A possible explanation for this de-
crease is that trade between clubs resulted in more player mobility
than under the 1976 agreement. The difference is that the players
did not benefit necessarily.
The new system's impact on player performance or morale is
difficult to assess. Most of the highly paid players appear to have
performed well, although injuries have hampered some of these
players.375 In contrast, the performance of some players undoubt-
edly has declined out of fear that an injury might diminish their
marketability.3 76 Nonetheless, the owners have sought revisions
370. Koppett, Wailing Owners Are Distorting the Facts, Sporting News, May 17, 1980,
at 38, col. 1. See also Klein, Shuffled Lineups: Baseball Is Prospering Despite Shfis Caused
by New 'Free Agents,' Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
371. Koppett, supra note 370.
372. Id
373. Player Selection Rights Study Committee, Management Representatives Report 2,
(Feb. 17, 1981).
374. See Koppet, Baseball "Stability" Claim a Sham, Sporting News, July 4, 1981, at
11, coL 1.
375. Bill Campbell, a Boston Red Sox relief pitcher, is a classic example of the latter,
but his excessive four and five inning relief stints on consecutive days may have been the
culprit. There was never any doubt that Campbell was willing to earn his well-publicized
salary. Elderkin, Baseballr Free Agents Pay Off, Except Sometimes Wien They Don't,
Christian Sci. Monitor, July 2, 1980, at 14, col I.
376. Outfielder Dave Winfield supposedly has admitted that he would not go to the
wall on long drives and fly balls because an injury might diminish his marketability. Cf
Yanks Sign Winfeldfor Up to $25 Million, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1980, § A, at 1, col 2. In
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of the 1976 agreement since early 1980. A players strike almost
resulted. A temporary solution was the alternative.
The 1980 agreement established a study committee composed
of two players selected by the players association and two repre-
sentatives selected by the clubs.377 The committee issued a report
on February 20, 1981. Meanwhile, in 1980, the parties continued
with the previous draft system. By February 20, 1981, the clubs
put into effect a proposal that was not "less favorable" than the
proposal advanced in the spring of 1980. This agreement pro-
vided that the association could reopen negotiations by March 1
and strike no later than June 1.378 The owner proposals provide
compensation in the form of a professional player comparable in
skill and ability to the player lost through free agency. No com-
pensation would be given for a player selected by three or fewer
teams. The amateur draft choice would continue when a player
was drafted by four to seven teams. When a player was drafted by
eight to thirteen teams, compensation would be an amateur draft
choice plus an "unprotected professional player of performance if
performance criteria are satisfied. '3 79  A club signing the free
agent may protect either fifteen or eighteen players in its entire
system from being chosen as compensation depending upon the
free agent's previous performance.
The clubs have noted that only five of the forty-two players in
the 1980 draft were drafted by enough teams to raise the compen-
sation issue under this proposal.380 It seems, curiously, that com-
pensation will not dampen the bidding war for the superstars who
are most likely to be drafted by eight to thirteen teams. As noted
in the Owner's Study Committee Report, many outstanding play-
ers have signed lucrative contracts even though the acquiring team
contrast, Carlton Fisk, whose contract expired in 1980, risked injuring his throwing arm
during the closely fought pennant race of 1978 and also on a cold April day in Milwaukee
when he substituted for floundering Boston catchers. See Fisk Takes Risk and HItns, Sport-
ing News, June 19, 1980, at 20, col. 1. See generaly Fik Going to Whiltesox, N.Y. Times,
March 10, 1981, § B, at 13, col. 4; Durso, Fisk Decared Free Agent; Cerone IC'ns Salary
Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1981, § A, at 19, col. 4; Durso, Case of Unsigned Fisk Goes to
Arbitration, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1981, § 5, at 7, col. 1.
377. Memorandum of 1980 Baseball Agreement, supra note 358.
378. Chass, Player's Union Sets May 29 Deadline, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1981, § D, at
21, col. 5.
379. For a discussion of the issues involved in the 1981 contract dispute, see Newhan,
Baseball Closes In on a Strike Agaitn The Issue Remains Compensation for Signing Free
Agents, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1981, § III, at 1, col. 1.
380. Interview by William B. Gould with Raymond Grebey, Chief Negotiator for own-
ers, in San Francisco (Sept., 1980).
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had to compensate the previous team. This signing has occurred
even when the team which acquired the player knew that his con-
tract was about to expire and that contract terms would have to be
negotiated if the player were not to become a free agent.38'
The likelihood of financial gain for other players is more diffi-
cult to foresee. The players association had voiced adamant oppo-
sition to any compensation proposal beyond the amateur draft
because it thought the clubs would draft outside the superstar cat-
egory deliberately to undermine the free agency of average play-
ers.382 If this deliberate drafting occurred, teams might not sign a
mediocre player to lucrative contracts because of the free agent
compensation required. A possible solution to this problem might
involve negotiating exceptions or limits on the number of times
certain players in defined ability classifications could be drafted.
In 1981, after a two month strike arising over the parties' in-
ability to agree on a new compensation provision, a rather compli-
cated agreement was reached. The replacement player
compensation provision of the Memorandum of Agreement en-
tered into on July 31, 1981 essentially defines a "Type A" ranking
player as one for whose loss a team may be compensated. The
players are ranked, in part, according to statistics on total plate
appearances, batting average, base percentage, total home runs,
and total runs batted in for two seasons.383 Players in the top 20%
are Type A. The top 20% to 30% are Type B. The number of
players that can be included in the Type A ranking category dur-
ing the period of the Basic Agreement-from 1981 to
1983-ranges from seven to nine.38 4
The other important disputed issue relates to the number of
381. Vida Blue and Rod Carew were early examples of this phenomenon. See Man-
agement Representative Report, supra note 373, at 3. More recently, the California Angels
were willing to release Frank Tanana and two other players to sign Fred Lynn to a four-
year contract worth $5.25 million. See also note 367 supra. Lynn was about to become a
free agent and could literally dictate the terms of his financial package and transfer to the
Angels. Similar circumstances surrounded the trade of Bruce Sutter from the Cubs to the
Cardinals. See Management Representative Report, supra note 373, at 3.
382. See, ag., Smith, Baseball Turns Back, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1980, § B, at 4, ol. 5.
383. Players who have been free agents through the reentry system and completed their
repeater rights under the provision and those with twelve or more years of credited service
are not covered by the agreement. See note 384 infra.
384. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Major League Clubs-Player Relations
Committee and the Major League Baseball Players Association 3 (July 31, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1981 Memorandum of Agreement]. See generally Koppett, How the New Free
Agent System Worksfor Baseball Re- entry Draft, Peninsula Times Tribune, Nov. 10, 1981,
at I, col 4.
"Only three Type A players, or pitchers [went into the 1981]... selection process: Ron
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players that a club may protect against compensation. The own-
ers initially insisted on protecting only 15 to 18.385 The agreement
provides that clubs may protect 24 to 26. Teams not signing the
Type A ranking player may protect 26. A maximum of five clubs
may be excluded altogether from the compensation provision.
"All players with no-trade clauses and those whose consent is re-
quired by the Basic Agreement to the assignment of their contract
must be included in a club's protected list. 38 6
Type B ranking players will require compensation in the form
of an amateur draft choice and an "added Amateur Draft Choice,
which shall be a special choice awarded immediately after the first
complete round of the draft and preceding the commencement of
the second round. ' 387 The 1976 agreement provided an amateur
draft selection for any player lost through the reentry procedure.
A payment of $150,000 was to be made to a club losing a player
from the pool for the first time. No further payments would be
made in connection with losses during the next two years. 388
The agreement reflects a compromise. Since the players asso-
ciation accepted the idea of compensation in excess of an amateur
draft choice in early 1981, and in light of the owners' position re-
ferred to above, it would seem that the agreement more nearly
reflects the players association position.389 Moreover, players who
received this compensation are drawn from a pool of participating
clubs, an approach proposed by the players.390 It took a strike of
more than two months, however, to achieve this agreement-a
factor which may not be lost on the players association in future
Guidry of the New York Yankees, Dick Tidrow of the Chicago Cubs and Ed Farmer of the
Chicago White Sox." Id.
385. See Free Agent Proposal Modfed by Owners, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1981, § D, at
19, col. 4.
386. 1981 Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 384, at 7.
387. Id at 8.
388. Id at 10.
389. Indeed, it would seem as though the Red Sox, through obtaining Carney Lans-
ford, Mark Clear, and Rick Miller for Rick Burleson (about to become a free agent) and
Butch Hobson, received more than the 1981 agreement compensation provisions require.
Moreover, only players in 1981 are Type A players who may require major league player
compensation. Koppett, supra note 384. Also, the salaries negotiated by players who could
have become free agents are in excess of what was negotiated in 1980. Chass, Free Agents
Rewarded, The New York Times, Nov. 12, 1981, at 26, col 3.
390. Smith, Sneezing in The Draft, The New York Times, Nov. 15, 1981, at 26, col. 1:
"Some teams can dicker with Type A men with impunity. The Chicago Cubs, for instance,
can be pretty sure that a team losing a Type A free agent would choose somebody else as
compensation rather than the Cub's 25th player."
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bargaining sessions.39'
b. Basketball. This sport maintains a lower profile than
baseball but has a higher salary structure (an approximate annual
average of $180,000) and more free agent flexibility-at least as of
1981.
The 1981 collective bargaining agreement between the players
association and the NBA encompasses both the college draft392
and free agency for "veteran" players after their rookie year. A
team which drafts a player is the only team with which the player
may negotiate, provided the club makes a tender offer before the
fifth of September immediately following the initial draft. The
player contract may extend for no more than one year, must pro-
vide at least the minimum salary, and must contain a one year
option clause, exercisable once, for at least the same salary. If the
contract offered is for longer than one year, it must be a four to
five year contract with an annual salary of $75,000 to $165,000. 393
If no offer is extended, the player may negotiate and sign with any
team on the sixth of September following the draft. If a drafted
player signs with a non-NBA team, the NBA team retains exclu-
sive rights to negotiate with that player in the future.394
Compensation problems relating to veteran free agents have
created most of the controversy between the players association
and the NBA. Problems arise under the 1976 collective bargain-
ing agreement and the settlement in Robertson395 -an antitrust ac-
tion brought to invalidate restrictions on player mobility and
alleged illegal league activity. The United States district court,
utilizing the services of a master, retained jurisdiction over the
parties to enforce the terms of the settlement and the consent judg-
ment. The settlement provided that the district court accept the
Special Master's findings of fact, unless found clearly erroneous,
and the master's recommendations for relief, unless based on
clearly erroneous factfindings, an incorrect application of law, or
391. See Koppett, Owners' Goal is Obvious. Soften the Union, The Peninsula Times
Tribune, July 13, 1981, § D, at 1, col. 1.
392. NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XXII, § 1(a), at 21-24 (Octo-
ber 10, 1980) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter cited as NBA
Agreement].
393. Id at 21-22. Compensation must begin at $75,000 with an upper range of
$110,000 to $165,000.
394. Id at 23.
395. Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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an abuse of discretion.396
After 1981, the clubs have a right of first refusal for any free
agent who wants to sign with another club. The player's old club
may match the player's best offer and thus retain him. 3 9 7 If the
old club does not match the offer, however, the player goes to the
new club, and the old club is not compensated. In addition, after
1987, there will be no restrictions on the signing of free agents
unless the league and association choose to renegotiate their
agreement.398
From 1976 to 1981, the NBA has operated under a compensa-
tion arrangement which provides that a team signing a free agent
whose individual contract has expired must compensate his for-
mer team in one or more of three ways: draft choices, current
NBA players, or cash.399 The leading case testing this compensa-
tion arrangement is the Marvin Webster litigation.4°° Webster, a
center with the Seattle Supersonics, signed with the New York
Knickerbockers after completing his contract obligations with the
Sonics. The Sonics and the Knicks were unable to agree on com-
pensation. The commissioner awarded a compensation package
to the Sonics consisting of the contract for New York player Lon-
nie Shelton, a New York first round draft choice, and $450,000.41
The players association attacked the commissioner's adjudication
as a "penalty," thus violating the agreement. The Knicks also
protested the award.' 2
The Special Master observed that the commissioner's award
was, in fact, "excessive" but concluded that it could not be set
aside without a showing of intent by the commissioner to make
the old team more than whole or a showing that the award was so
"clearly excessive" as to either demonstrate such intent or "gross
error of judgment. ' '4°3 The master accordingly denied plaintiffs'
petition to set aside the award. The master also ruled that in fu-
ture proceedings, the players association could not present evi-
dence that was not previously presented to the commissioner.404
396. Id
397. NBA Agreement, supra note 392, art. XXII, § l(d), at 28-32.
398. Id § 2(a), at 33.
399. Id § l(q), at 26-27.
400. In re Robertson Class Plaintiffs, 479 F. Supp. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), a17'd in part,
625 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1980).
401. Id at 661.
402. Id at 662.
403. Id at 663.
404. Id at 662.
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The master further ruled that both teams-the one which had
signed and the one which had lost the player-were proper parties
in the proceedings before him.
District Judge Carter reversed the master's rulings. Judge
Carter granted the player's petition and set aside the award as a
penalty. Judge Carter also concluded that an award which was
"excessive" was a penalty, and, despite the commissioner's broad
discretion in fashioning a "final" award, the master and ultimately
the court were mandated to set aside an excessive award as a pen-
alty.405 Judge Carter's ruling was appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit which upheld the district court's basic
view that it had "virtually plenary authority to determine whether
the substantive standards of the agreement have been ob-
served."'  The court, however, speaking through Judge New-
man, adopted an intermediate standard between that of the
district court and the. master and rejected Judge Carter's view that
any compensation which exceeded the worth of a player beyond
an "insignificant" amount was a penalty. According to Judge
Newman, Judge Carter's view would leave the commissioner with
no discretion and would be inconsistent, therefore, with the settle-
ment agreement. Judge Newman stated: "While we do not wish
to inject mathematical certainty'into an area that requires some
flexibility, we would not think the Special Master would be un-
warranted in concluding that an award becomes a penalty when it
exceeds the fair value of the player by approximately 20% to
25%."' 407
The court opined that it would not have been "displeased" if
the parties had determined that the compensation issue were to be
immunized from judicial scrutiny. While the "nuances" of bas-
ketball skills are not problems which are handled by the federal
judiciary with regularity, the court noted that it often resolved dis-
putes relating to the value of property and personal services. The
court thus recognized that the commissioner was not impartial in
player-club disputes. This recognition undoubtedly influenced its
decision to proceed.408
The wisdom of this decision may be questionable, particularly
in light of the complex issues in the Bill Walton compensation
405. Id at 668.
406. Robertson Class Plaintiffs v. NBA, 625 F.2d at 412.
407. Id at 413.
408. Id at 414.
7851981]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
award.4 °9 This problem is largely mooted by the shift to the right
of first refusal. It is difficult to determine whether the right of first
refusal will impede player mobility or limit salaries. It must be
noted, however, that the team losing a free agent under the old
system apparently always was willing to meet the offer of the team
negotiating the new contract. The player usually moved because
of a desire to join a new club and not primarily for the money.
The new system may change this decisionmaking. If owners have
no obligation to compensate the club losing the player, they may
not be able to resist raising the stakes. Players and their agents
know of this possibility and undoubtedly will "test the waters."
Since the 1981 Right of First Refusal Agreement has been in
effect, a limited number of free agents have been benefiting from
an escalating salary war.41 A club faced with the loss of a player
frequently matches the competing club's offer and then trades the
player against draft choices or before it must match the offer.4
1
This procedure does not seem to violate the agreement since the
player benefits from the offer which prompted his team to make
the deal.
Basketball owners initially entered into the collective agree-
ments which provided compensation on a transitional basis and
the right of first refusal. These agreements were signed for three
reasons: the threat of more severe liability, as was imposed in the
Robertson case; an erroneous belief that the elimination of the
ABA would depress rookie salaries; and, the view that the com-
pensation procedure would deter player mobility and thus limit
salary increases.41 2 To some extent, the owners' strategy assumes
that the compensation procedure has given them the latitude to
enter into long term individual contracts and to stagger such con-
tracts so that a common expiration date does not cause excessive
pressure. The advent of cable television and its revenue potential
also might lessen the burden of increased player salaries.
409. In re Portland Trailblazers, Opinion and Award of the Commissioner (Sept. 18,
1979); Robertson Class Plaintiffs, Report of Special Master (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1980); Modi-
fied Opinion and Award of the Commissioner (Aug. 15, 1980); Walton and Webster
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1980).
4 10. Littwin, NB,4 Owners: They're Taking a SecondLook at First Refaal, L.A. Times,
July 10, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
411. Elderkin, Its a New Salary Game in the NB4, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 17,
1981, at 16, col. 1.
412. Interview by William B. Gould with Lawrence Fleisher, General Counsel, Na-
tional Basketball Players Association, in New York City (Oct. 31, 1980).
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c. Football. Although the antitrust cases in football have dis-
couraged restrictions on player mobility, the 1977 NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement is, ironically, one of the least effective
agreements in professional sports on the issue of player mobility.
This ineffectiveness begins with draft provisions of the agreement.
Football's collective agreement provides that there will be 336 se-
lections with special numbers for expansion teams.41 3 This provi-
sion attempts to accommodate those players who are not in the
superstar category and who can negotiate freely with any team
without affecting the competitive balance in the league. The 336
selections, however, funnel most of the viable candidates through
the draft procedure and not through free agency. A player who is
not signed with the club drafting him may be drafted by another
team in an extra round. The only way to escape this provision is
to play outside the United States.41 4 If a player does not sign after
the second round, he then may negotiate with any team without
restriction. If a player has signed with a non-NFL team and
wants to enter the NFL after two years, the NFL club which origi-
nally drafted him has a right of first refusal. Despite the Yazoo
Smith415 decision declaring the old draft illegal, the new draft,
apparently insulated by the antitrust labor exemption, is far from
an open one.
Option years are required for rookie one-year contracts and
are permissible in all other instances. Despite the fact that the
agreement seems to address a one-year option-the player is to
receive 110% of the "salary provided in his contract for the previ-
ous year... ,,,46an arbitration award has held that players do
not become free agents at the expiration of the option year.417
The NFLPA contended that the one-year-option interpretation
would provide the clubs with a "perpetual option" on the player's
service-the same position that was rejected in the Mfessersmith
baseball award.418 The clubs argued successfully that approval of
413. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between NFL Players Association and NFL
Management Council, art. XIII, § 2 (March 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as NFL Agreement],
reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 52.
414. Wallace, How Canada Provides a Lurefor Many NFL. Prospects, N.Y. Times,
May 18, 1981, at 30, col. 1. Cf. Eskenazi, Ferragamo Gets Warm Welcomefrom Aiouette
Fans, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1981, at 26, col. 1.
415. See note 296 supra and accompanying text.
416. NFL Agreement, supra, note 413, art. XIV, § 3, reprinted in REPRESENTING PRO-
FESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 59.
417. NFL Players Ass'n v. NFL Management Council (Dutton) (May 14, 1980).
418. For a discussion of Messersmith, see notes 216-27 supra and accompanying text.
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the players' position ignored the detailed contractual language, re-
ferred to below, providing for both a right of first refusal and com-
pensation in free agent situations. The arbitrator noted that the
players were willing to agree to "restrictions and compensation"
as part of an "overall procedure." 419 The arbitrator also noted
that the parties had been careful to articulate contractual excep-
tions to the general rule that teams have both the right of first
refusal and compensation if a player seeks to become a free
agent. 2°
The most effective NFLPA argument was that the agreement's
failure to enumerate in the agreement the compensation available
to a player after his option year indicated that the parties did not
intend for the team to retain his services. Moreover, with the in-
validation of the Rozelle Rule in Mackey,421 an appropriate ap-
proach to contract interpretation assumes that any limitations on
free agency should be articulated clearly. Since the courts have
held these player restrictions invalid absent the antitrust labor ex-
emptions, any ambiguity should be construed in favor of the play-
ers. Indeed, in some respects, the association's position in the
football option arbitration is more attractive than the baseball
players' position in the Messersmith case.422 At the same time,
however, the bargaining history of football did not reflect any ex-
plicit intention by the parties to confer free agent status on players
whose option year had expired, and the arbitrator refused to as-
sume this duty absent an explicit provision to that effect.
Unlike baseball, any NFL player whose contract expires or
who has played out an option year may seek free agency. The
player's team, however, may match another team's offer through a
right of first refusal. If a team matches the "principal terms" of
the offer, a "binding agreement" with the player is created under
the collective agreement.423 If the right of first refusal is not exer-
cised, the losing team receives draft selections as compensation.
The desirability of the draft choice is related to the amount of the
free agent's offer.
Football players rarely move to new teams under the contrac-
tual free agency procedures. The compensation deters most clubs
419. NFL Players Ass'n v. NFL Management Council, at 36.
420. Id at 39-41.
421. See notes 276-95 supra and accompanying text.
422. See note 216 supra and accompanying text.
423. NFL Agreement, supra note 413, art. XV, § 4, reprinted in REPRESENTINr PRo-
FESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 61.
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from entering into serious bidding. As a result, average salaries,
approximately $80,000 per year, are considerably lower than those
in baseball or basketball.424 It is difficult, however, to assess the
reasons for this differential. A greater number of football players
are, in fact, fungible. Football differs from baseball in that a sin-
gle player is less likely to affect a game's outcome because football
is a more team-oriented sport. Moreover, there may not be an
adequate economic incentive to sign free agents in football. Un-
like baseball and perhaps basketball, it is doubtful that free
agency boosts a football club's ticket sales. Even most losing
teams are guaranteed a capacity crowd.4" Consumer demand has
made lucrative television and radio contracts available regardless
of the presence of free agents and victories. Football enjoys full
houses and an equal pay formula national television contract.
Free agents in football, therefore, unlike the free agents in base-
ball, are an expensive and not necessarily attractive commodity.426
All of these considerations have led the NFLPA to emphasize
demands based on a salary scale and a percentage of gross reve-
nue rather than to address the free agent issue in connection with
the 1982 negotiations. 427 The high salaries paid to rookies appar-
ently have increased the discontent among the rank and ffle.428
d. Hockey. Earlier discussion has focused on the McCourt
case429 and the NHL's approach to free agency compensation.
This system of compensation is unique to hockey and is somewhat
analagous to salary arbitration in baseball. When a player be-
424. See note 41 supra.
425. See Miller, The Not-So-Free Agents, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 20, 1981, at 64, col. 1.
426. When the Philadelphia Phillies signed Pete Rose, the team's income from ticket
sales and television contracts exceeded Rose's salary. Garvey, Why the NFL Snubs Free
Agents, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1979, § S, at 2, coL 1. In 1981, the Red Sox traded Rick
Burleson and Butch Hobson. The team then suffered losses of television contracts which
exceeded the anticipated salary expenditures for Fred Lynn and Carlton Fisk. Newhan,
One WaytoAvoida $2 Million Tab, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1981, § III, at I, col. 2. The same
dynamics are not operative in football.
427. See NFL Players Askfor Salary Scale, S.F. Chronicle, June 12, 1981, at 83, col. 6;
The Coming Fight Over NFL Riches, S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 21, 1981, at 47, col. 1. The
players, however, seem to be divided on this issue. See, eg., Dickey, Disunity in the NFL's
Player Union, S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 19, 1981, at 61, col. 1; Miller, How the 49ers View the
Next NFL Contract, S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 14, 1981, at 71, col 1. One virtue of a salary
scale is that players would be compensated more adequately and without the need for free
agency and consequent disruption of fan morale. Koppett, Fixed Pay Scale Might Benet
Fan, Sporting News, Nov. 28, 1981, at 12, col. 1.
428. Anderson, he NFL'S Dangerous Trend, N.Y. Times, April 29, 1981, § B, at 11,
col 4.
429. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978). See notes 332-39 supra and accompanying text.
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comes a free agent and signs with another club, the equalization
process begins. If the old and new clubs cannot agree on the com-
pensation, the dispute is submitted to an arbitrator. Each club
submits its opinion of the appropriate compensation level. The
submitted figures need not have been subject to discussion or ne-
gotiation between the clubs. The arbitrator, after a hearing, must
choose one of the two proposals without amendment.43 °
The above procedure occurs after the expiration of a hockey
player's contract, including any options that may have been exer-
cised. Hockey's option system is unique in its use of a "dual op-
tion." The procedure is somewhat complex but is designed to aid
the player and the club.43' First, no later than the tenth of August
in a year when the regular term of a player's contract has ended, a
club may request that a player sign a termination contract. If that
player signs, his contract is extended for one year, but the player
becomes a free agent the following June first. If the player does
not sign, he is unconditionally released the tenth of September
before the season begins. If the club does not tender the termina-
tion contract, it must tender a standard player contract with the
same terms as the previous contract, including paragraph seven-
teen which allows this procedure to occur again.432 Second, the
player may exercise certain rights regardless of the club's actions.
The player, before September tenth, may request the club to
tender an option contract. Although this contract is new, the
terms remain the same, except the contract is extended until June
first of the year following when the player becomes a free agent.433
Thus, after the club offers the player either a termination or stan-
dard player contract, the player essentially may refuse these new
contracts by requesting a one-year extension of the old contract.
If neither party exercises its rights, the parties shall enter into a
new agreement under a standard player contract, with the same
terms, except that salary shall be determined by arbitration.434
Hockey and baseball are the only sports that do not provide
for the drafting of players in their collective bargaining agree-
ment, who are initially entering the system. Since baseball is ex-
430. NHL Agreement, supra note 334, By-Law § 9A, I 8(b), reprinted in REPRESENT-
ING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 294.
431. Id, art. IX, reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at
273-77.
432. National Hockey League Standard Player's Contract, para. 17 (1974), reprinted in
REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 292.
433. Id, reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 292.
434. Id, reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 292.
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empt from the antitrust laws, there is almost no risk in
management retaining the draft as its exclusive prerogative. For
hockey, however, litigation is foreseeable in light of the Yazoo
Smith case.435 Management may avoid this possibility by adding
the draft provision to the agreement, thus creating the grounds for
claiming antitrust immunity under the labor exemption.
e. Soccer. The newest of the collective bargaining agree-
ments in sports has been negotiated in soccer. Although there are
both indoor and outdoor soccer leagues, the Major Indoor Soccer
League (MISL) has gone further in experimenting with free
agency than any other soccer league in the United States. The
collective agreement begins: "The parties agree to encourage free
movement of players between the NASL, MISL, and the ASL and
veteran free agents within the MISL.' 436 The agreement provides
that the standard contract will include a one year option, exercisa-
ble by the club, but it then stipulates: "At the end of the option
year, the player is completely free to seek employment from other
teams without any restriction. The clubs agree to deal with free
agents in good faith." '437 Except for the option, therefore, com-
plete free agency is a reality only in the MISL. It also should be
noted that the collective agreement provides for a draft of only
amateur players, not professionals from other leagues.438
The North American Soccer League (NASL) also recently ne-
gotiated a collective bargaining agreement, but only after a long
and bitter fight by the owners to avoid agreement.439 The agree-
ment contains other variations on the option and right of first re-
fusal mechanisms and it concentrates on players as they first enter
the league. Rookies entering into their first agreement with a club
must negotiate a contract in duration from six to twelve months.
The contract "shall also contain a double option permitting the
Club to renew the contract for two successive twelve month peri-
ods following the expiration of the initial term."' 0 The club then
435. See note 296 supra and accompanying text.
436. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Major Indoor Soccer League Players
Association and Major League Indoor Soccer League, art. XVIII (Oct. 8, 1979) (on fie at
Case Western Reserve Law Review).
437. Id, art. XIV.
438. Id, art. XV. "Veterans with NASL or ASL are not subject to the draft." Id
439. See Morio v. NASL, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980). See also text accompanying
notes 490-500 infra.
440. NASL Players Agreement, art. XLIH (1980) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as NASL Agreement].
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has the right of first refusal if another team offers a contract. This
right expires one year after the second option has expired. If a
player plays out the second option and signs with a team outside
the United States and Canada, the club losing the player is enti-
tled to compensation."
The NASL draft is also innovative. The agreement does not
specify the mechanics of the annual draft, but many general provi-
sions appear. In addition, a reentry draft is held for college and
high school players not signing within a year and a half of the
original draft. If a drafted player signs outside the NASL, the
team with draft rights holds him for one year and has a right of
first refusal for two years. The same holds true of players not
signing after the reentry draft.' 2
In conclusion, basketball, of all the sports discussed above,
seems to provide the greatest benefits for players. Given the indi-
vidual contract no-trade prohibition in the collective agreement,
trading may be the chief avenue for player mobility if old teams
match their rivals' bids. Declining gate revenue is ominous and
could undermine player expectations. While the salary escalation
in baseball seems to continue, compensation may slow the in-
creased demand for mediocre players. Hockey's idiosyncratic
practices and bargaining structure hamper clear analysis. Trends
are also difficult to discern in soccer, a young sport. In addition,
for the reasons stated, football seems headed for a showdown
when the players agreement expires in 1982.
2. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining
The subject matter negotiated between players and owners re-
lates to more than player mobility. Collective bargaining agree-
ments negotiated by players associations and teams cover a wide
spectrum. Some items such as medical benefits, termination pay,
meal money, moving expenses, life insurance, and pensions ap-
pear in many labor contracts. Other provisions are relatively pe-
culiar to sports in general or one sport in particular. These
provisions range from the most basic, such as allowing an individ-
ual player to negotiate for a salary above the minimum, to the
very specialized, such as basketball's provision requiring extra-
large beds for players on roadtrips.4 3 Basketball has included
441. Id, art. XLIV.
442. Id, art. XXVII.
443. NBA Agreement, supra note 392, art. V, § 1(c), at 9.
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clauses in its agreements prohibiting no-trade clauses in individ-
ual contracts, ' and most major sports include clauses establish-
ing the playing season schedule." 5 Problems have arisen in
baseball, however, because a number of players during the past
few years have announced their demands for renegotiation of
their individual contracts. 46
Controversy inevitably has arisen concerning what issues in
sports constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining under the
NLRA, which would oblige the parties to bargain to a point of
impasse.447 Section 8(d) of the NLRA imposes an obligation
on labor and management to "confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment
... ,44 The essential question is what subject matter this defi-
nition covers. While it is usually the players who urge that some
issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining, there are exceptions.
Over the last few years, several star players have threatened
not to play during the season unless contracts were renegoti-
ated." 9 The basketball agreement, however, states that both the
NBA and the players association,
agree that a Player who publicly demands a renegotiation of his
Player Contract, and who threatens to withhold the services he
has agreed to render under the Player Contract or to perform at
a level below his full capabilities unless such recognition takes
place, shall be considered to have engaged in conduct impair-
ing the faithful and thorough discharge of the duties incumbent
upon the Player within the meaning of paragraph 4 of the Uni-
form Player Contract.4
50
444. Id, art. XIV, at 13.
445. See, eg., NBA Agreement, supra note 392, art. X, at 12; NASL Agreement, supra
note 440, art. XXXVII, at 35-36; NHL Agreement, supra note 334, art. XXIII, reprinted in
REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 287-88; 1976 Baseball Basic
Agreement, supra note 355, art. IV, reprinted in REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS,
supra note 334, at 120-24.
446. Smith, Luis and His Agent, N.Y. Times, March 6, 1977, § 5, at 3, col. 5.
447. See, ag., NFL Management Council, 203 N.L.R.B. 958 (1973), remanded, 503
F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1974), Supplemental Decision and Order, 216 N.L.R.B. 423 (1975) (artifi-
cial turf and bench fines found to be mandatory subjects of bargaining).
448. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
449. A brief discussion of the renegotiation question appears in note 39 supra. In addi-
tion to the case where a player is simply dissatisfied with his contract and wants it changed,
there are cases where the player asserts he was promised an opportunity to renegotiate if
certain events occurred. This assertion obviously presents complications, and definitive
responses are not always easy to formulate. In one NBA case, the arbitrator essentially
held that, for a promise to renegotiate to be enforceable, it had to be in writing. NBA
(Chicago Bulls) v. NBA Players Ass'n (Robert E. Love) (Feb. 6, 1975) (Seitz, Arb.).
450. NBA Agreement, supra note 392, art. XX, § 4.
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The Uniform Player Contract provides for suspensions and fines
against the player in the event such conduct occurs.45
The question is whether the owners in other leagues could de-
mand bargaining over a similar clause. This question seems to be
answered in the affirmative since a no-strike clause is a mandatory
subject of bargaining,452 and these clauses are essentially no-strike
clauses. It thus may be concluded that owners in leagues other
than basketball could insist on an NBA-type clause to the point of
impasse.
The players have other perspectives. Clubs frequently have
taken the position that a unilateral change is a management pre-
rogative. Such a change is supposedly within the commissioner's
authority or entreprenurial judgment of how to sell the game to
the fans453 and, therefore, inappropriate for bargaining. 4  The
General Counsel of the Board has ruled that the size of basketball
rosters, for instance, is a mandatory subject because of its obvious
impact on employment opportunities.4-5 The owners might argue,
supposedly in response to consumers, that the impact on the play-
ers' employment is overriding.
In other significant cases, the Board has held that imposing
fines on players is a bargainable subject under the Act because
fines reduce compensation.456 In response to the argument that
artificial turf was more conducive to football injuries, the Board
found that the issue immediately related to employment and thus
the subject was bargainable.457 In another case, not appealed to
the Board because of a strike settlement, an Administrative Law
Judge considered whether changes in football punt rules and sud-
den death overtime rules were negotiable.45 8 The owners argued
that these changes made the product more appealing to fans.
451. NBA Uniform Player Contract, para. 20, reprintedin REPRESENTING THE PROFES-
SIONAL ATHLETE, supra note 42, at 54-56.
452. Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
453. See note 461 infra.
454. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (court held
nonmandatory issues in bargaining may not be insisted upon to point of impasse but may
be discussed).
455. The case proceeded to arbitration and was resolved against the National Basket-
ball Players Association. National Basketball Association (Nov. 1977) (Seitz, Arb.)
(unpublished).
456. See note 447 supra.
457. Id
458. National Football League Management Council v. National Football League
Players Ass'n, No. 2-CA-13379 (June 30, 1976) (Schneider, ALl), reprintedin REPRESENT-
ING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 299.
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Such modifications were analogous to automobile design changes
and, the argument continued, though managerial or entre-
prenurial judgment may affect employment opportunities, it is not
bargainable. The Administrative Law Judge rejected this argu-
ment on the ground that both rules increased the possibility of
player injury. The overtime "prolonged the period of time they
[players] are exposed to injury. . . . Overtime games lengthened
the player's hours of work, pro tanto reducing his pay for time
expended, and increased his exposure to injury."' 45 9
Employees in other industries may insist on bargaining to re-
duce workweeks inasmuch as both wages and employment condi-
tions are at issue. If baseball players, for example, were to bargain
for a seven inning game, they would be demanding a shorter work
day. The players already have set the number of games in their
collective agreement. The clubs would argue that this interest is
exclusively entrepreneurial and beyond the -scope of bargain-
ing-in part, because fans identify nine innings as integral to the
product.
The owners' argument is weakened, however, in light of their
record of alterations of baseball's structure. The owners, for in-
stance, instituted the designated hitter rule (DH) in the American
League-much to the consternation of baseball aficionados who
delighted in late inning pinch hit strategy, inevitably linked to
managerial judgments about the strength of the bull pen.460 The
rule altered key elements in the game-as did the lowering of the
pitching mound to improve the hitter's chances. The players as-
sociations argue that these rules affect both player performance,
salaries, and longevity. In essence, aspects of the game which di-
rectly affect playing conditions, once immutable, now are being
questioned. In the pitching mound example, where sore arms and
shoulders can be the price of change, the argument for character-
izing such matters as mandatory subjects of bargaining within the
459. Id, reprintedin REPRESENTING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 334, at 321-22.
460. Red Sox and Yankee fans, for example, vividly recall the final game of the 1949
regular season. The two teams entered the game tied for the league lead. Behind 1-0 after
seven innings, Boston manager Joe McCarthy had to decide whether to allow his pitcher,
Ellis Kinder, to bat. Kinder had limited the Yankees to four hits and the single run. Mc-
Carthy sent in a pinch-hitter, and the choice proved disastrous. The Red Sox failed to
score in their half of the eighth, and Kinder's first replacement, Mel Parnell, who had
pitched the previous day, promptly allowed a Yankee home run. The second Red Sox
replacement, Tex Hughson, allowed two more runs. Although Boston scored three times in
the top of the ninth, that was not enough to win. The Yankees won the game 5-3, and the
pennant. Yanks Ifh Red Sox in Season Fnale to ffm 161h American League Pennant,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1949, at 21, col 1.
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meaning of the NLRA is even more persuasive.46'
3. Unresolved Issues for Players and Their Associations
a. The unit. Employees of any "labor organization" may file
a petition calling for a vote to select their representatives in the
collective bargaining process. If the employees are petitioning for
representation and an election concerning a "labor organization"
within the NLRA's meaning, and if thirty percent of the employ-
ees in the appropriate unit vote to have a Board conducted
election, the Board must hold an election for workers in an appro-
priate unit or grouping.462
If a majority of players in the unit who vote in the Board con-
ducted election cast their ballots in favor of the union or associa-
tion, the Board certifies the union as the exclusive bargaining
agent for the unit. Sometimes craft or skilled workers may sever
themselves from the unit.463 It has been suggested that superstars
or players representing an occupational minority in sports, such as
pitchers in baseball, quarterbacks in football, and goalies in hock-
ey, ought to separate from the broader unit and bargain collec-
tively for themselves. The Board is not likely to allow this
separation. While most players in these positions have main-
tained a separate sense of identity-a criterion which the Board
considers in determining whether an occupational group should
become its own unit'-other criteria, such as the integration of
their tasks with the functions of the enterprise and the qualifica-
tions of a union experienced in representing them, make severance
seem unwise.
Another persistent issue is whether the appropriate unit or
grouping of players for collective bargaining purposes should be
defined according to club or league. This classification is particu-
larly important since many decisions are made on a league-wide
461. The Court, during the past year in First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 49 U.S.L.W.
4769 (June 22, 1981), has adopted what was previously only a concurring opinion of Justice
Stewart that the design of the product is clearly a management prerogative. Cf. Fiberboard
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The issue in baseball then is whether
the game is the product in the sense that it cannot be bargained over except where safety
issues are involved. See Gould, The Supreme Court'r Labor and Employment Docket in the
October 1980 Terr" Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLO. L. Rav. 1 (1981).
462. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18a (1975).
463. NLRA § 9(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1976).
464. In Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 397 (1966), the Board lists
maintenance of separate identity as one of six criteria to be considered in determining the
propriety of allowing craft unit severance.
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basis, specifically through the commissioner's office. When the
NFLPA petitioned the Board for a league-wide unit, naming the
commissioner as the employer's representative, the NFL was in-
duced to negotiate a consent agreement. This agreement provided
that a newly created entity, the NFL Management Council, would
serve as employer, thus eliminating any reference to the com-
missioner.465
The issue is important for two basic reasons. First, the com-
missioner purportedly acts as a neutral arbitrator. This position as
an impartial protector of the game's integrity would be seriously
undermined if he were regarded as a representative of the em-
ployer. It would be impossible for the NFLPA to negotiate re-
garding player mobility, in the form of reserve and option
provisions, because these decisions are made by the league or
commissioner. The same rationale applies to the draft and rules
relating to circumstances under which players may be waived and
traded. Approval of the standard player contract often comes
from the commissioner's office, which is often involved in discipli-
nary matters. 6
North American Soccer League"7 was the first sports case to
465. Ed Garvey, executive director of the NFLPA, testified before a congressional spe-
cial subcommittee that the 16-club NFL had been the only employer signatory to the first
collective bargaining agreement in 1968. In 1970, however, the owners refused to negotiate
unless the NFLPA agreed to amend its certification petition by deleting the league as a
joint employer. This refusal eventually resulted in the creation of the National Football
League Management Council. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 188, at 13-15.
466. As to approval of the Standard Player Contract, see, for example, NBA Uniform
Player Contract, para. 14:
This contract shall be valid and binding upon the Club and the Player imme-
diately .... If, pursuant to the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association,
the Commissioner disapproves this contract within ten (10) days after the filing
thereof in his office, this contract shall thereupon terminate and be of no further
force or effect ....
Id, reprintedin REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE, .supra note 42, at 52-53. The
requirements of the player contract have similar effect. NFL Player Contract, para. 19,
reprinted in REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE, supra note 42, at 27. This ap-
proach seems to ignore two cases where players were not held to contracts entered into by
them but repudiated before the commissioner's approval. See Detroit Football Club v.
Robinson, 186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La.), ag'd, 283 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1960); Los Angeles
Rams v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
The commissioner's disciplinary powers are accorded to him in the constitution and
bylaws of all leagues, though recent collective bargaining agreements have modified these
powers. Certain disciplinary powers often are alluded to in the player contract itself or
attached as addenda. See, e.g., NBA Uniform Player Contract, Excerpt from Constitution
of the Association, para. 35, reprinted in REPRESENTING THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE,
supra note 42, at 56-58.
467. 236 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1978), aj'd, 501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y.) aj'd, 632 F.2d 217
(2d Cir. 1980).
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confront the unit issue. The Board held that the league and the
clubs constituted a joint employer. Although the individual clubs
also might be deemed an appropriate unit on a club-by-club basis,
the joint employers were an appropriate unit within the meaning
of the NLRA. The Board particularly was influenced by the fol-
lowing factors: The commissioner conducts the annual college
draft and establishes the conditions under which a college player
may be signed to a professional contract; the commissioner may
disapprove the assignment of a player to another club if, in his
opinion, the agreement contains terms not in the league's best in-
terest 468 or if either part is guilty of conduct detrimental to the
league or the sport; the commissioner's approval must be obtained
for any player's waiver, and the commissioner will not approve
the contract termination if he determines that the league's interests
will suffer; and, under the standard player contract, the player
must comply with the applicable provisions of the league constitu-
tion, regulations, and bylaws.4 6 9 In addition, the Board found that
the clubs had considerable autonomy in certain aspects of their
employment relationships because numerous modifications were
allowable under the standard player contract. The clubs and the
league, therefore, were regarded justifiably as joint employers.
Whether the NSPA could be regarded as a "labor organiza-
tion" within the NLRA's meaning also was addressed. The own-
ers contended that the NSPA did not intend to act as an exclusive
bargaining representative since individual salaries still were nego-
tiable. The Board concluded that simply because agents bargain
on important salary items, a players association is not deprived
necessarily of labor organization status.470
b. Exclusiviy. Over a thirty-seven year period, the courts
and the Board followed the Supreme Court's lead in a series of
cases. These decisions established the union's preeminence as ex-
clusive bargaining representative and have collectivized practi-
cally all portions of the employment relationship where a union
has been selected by a majority of the employees. The Court,
fashioning a corollary to the broad authority given the union as
exclusive agent, has held that the union has a duty of fair repre-
sentation to all workers in the bargaining unit-whether union or
nonunion. The union must bargain and negotiate on behalf of its
468. Id at 1318.
469. Id at 1318-19.
470. Id at 1320.
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players without hostility, bad faith, or discrimination.471 Al-
though the meaning of these words is ambiguous,472 the union ap-
parently has broad discretion in negotiating collective bargaining
agreements and may recognize legitimate differences between dif-
ferent occupational groups.473 Just as a union may negotiate a
hiring hall or seniority provision in the collective bargaining
agreement without violating its duty of fair representation, it also
may negotiate maximum and minimum salary levels. Baseball
and basketball owners have had a particular interest in this ap-
proach.474 Although this policy seems to have been abandoned,
the NFLPA has been advocating wage and occupational senior-
ity-provided that the percentage of football revenues allocated to
player incomes is at least doubled.475 The extent to which high
salaried quarterbacks, for instance, would accede to such limita-
tions is highly problematic.
Issues arising out of the newly formed NASL have posed unu-
sual labor issues to professional sports. In J.Z Case v. NLRB, 476
the leading decision relating to the exclusivity doctrine, the em-
ployer executed individual contracts with approximately 75% of
his work force. The employer initially relied on these contracts as
a bar to a representation proceeding, but the Board directed an
election which the union won. The union then was certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees in the
appropriate unit. When the union sought to bargain with the em-
ployer, management offered to negotiate on matters not affecting
any rights under the individual contracts. All other matters would
be open for negotiation as the contracts expired. The union al-
leged that this refusal to bargain collectively constituted an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA. The Board agreed and ordered
the company to cease and desist from giving effect to or extending
the contracts in question and from entering into new contracts.
The Board further ordered the company to bargain on the subject
471. See, eg., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
472. See, eg., Rusicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
473. "A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining represen-
tative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338.
474. See Players Want Easier Route to Gain Free-Agent Status, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,
1979, at 17, coL 2.
475. See notes 346 & 425 sufra.
476. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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matter of the individual contracts. The Circuit Court of Appeals
enforced this order, and the Supreme Court affirmed.477 The
Court's rationale bears on some of the problems faced in the
sports cases.
The Court noted that the negotiation of the collective agree-
ment did not constitute an employment contract since no individ-
ual was employed under its terms. The labor contract created no
obligation to employ particular individuals. The Court stated:
The employer, except as restricted by the collective agreement
itself and except that it must engage in no unfair labor practice
or discrimination, is free to select those he will employ or dis-
charge. But the terms of the employment already have been
traded out. There is little left to individual agreement except
the act of hiring. This hiring may be by writing or by word of
mouth or may be implied from conduct. In the sense of con-
tracts of hiring, individual contracts between the employer and
employee are not forbidden, but indeed are necessitated by the
collective bargaining procedure.478
The Court believed that the individual hiring contract was
"subsidiary" to the terms of the collective agreement and workers
could not waive its benefits. The Court reasoned that once the
majority selected a union as exclusive bargaining representative,
advantages or disadvantages provided in individual contracts
would disrupt industrial peace and become a "fruitful way" of in-
terfering with the organization of workers.479
If, however, a union is designated as majority representative in
a professional sport with a tradition of individual contracts ad-
dressing salary and other compensation matters, the union might
seek to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement covering all
aspects of wages, hours, and working conditions. The union
might also negotiate a comprehensive agreement ultimately limit-
ing, but not necessarily eliminating, individual salary and com-
pensation negotiations.
The unions and associations in sports have taken a variety of
approaches to the relationship between the collective and individ-
ual agreement, especially as to compensation. Baseball, for in-
stance, has two provisions in the agreement on this subject. In
article II, the clubs recognize the association as bargaining repre-
sentative, but provide that "Special Covenants. . .[may]. . .be
included in individual Uniform Player's Contracts, which actually
477. Id
478. Id at 335-36.
479. Id at 336, 338.
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or potentially provide additional benefits to the Player." 80 The
basketball agreement provides that individual contracts may not
"provide for the waiver by a Player of any benefits or the sacrifice
of any rights to which the Player is entitled by virtue of. . .this
Agreement."48' Basketball has attempted to preclude amend-
ments to individual contracts.482
The soccer agreement is more ambitious and specific. The as-
sociation may "disapprove" an individual contract for any of the
following reasons: uncertainty or incompleteness in expression of
its terms; "any conflict" between its terms and the collective agree-
ment; the club, or one of its officials has "made or agreed to make
payment or convey anything of value to any firm or person for
legal or representational services provided to a player in connec-
tion with the negotiation of a contract;" and finally, failure to dis-
close to the union the identity of an agent, attorney, or other
representative. 83 The union is thus empowered to address abuses
of agents, such as payments to agents by clubs when the clubs
supposedly are representing the player's interests in an adversary
context.
The collective agreement also states: "[A]bsent an express
waiver by the Union, they [the League and clubs] could not nego-
tiate or execute agreements with individual players."'4 ' The labor
contract further states that when a club learns that a player or
prospective player is to be represented by an agent "it shall
promptly notify the Union.' '"4 The union has an "absolute right"
to attend all individual contract negotiations but no right to
thwart or delay these negotiations. The subject matter that may
be addressed in individual-club bargaining is specifically enumer-
ated.486 The Standard Player Contract may not be amended.
The union's concerns in this area are threefold. First, there are
the problems with agents alluded to above. Second, conflicts or
inconsistencies with the collective agreement may arise. Finally,
there may be an undermining of union goals through individual
negotiations. An example of the first and the third problems is the
increased use of deferred compensation, which may deflect player
480. 1976 Baseball Basic Agreement, art. IL re rintedin REPRESENNG PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS, supra note 334, at 119.
481. NBA Agreement, supra note 392, art. I, § 3.
482. See id § l(b).
483. NASL Agreement, supra note 440, art. XXIII, § 8.
484. Id § 1.
485. Id § 2.
486. Id §4.
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concern from pensions. Unless the union is able to control or in-
fluence such negotiations, it may be left with few subjects on
which to bargain. Agents frequently do not defer their fees after
negotiating such an agreement-a practice which seems particu-
larly inequitable when the deferred compensation is not
guaranteed.
With regard to agents, it is quite probable that players associa-
tions, particularly in football and soccer, will attempt to regulate
the conduct of agents. The allegation that a "spurious" labor or-
ganization of agents has conspired to "undermine the NFL play-
ers' ability to improve their incomes" by a wage schedule which
would adversely affect the agents' "profits," ' 7 has inspired anti-
trust litigation by the NFLPA against some of the agents. The
theory of the litigation, ironically, is predicated on the view that
the agents are entrepreneurs. If the associations are successful in
regulating agents through licensing fees, limitations on agents'
fees, and union member boycotts against agents who refuse to
comply, the associations then must contend that agents are not a
nonlabor group of businessmen to avoid antitrust liability. 88 This
argument is highlighted by the Court's decisions inAmerican Fed-
eration of Musicians v. Carroll4"9 and H. 4. Artists & Associates v.
Alctor's Equity Association ,490 where franchising arrangements and
the boycotts of nonmembers were held to be within the labor ex-
emption because unregulated agent fees would intensify wage
competition among union members. It is contended that in this
situation, "job hungry" athletes are prone to exploitation.
Problems will continue while the agents play an active role in this
process.
An important issue is whether an employer may retain and
honor individual employment contracts and enter into new con-
tracts with athletes who are being recruited while such negotia-
tions continue. The North American Soccer League litigation,
which preceded the agreement referred to above, addressed this
problem.49' In that case, the Board and the union took the posi-
tion that adherence to or negotiation of such individual contracts
was an unfair labor practice under the .Z Case theory.492 The
487. Upshaw v. Trope, Civil Action No. 80-03680 (C.D. Cal, Aug. 20, 1980).
488. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
489. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
490. 449 U.S. 991 (1981).
491. See note 166 supra.
492. See note 476 supra.
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Board's position was that the employer could not act unilaterally
as to wages, hours, and working conditions until the parties bar-
gained to an impasse. This restriction would apply irrespective of
the union's intent to contract collectively or individually. At the
point of impasse, the employer could rely on individual contracts
and relationships.493
In the context of temporary injunction proceedings4 94 insti-
tuted by the Board, the court in North American Soccer League495
adopted the above position. The injunction prevented future ne-
gotiation of individual contracts, and the court also ordered addi-
tional relief.496 The Second Circuit affirmed.497
In North American Soccer League, the clubs litigated the ap-
propriate unit issue through unfair labor practice proceedings,498
entered into individual contracts with players, and committed sev-
eral unfair labor practices49 9 subsequent to a secret ballot election
493. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
494. Section 10(j) of the NRLA provides:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in
subsection (b) of this section charging that any person has engaged in or is engag-
ig in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, within
any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have oc-
curred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate tem-
porary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court
shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall
have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order
as it deems just and proper.
29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1976).
495. 501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
496. Judge Motley also enjoined the league "[flrom giving effect to these individual
contracts of employment or any modification, continuation, extension or renewal thereof
'to forestall collective bargaining'" which were entered into prior to Sept. 1, 1978. Id at
640.
497. 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
498. Morio v. NASL, 501 F. Supp. at 635. Certification of unions as exclusive bargain-
ing agents may be reviewed by virtue of an employer's refusal to bargain. American Fed'n
of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
499. Judge Motley sets forth the unfair labor practices the North American Soccer
League had engaged in:
Respondents conceded that they have unilaterally changed the conditions of em-
ployment by requiring employees to obtain permission from their respective clubs
before wearing a particular brand of footwear other than that selected by each
Respondent Club; that they have changed the conditions of employment by initi-
ating plans for a new winter indoor soccer season which began in November,
1979 and ended in March, 1980; that they unilaterally changed conditions of em-
ployment by requiring employees to play or otherwise participate in the winter
indoor soccer season; that they unilaterally changed conditions of employment by
initiating plans to increase the 1980 summer outdoor soccer season by two games
and two weeks over the 1979 format, which is presently in operation; and that
they unilaterally changed employment conditions by initiating plans to reduce the
maximum roster of all the Respondent Clubs during the regular summer outdoor
1981]
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in which the union obtained a majority vote and the Board certi-
fied the union as exclusive bargaining agent. The unit issue even-
tually was resolved against the clubs. Meanwhile, 96.8% of the
individual player contracts were negotiated and entered into sub-
sequent to the union certification. The Board sought a remedy
which would render the individual contracts voidable at the
union's option. Judge Motley stated:
Respondents' claim that such power in the hands of the Union
... would result in chaos in the industry and subject Respon-
dents to severe economic loss and hardship since these individ-
ual contracts are the only real property of Respondents.
It should be noted . . . that the relief requested by Peti-
tioner is not a request to have all individual contracts declared
null and void. It should be emphasized that Petitioner is not
requesting that the "exclusive rights" provision of the individ-
ual contracts, which bind the players to their respective teams
for a certain time, be rendered voidable.5"
Judge Motley further ordered that contracts entered into
before the certification be rendered voidable. The purpose of this
remedy was to allow the collective bargaining process to function
effectively. It is important to note that the remedy was limited to
the portion of the agreement that did not affect the team's exclu-
sive right to a player and thus the reserve system.
The situation in North American Soccer League differs from
JZ Case in that the employer in the former case did not consider
the individual contract as a bar to collective bargaining over the
subject matter which was previously negotiated. The crux of the
employer's argument was that individual contracts may be entered
into during continuous negotiations. The Board's contention was
that Supreme Court authority precludes an employer from mak-
ing unilateral changes in conditions of employment until an im-
passe or deadlock develops.50 ' To permit the employer to
negotiate with the individual would undermine the union's status
as exclusive bargaining representative and erode its support
among the players in the unit. The subtle message to the players
is that the association is largely irrelevant and more likely a hin-
drance to their interests.
season from 30 players to 26 players beginning on or about October 16, 1979, and
continuing to the present.
501 F. Supp, at 637-38.
500. Id at 693.
501. In NRLB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Supreme Court held that unilateral
action by an employer without prior discussion with the union may constitute an unfair
labor practice in violation of § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
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Since there is no legal demarcation between the subject matter
covered by the individual agreement as opposed to the collective
agreement, a major concern is whether all the subjects discussed at
the bargaining table would be superseded by the individual con-
tract. The employer, in its dealings with some players, might ne-
gotiate some terms which would constitute an incursion into that
area which might be within the domain of the exclusive bargain-
ing agent in its collective bargaining.
If individual negotiations with players are an unfair labor
practice, notwithstanding its customary usage in the sports indus-
try, the remedy raises troublesome problems. The remedy, even
with the exclusive rights limitations, means that the union is in a
position to utilize the most effective economic pressure to coerce
the employer to accept its position. It raises problems somewhat
analogous to other labor law issues which have been resolved, per-
haps erroneously, against the unions.
For the past forty-three years, the Court has taken the position
that an employer may not only hire strikebreakers in the course of
the strike but also may replace strikers permanently with these
individuals. 50 2 The rationale is that the employer may show a
business justification in keeping production optimal. This justifi-
cation, under certain circumstances, outweighs the statutory poli-
cies supporting workers' rights to engage in strikes and other
forms of economic pressure to further their self-interest. The em-
ployer, therefore, may enter into individual contracts, notwith-
standing exclusivity considerations. If the employer's interest in
production outweighs the right to strike, then there can be signifi-
cant difficulties in reaching an accord with the union because the
union can bring the industry to a grinding halt until impasse by
voiding and refusing to enter into contracts involving both incum-
bents and applicants, until the dispute is resolved. The union has
an interest in protecting itself as an institution from infringement
through contracts embracing the same subject matter as the collec-
tive bargaining agreements. It is difficult, however, to view this
interest as more significant than the strike weapon itself, which
was made subordinate by the Court in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co. 5 3 The impact of North American Soccer League in
sports may signal the employer's inability to hire strikebreakers
unless the case is limited carefully to its facts. Hiring strikebreak-
502. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & TeL Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
503. Id
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ers should exist only as a remedy for unfair labor practices which
are likely to stultify future collective bargaining.
c. Individual v. Collective Interests. The case law of labor ar-
bitration addresses a number of important issues as it explores the
inner workings of a league. Cases which confront the tensions be-
tween the individual and the collective interest of the players are
of particular importance to this analysis. Individuals may not al-
ways be served best by collective action. The individual may be
able to obtain advantages for himself that run counter to agree-
ments forged between the union and management. These individ-
ual advantages often must be curtailed, as the earlier discussions
on the unit5° and exclusivity 505 have revealed. An examination
of some of these problems in the baseball context sharpens the
focus.
The Moore5 ° 6 decision arose out of a special covenant between
Alvin Moore and the Atlanta Braves. The National League Presi-
dent disapproved of this arrangement on the ground that the cove-
nant was "inconsistent" with the basic agreement.5 0 7  The
covenant stated that Moore could not be traded without his con-
sent and could become a free agent at the end of the 1977 champi-
onship season "if he so desires. ' 50 8 The players association
challenged the disapproval of the contract in a grievance.
The players association argued that the individual contract
could not be regarded as "inconsistent" with the collective agree-
ment since it accorded benefits not available under the basic
agreement. The clubs contended that the covenant struck "at the
very heart" of the negotiated reserve system. The argument was
that the Braves, by providing free agency for Moore without refer-
ence to the contractual scheme contained in the collective agree-
ment, ignored the other clubs' interest in maintaining a
competitive balance-the very objective of the negotiated reserve
system.50 9
At the time the grievance was filed, Moore did not have six
years service in the major leagues-a prerequisite to free agency
under the labor contract between the parties. The covenant,
504. See notes 462-70 supra and accompanying text.
505. See notes 471-503 supra and accompanying text.
506. Major Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n (Moore), No. 77-18 (Sept. 7, 1977) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review).
507. Id at 2.
508. Id
509. Id at 8.
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moreover, made no reference to the quota and compensation pro-
visions of the basic agreement. In response, the association noted
that the agreement contemplated free agency through methods
other than the reentry draft. By way of rejoinder, the clubs main-
tained that these other avenues were designed for players whose
careers were ending, younger players, players of marginal skills or
a default by the club.510 With regard to the former category, the
clubs contended that "[lt was never contemplated that promises
of outright release or termination would or could be used by indi-
vidual Clubs and Players as a negotiating device or bargaining
chip in order to evade the reentry procedure and other aspects of
the reserve system."511
The arbitration panel held there was no reason that Moore
could not negotiate conditional rights either to be traded or to be-
come a free agent. The opinion stated:
There is clear merit in the Association's argument that the
words 'additional benefits to the Player' should be liberally
construed to support a wide variety of benefits to a player over
and above the benefits accorded to him by the Basic Agree-
ment. Though covenants containing such benefits may be 'in-
consistent' with a particular provision of the Agreement dealing
with the same subject matter, there is logic in the Association's
argument that they are not, in fact, 'inconsistent' because Arti-
cle II authorizes such inconsistencies where they provide addi-
tional benefits to the Player. The evidence... suggests the
League Presidents have approved a number of special cove-
nants in this light, where the 'additional benefits to the Player'
were within the Club's power to bestow. 512
Inasmuch as the Braves were not terminating Moore for lack
of playing skill, the arbitrator decided that Moore could not es-
cape the reentry draft provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement. The procedure and "its related quota provisions pro-
tect the interests of all 26 Clubs and cannot be waived by the At-
lanta Club in the circumstances of this case. 513  The fact is,
however, that the modification of the length of service provisions
negotiated between Atlanta and Moore, and circumvention of the
reentry draft procedures, may affect the competitive balance in the
league so as to promote the interests of some other clubs. If, for
example, certain superstars became available earlier than pro-
510. Id at 11-12.
511. Id at 12.
512. Id at 14-15.
513. Id at 17.
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vided for in the collective agreement, the resulting bidding wars
would benefit wealthier teams such as the Yankees, Angels, and
Braves. If, in contrast, the number of talented free agents avail-
able depressed the market, the impact could be immediate and
substantial. In some instances, the players rather than the owners
would be adversely affected. It is thus difficult to establish a
clearly logical demarcation between length of service and other
aspects of the reentry draft since one element protects the clubs in
the league and the other does not. The Moore decision is proba-
bly the correct one. The additional benefits secured by individual
players must be reconciled with the overriding procedures estab-
lished by the collective agreement's reentry draft.
The second important case involved Mike Marshall, the 1974
Cy Young Award winner and erstwhile relief pitcher for the Min-
nesota Twins, among others.51 4 Marshall negotiated a special cov-
enant with the Twins which permitted him to become a free agent
after the 1978 season but "without regard to the compensation
provisions therein."5 5 The arbitrator, following Moore, con-
cluded that the compensation provisions were designed for the
benefit of all clubs and not merely the individual club which lost
the player to free agency. While the arbitrator conceded that the
club losing the player might waive its right to compensation, it
would not waive the "detriment" or "cost" that the signing club
would incur in the normal reentry draft procedure. 6
The recent Dave Winfield free agency episode created another
problem. The Yankees, fearful that they would not be one of the
thirteen teams able to draft Winfield, reportedly negotiated with
the Padres to provide for an agreement between the Yankees and
Winfield and a trade between the Padres and the Yankees based
on that deal.51 7 This alleged agreement circumvented the reentry
draft procedure and compensation and, in theory, imposed a cost
on the signing club. The players association, however, accepted
this procedure as compatible with the agreement because Winfield
was able to use the prospect of free agency, limited only by the
514. Major Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n (Marshall v. Minnesota Twins), No. 78-15 (Oct. 25, 1978) (unpublished) (on file at
Case Western Reserve Law Review).
515. Id at 2.
516. Id at 13-14.
517. See Yanks Seek to Land Win/feld Before He is a FreeAgent, N.Y. Times, Oct 22,
1980, § 2, at 5, col. 1; Winfield Optsfor Free Agency, Stalling Deal to Become Yankee, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1981, § 4, at 19, col. 4.
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amateur draft compensation, as a vehicle to bargain for acceptable
contract terms.
The final group of baseball-related cases involve option
clauses and right of refusal clauses in special covenants. In 1976,
Carlton Fisk, Rick Burleson, and Gary Maddox negotiated provi-
sions giving their respective clubs the right of first refusal at the
end of their contracts. Their theory was that a player could reap
the financial benefits of a bidding war while remaining with the
club in cities like Boston and New York where there are many
fringe benefits to being a famous ballplayer. The association ob-
jected to these convenants on the theory that they inevitably de-
press the bidding between clubs. An arbitrator took the position
that a right of first refusal "could not possibly produce anything
better than free agency."' 18 This position seems flawed given the
advantages that players might reap from such a provision. To
take an extreme example, players cannot waive their right to be
part of the free agent draft after six years, although they may do
so indirectly by entering into a long-term contract. The grievance
thus was settled in favor of the association 9-- a further step to-
ward collectivizing the relationship.
Another important variation on this theme of individual-col-
lective tension involves negotiated option clauses. The Carlton
Fisk award5 20 decided that substantial performance by the Red
Sox was not adequate to meet the option tender date of December
20 established under the collective agreement. 521 The arbitrator
rejected the club's reliance on extreme forfeiture as an excuse of
the condition since the Red Sox already had received Fisk's per-
formance for salary paid between 1976 and 1980. This rationale is
questionable in light of Fisk's inability to play during most of
1979-although Fisk played in 1980 under adverse circumstances.
The arbitrator's comment that free agency status for Fisk was an
"unfortunate consequence for the Club in comparison to the mi-
nor inconvenience to him flowing from the related contract
518. Decision of the Arbitration Panel, Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Chi-
cago Cubs (Tidrow), No. 80-18 (Nov. 4, 1980) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Re-
view) [hereinafter cited as Tidrow].
519. "The league presidents who originally approved the contracts [Lynn, Burleson,
Fisk, and Maddox] since have strickened those clauses." Chass, Miller Sees4 Ripoffin
Agents'Acts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1977, § C, at 25, coL 1.
520. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n (Fisk), No. 80-35, (Feb. 12, 1981) (unpub-
lished) [hereinafter cited as Fisk].
521. See note 378 supra.
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tender"522 understates the matter.
Another option clause case, the Tidrow arbitration,523 was of
more precedential value. Tidrow, prior to joining the Chicago
Cubs, signed a contract with the Yankees for 1977 to 1979 and
then in 1978 negotiated an extension for 1980. The contract pro-
vided for compensation, some of it deferred, and stated that the
club reserved the right to exercise an option on Tidrow's services
at a salary of $200,000 for 1981 by notifying Tidrow before De-
cember 20, 1980.524 The renewal option was exercised by a letter
dated August 28, 1980. The players association objected to the
renewal which purportedly blocked Tidrow's access to the reentry
draft on the ground that the special covenant containing the op-
tion did not constitute an actual or potential benefit to the
player.5 25 The club contended that Tidrow had executed a con-
tract for the succeeding season which was a contractual limitation
on free agency rights.
The arbitrator, however, held that the individual contract's
special covenants referred to the 1980 season.5 26 Tidrow thus
could not be deemed to have executed a contract for 1981. The
arbitrator also concluded that the agreement extracted from
Tidrow all irrevocable offers to enter into a future contract. More-
over, since the players association successfully resisted incorpora-
tion of an option year in the collective agreement as a prerequisite
to free agency--except for players like Fisk who had contracted
prior to August 9, 1976 527 .-the arbitrator found the bargaining
history to be "strong evidence" of an intent not to eliminate free
agency through an option clause.528
Since Moore held that a contract could be inconsistent and yet
acceptable if it provided an actual or potential benefit, further ar-
bitral inquiry was requested. The arbitrator discussed the conten-
tion that Tidrow had benefitted through the economic "package"
that he received with a guaranteed contract rather than the stan-
dard contract. Any detriment, reasoned the arbitrator, could be
offset by a potential benefit. The option clause, however, must
provide its own benefit. Tidrow, experienced in negotiations and
522. Fisk, supra note 520, at 20.
523. See Tidrow, supra note 518 and accompanying text.
524. Clubs' Memorandum, Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Chicago Cubs 3
(Tidrow), No. 80-18 (Nov. 4, 1980) (on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review).
525. Id at 14-15.
526. See Tidrow, supra note 518 and accompanying text.
527. See Tidrow, supra note 518, at 19.
528. See Tidrow, supra note 518, at 16.
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aware of free agency's benefits, could have perceived an option
clause as being more advantageous.
In making his determination, the arbitrator found the follow-
ing to be conclusive: "By remaining silent until the latter part of
1979 and retaining $100,000 in bonuses for signing the contract he
now seeks to overturn, Tidrow led the Cubs-who acquired his
contract in apparent good faith-to act in reliance on his evident
acceptance of all of its terms."52 9 Tidrow accordingly was es-
topped because of his tardy disavowal, his actual or constructive
knowledge that he was losing free agency, and detrimental reli-
ance by the Cubs. While the arbitrator stated that clubs might
attempt to circumvent the collective agreement through such cove-
nants as making optional renewal clauses a condition precedent to
all contracts, such was not the case in Tidrow. Tidrow is thus a
"narrow holding" which again emphasizes the tension between
collective and individual interests.
IV. THE 1980's AND "HIT 'EM WHERE THEY AIN'T"
"History teaches no lesson but change" said H.A.L. Fisher.5 30
Assuredly, change has been the key element in the professional
sports industries in the past few years. Visions of a straw-hatted
owner sitting contentedly in his first base box behind the dugout
and the players "aw shuckin'" it between chaws are fast fading.
The boys of summer-and of fall, winter, and spring-may come
to play, but they also come to be paid. These players bring with
them their agents and union representatives to back their de-
mands. Professional sports always have been considered com-
merce, Justice Holmes notwithstanding, but that commerce has
now been transformed into industry. In these industries, labor re-
lations are the focus, and the changes wrought by collective bar-
gaining are deep and decisive.
Nonetheless, collective bargaining is not the totality but is to-
day's catalyst. This bargaining makes the system work better than
any other tool now available, but there are also problems. The
manageability of the collective unit and its long term cohesiveness
still must be tested. The union may attempt to assert exclusive
control over the player-club relationship, but these attempts will
be challenged. The collective is not a monolith and may be dis-
529. Id
530. See Wyzanski, History and Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 237, 243 (1959).
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rupted by individual preferences. When these factors are com-
bined with other foreseeable impacts, more change is inevitable.
The developing technologies of cable television, satellite trans-
mission, videodiscs, and cassettes may alter the basic economics of
existing leagues and encourage the growth of rival leagues and
new sports. Leagues may form their own networks,531 just as a
host of other companies are invading the cable market and single
stations are turning themselves into superstations of national
transmission. Group efforts outside the sports structure may in-
tensify. Consumer interests may trigger governmental interven-
tion as a vehicle for change. Within the sports themselves, players
may demand a more direct share of the revenues while disagree-
ing over the division of those revenues. In some sports, the union-
agent dichotomy may accelerate and the very roots of the process,
now springing from collective bargaining, may be altered percep-
tibly. These observations are not meant to assert that all will
come to be, but, as judges have intoned in assessing consequential
damages issues, it is "not unlikely," it is a "serious possibility," it
"may well occur. '532
Wee Willie Keeler's axiom was "hit 'em where they ain't. '533
531. These formations already are occurring, at least at the club level in leagues, where
the individual franchise is allowed to pursue wide-based marketing of its product via cable
or other new technological advances. The Seattle Supersonics and the Boston Celtics are
two of the clubs clearly moving in this direction. See Craig, Celtics, Whalers Hope Cable
WillPay, Boston Globe, May 30, 1981, at 28, col. 1; Craig, Celtics Cable TVPlan Has Huge
Potential, Boston Globe, May 27, 1981, at 37, col. 1; Craig, Sonic Cable Idea Could.Boom,
Boston Globe, Feb. 28, 1981, at 28, col. 1. See generally Eskenazi, Cable TV Begins to
Make Big Changes in Professional Sports, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1981, § 5, at I, coL 1.
These ventures into cable are not always met with enthusiasm, particularly where the cable
system does not substantially service an area. See Craig, Realty of Cable a Jolt to Chicago
Fans, Boston Globe, Dec. 7, 1980, at 82, col. 1.
532. For expressions contained in the text above, plus other attempts at defining fore-
seeable consequential damages, see Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex.
1854); Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Indus., Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 540,
and The Heron U (Koufos v. Czarnikow, Ltd.), [1967] 3 All E.R. 686.
533. It is fitting to conclude with a note about William Henry Keeler. Like the players
associations, Keeler seemed to have a propensity toward overcoming obstacles. At five-
foot-four, Keeler had to rely on skils-other than those attributable to physical
size-namely, speed, brains, and ability to make contact with the bail Starting as a profes-
sional in 1892, Keeler, a left-handed third baseman, hardly had a propitious beginning.
Nevertheless, he eventually developed into one of the all-time great right fielders. With
John McGraw, Keeler led the old Baltimore Orioles to championships in the 1890's with
aggressive play and the development of two great additions to the game-the hit-and-run
and the "Baltimore chop." Wee Willie still holds the record for most singles in a season,
202 in 1898. Overall, Keeler collected 2,955 career hits and a .345 career average. "Keeler
was perhaps the most accurate placehitter in the history of the game .... D. WALLOP,
supra note 35, at 73. He hit 'em where they weren't.
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This axiom has been an inspiration for today's players as well-if
not on the field, at least at the negotiating table, before the arbitra-
tor, in court, or on the picket line. Where the owners have said,
"they can't be serious about striking," the players have been.
Where the owners have said, "a judge (or an arbitrator) would
never decide it that way," the players have pressed the issues and
have won more than they have lost. Where the owners have said,
"we'll never agree to that term," the combined leverages of persis-
tence, litigation, arbitration, and walkouts have forced agreement.
The intriguing question is how long this leverage will persist. Will
the 1980's continue to be the era of the players hitting 'em where
they ain't? Or will the owners finally find a reliever from their
bullpen who can come in and put out the fire. Whatever, there
will be another game tomorrow-at least until the next strike.
